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Dissertation Abstract 
Although actual human omniscience is unimaginable, it is not obvious what it means to 
be limited with regard to thought. One of Kant‟s significant contributions to epistemology was 
his redefinition of the limits of thought. He is explicit about this when he contrasts human, 
receptive intuition, and the creative intuition that an infinite being would have. Importantly, 
judging and reasoning are only necessary for a mind that is first affected by an object through 
sensibility, which is not the case for a being with creative intuition, since this kind of intuition 
creates its own object. This means that the intellect of Kant‟s God is distinct from the human 
intellect in kind, since judging and reasoning are essentially finite (or what I will call „non-
omniscient‟) activities; they are already evidence of a finite, human cognition.
1
 In contrast, 
Aristotle argues that human cognition - beyond its capacity for discursivity -  is able to 
contemplate; as we will see, Aristotle argues that contemplation is divine, and so a limited 
intellect can become more or less like an omniscient intellect depending on the quality of one‟s 
contemplative life. In this work, I want to 1) establish that Kant and Aristotle have incompatible 
conceptions of non-omniscience, 2) trace the epistemological commitments that motivate their 
rival positions on non-omniscience, 3) show that their particular views on the legitimacy of 
metaphysical judgments presuppose their particular interpretations of non-omniscience, and 4) 
argue that Kant provides a superior analysis of non-omniscience. 
                                                          
1
 For reasons that will become clear in Chapter 5.D, it is important that judging and reasoning are the only ways for 
human cognition to be active. 
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Project Introduction 
The West has a long tradition of associating human reason and divinity. Plato‟s Socrates 
recommended that “…we should make all speed to take flight from this world to the other, and 
that means becoming like the divine so far as we can, and that again is to become righteous with 
the help of wisdom” (Th 176b).
2
 Aristotle believed that „the intellect is divine,” and so “the life 
in accordance with it is divine” (NE 1177b30-1).
3
 Two millennia did not change the intellectual 
culture much, for Spinoza expresses a similar sentiment: “[i]t is in the nature of reason to regard 
things as necessary… But this necessity is the very necessity of God‟s eternal nature. Therefore 
it is in the nature of reason to regard things in this light of eternity” (Ethics II.44).
4
 They were of 
course not trying to say that human intellect might become similar to a divine intellect, but that 
divine cognition operates as an ideal for human cognition. It makes no difference that this goal is 
unattainable; what is important is that some are closer than others. This type of thinker would 
believe that I may become omniscient in the same way that I may run faster than the speed of 
sound. The inevitable failure to become omniscient is simply a way to express the condition of 
frail, human reason. 
Although it is now out of fashion to be this theologically explicit, Henry Allison observes 
that this model of knowledge is possible without a belief in the existence of God because the 
knowledge that a hypothetical God would have can still be used as a measuring stick: “human 
knowledge is judged by the ideal standard of divine knowledge and found wanting” (22).
5
  
Allison calls this the theocentric view of knowledge; this classification is reasonable because on 
                                                          
2
 The Collected Dialogues of Plato. Edited by Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns. Princeton University Press; 
Princeton, New Jersey, 1985 ed. Theaetetus translated by F.M. Cornford. 
3
 The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation. Edited by Jonathan Barnes. Volume Two. 
Bollington Series LXXI.2; Princeton University Press. Nicomachean Ethics translated by W.D. Ross.  
4
 Spinoza, Baruch. The Ethics (II, prop 44, Proof of Corollary II). Translated by Samuel Shirley. Hackett Publishing 
Company; Indianapolis/Cambridge, 1992 ed. 
5
 Allison, Henry. (1983). Kant’s Transcendental Idealism: An Interpretation and Defense. New Haven: Yale 
University Press, p. 22. 
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this model, human knowledge is divine knowledge writ small; conversely, divine knowledge is 
human knowledge writ large. Allison points out that Kant interprets knowledge differently. 
Kant‟s alternative model becomes clear when he contrasts a human, receptive intuition with the 
creative intuition that an infinite being would have. Importantly, discursive reasoning (that is, 
thinking or judging) is only necessary for a mind that is first affected by an object through 
sensibility, which is not the case for a being with creative intuition, since this kind of intuition 
creates its own object. This means that the intellect of Kant‟s God is distinct from the human 
intellect in kind, since thinking is essentially a finite activity; thinking is already evidence of 
finitude. Thus, Allison calls Kant‟s model of knowledge „anthropocentric.‟ For Kant, divine 
knowledge cannot even serve as an ideal to which human knowledge may aspire.  
Aristotle, like Kant after him, considers the nature of divine mental activity and then 
compares and contrasts human thinking. He says in reference to contemplation - the highest form 
of mental activity - that “God is always in that good state in which we sometimes are” (Meta 
1072b24).
6
 Although it is quite controversial in the secondary literature, I want to establish that 
this really means what is seems to mean, namely that (some) humans literally have the capacity 
to engage in the same activity in which God does, if only for short periods of time and about 
fewer things. Aristotle means that human reason is divine, and so a human intellect can become 
more or less like an omniscient intellect depending on the quality of one‟s contemplative life. 
Allison has labeled Kant‟s model of knowledge „anthropocentric‟ and Aristotle‟s 
„theocentric.‟ Since I am not interested in knowledge per se, but rather with the limits of 
knowledge compared with omniscience, I will characterize these models as competing 
interpretations of non-omniscience. Aristotle‟s model of non-omniscience may be called „degree 
                                                          
6
 The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation. Edited by Jonathan Barnes. Volume Two. 
Bollington Series LXXI.2; Princeton University Press, 1984, ed. Metaphysics translated by W.D. Ross. 
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non-omniscience,‟ since human reason differs from divine reason by degree. Kant‟s may be 
called „kind non-omniscience,‟ since human and divine reason are different sorts of things. 
Another way to characterize this difference is to note that Kant and Aristotle have different ways 
to answer this question: As we acquire knowledge of the world, do we approach omniscience? 
The advantage of putting the matter this way suggests that their positions are contradictories and 
not contraries. 
While I want to explore the epistemological presuppositions of these rival models of non-
omniscience, my deeper interest concerns the human potential to make metaphysical judgments 
that result in knowledge.
7
 I take up a version of a question that Kant first asked: why do we 
believe that we have a right to make metaphysical judgments?
8
 There seems to be a great 
majority of philosophers, to say nothing of other academics and certainly non-academics, who 
believe in our right to metaphysics. An important word of warning: it is not the case that 
someone who believes in our right to metaphysical judgments will necessarily be optimistic 
about the possibility of metaphysical knowledge. It is consistent for someone both to believe that 
some metaphysical judgments are legitimate (that is, that we have a right to them) and also to be 
pessimistic that those judgments will ever be known, because for judgments to be known they 
must be justified. Consider a religious believer who believes that human reason will never be 
able to justify a metaphysical judgment. She may, however, believe that divine revelation 
imparts such judgments truly. So, for example, she could believe in free will because of a 
religious conviction, but believe that philosophical metaphysics will probably never justify this 
belief. This is an example of someone who believes that some metaphysical judgments are 
                                                          
7
 Kant everywhere emphasizes that some metaphysical judgments are legitimate provided that they are pure 
postulates of moral reason (namely, God, the soul, and freedom). These, however, are practical metaphysical 
judgments that do not result in knowledge. Only the latter type are illegitimate.  
8
 Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Pure Reason. Translated and Edited by Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood. The 
Cambridge Edition to the Works of Immanuel Kant: Critiqueof Pure Reason. Cambridge University Press, 1998 ed., 
A84/B116 
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legitimate but is pessimistic about metaphysical knowledge. In what follows, I try to prove that it 
is Aristotle‟s and Kant‟s rival notions of non-omniscience that necessarily lead them to different 
positions on the legitimacy of metaphysical judgments. 
Following Allison, I believe that Kant presents the most explicit and compelling 
argument for kind non-omniscience, and so my decision to allow Kant to represent this position 
is understandable. Although there are no shortage of rivals in the history of philosophy to Kant in 
this respect, I have chosen Aristotle in particular because his position is easily compared and 
contrasted with Kant‟s for several reasons (some of which I will have to argue): 1) they both 
explicitly confront the question of non-omniscience; 2) they both posit an omniscient intellect 
and then discuss the manner in which the finite, human intellect is different; 3) they have 
relevantly similar conceptions of omniscience; 4) they in fact believe differently about 
philosophy‟s right to metaphysical judgments; and finally 5) Aristotle‟s epistemology presents a 
unique challenge that Kant did not fully comprehend, which means that it is will be necessary for 
me to rearrange Kant‟s classification of metaphysical arguments to show how even Aristotle is 
wrong about non-omniscience. 
And there is a sixth reason that Kant and Aristotle prove to be such interesting opponents. 
Although most of the story I want to tell emphasizes the differences between these thinkers, it is 
interesting that their arguments unfold from similar yet uncommon places. First, Kant and 
Aristotle share the intuition that knowledge of the sensible world is not just possible, but 
ordinary; what is more, this should be obvious to anyone. Both thinkers indicate that their 
epistemological optimism and the disdain of skepticism that it entails were present even before 
they had identified and formulated an argument to refute the skeptic.
9
 This, however, is quite 
                                                          
9
 Kant characterized the Transcendental Deduction as the most difficult of all of his arguments to construct, which 
indicates that he knew what his goal was before he figured out how to argue for it. Aristotle appears to believe that 
 x 
 
different from the famous foot-stomping of G.E. Moore, who insisted that the skeptic was wrong, 
and his justification for his claim was that people do in fact know many things. What Moore 
shares with Kant and Aristotle is the basic intuition that a good epistemologist must figure out 
what has gone so wrong with the skeptic‟s argument that he has managed to lose sight of the 
most astonishing epistemological truth of all: that we find ourselves with the kinds of minds that 
are able to investigate the world. But Moore does not offer any real evidence for his belief, while 
Kant and Aristotle both make the kind of arguments that, if sound, would refute a skeptic. 
So in order to support their basic intuitions, Kant and Aristotle must give arguments to 
show that knowledge of the sensible world is possible. Here we find another important similarity 
in the way they carry out their task, for they were impressed by the same epistemological aporia 
concerning the possibility of experience (i.e. the acquisition of ideas). Both think of themselves 
as carving out a middle ground between the theory of innate ideas on the one hand, and the 
model of the mind as a blank slate on the other. Kant‟s version of this maneuver is better known 
(or rather, it is usually thought that this move is properly Kantian), but this is precisely how 
Aristotle characterizes the roots of his own insights in the Posterior Analytics:  
[consider] whether the states are not present in us but come about in us, or whether they 
are present but escape notice. Well, if we have them, it is absurd; for it results that we 
have pieces of knowledge more precise than demonstration and yet escapes notice. But if 
we get them without having them earlier, how might we become familiar with them and 
learn them from no pre-existing knowledge? For that is impossible…It is evidently 
impossible, then, both for us to have them and for them to comes about in us when we are 
ignorant and in no such state at all (99b24-b31).
10
 
 
Aristotle, like Kant, stood against the orthodox thinking of his time that believed that empiricism 
and rationalism exhausted the possibilities of accounting for the origin of ideas. They found them 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
the skeptic‟s position is simply an intellectual hurdle that must be overcome, rather than a serious possibility to be 
considered. 
10
 The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation. Edited by Jonathan Barnes. Volume Two. 
Bollington Series LXXI.2; Princeton University Press. Posterior Analytics  translated by Jonathan Barnes. 1984 ed. 
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both insufficient, and set out to chart their own course. With similar beginnings to their careers 
as epistemologists, it is no small wonder that they ended up defending contradictory positions on 
the nature of human non-omniscience and the possibility of metaphysics. 
Chapter Contributions 
 
Kant‟s position on the nature of non-omniscience is relatively straightforward: human 
intuition is receptive, unlike God‟s intuition, which means that human cognition is essentially 
different from God‟s. Quite the opposite is true regarding the meaning of Aristotle‟s notion that 
the intellect is divine, henceforth called „the divinity thesis;‟ thus, the goal of Part One is simply 
to understand the meaning of this thesis. Aristotle says that „God is in that good state in which 
we are sometimes.‟ Could he mean this as it sounds? Is it possible that Aristotle actually believes 
that humans have a manner of thinking available to them that is identical to God‟s? There are at 
least three problems that threaten to undermine the very intelligibility of his account, although all 
of these problems arise from what I will argue are interpretive shortcomings. The first difficulty 
is that if the intellect is divine, how could it be expressed in the context of a human life? As I will 
argue, even Aristotle‟s most sympathetic commentators give interpretations of this human-yet-
divine life of contemplation that render his account of it untenable.  
Second, traditional scholarship has a misguided notion of Aristotle‟s analysis of the 
difference between the human capacities of intuition and discursive reasoning, which leads to a 
misunderstanding of his doctrine of human contemplation. What Aristotle means, I argue, is that 
contemplation is intuition and not discursive thinking, but intuition that is active and not 
receptive (and therefore passive) because it does not depend on being actualized by any form in 
the external world. Finally, Aristotle‟s notion of continuity between human and divine reasoning 
will be undermined if it turns out that God, when God contemplates, contemplates nothing but 
 xii 
 
God‟s own self. On the contrary, God‟s contemplation consists of active intuition of the forms of 
the world, which is the very same activity in which some humans sometimes participate. The 
resolutions of these problems constitute Chapters 1, 2, and 3, respectively. Taken together, these 
three chapters will clarify the meaning of Aristotle‟s divinity thesis, which will therefore also 
clarify his doctrine of finitude.  
 Part Two (Chapters 4 and 5) is given the task of showing why Kant and Aristotle have 
similar interpretations of omniscience but incompatible interpretations of non-omniscience. 
While it is true that there is little scholarly debate on what Kant‟s position on what the nature of 
human finitude actually is, an account of why he holds this position is not as common. In 
Chapter 4, I find that Kant‟s interpretation of non-omniscience depends on his unique 
understanding of spontaneity. For Kant, cognition is partly receptive and partly spontaneous, and 
therefore, any analysis of cognition must respect both capacities. Importantly, Kant finds that 
both the categories and the formal intuition are products of spontaneity. This feature of Kant‟s 
epistemology, as noted by Henry Allison, implies epistemic limits, since human cognition must 
have epistemic conditions. Furthermore, Allison points out that this commits Kant to a unique 
understanding of the limits of human knowledge – a position which I have named „kind non-
omniscience.‟  
The beginning of Chapter 5 consists of an analysis of Kant‟s intellectus archetypus (to 
match Aristotle‟s analysis of divine cognition, which constitutes Chapter 3), and a direct 
comparison of their two conceptions of divine omniscience. Here I argue that whatever 
differences between their conceptions of omniscience there may be, they both have in mind an 
intellect that has complete, active, intuitive understanding of the world. In the context of the 
discussion of intuitive understanding, I return to the topic of spontaneity at the end of Chapter 5; 
 xiii 
 
in Chapter 4, I argued that Kant‟s notion of spontaneity is consequential for his understanding of 
the nature of non-omniscience. But this is potentially misleading, because discursivity is 
spontaneous in a certain respect; furthermore, as I have shown, Aristotle‟s notion of active 
intellectual intuition is spontaneous in the same measure. The important difference is that for 
Kant, spontaneity is a priori, while for Aristotle (and for the Western philosophical tradition 
generally), spontaneity is a posteriori; that is, cognition becomes active after objects are given to 
it. The reason for this difference, I argue in 5.D, is Kant‟s denial of passive intellectual intuition 
as a human faculty. The upshot is that when Kant talks about spontaneity, he always has in mind 
a priori spontaneity that necessitates that human cognition is constitutive of objects as they 
appear, as opposed to how they are in themselves. Therefore, Kant‟s position on the nature of 
non-omniscience may be traced back to a single, detrimental belief, namely, that intuition is 
never intellectual. 
Part Two is not normative, since there, I merely explain which of Kant‟s epistemological 
commitments gave rise to his doctrine of non-omniscience, without passing judgment on whether 
those commitments are justified. Part Three (Chapters 6 and 7) is essentially different, as I 
consider there whether we should believe Kant when he says that intuition cannot be intellectual. 
Although it is not obvious, one way to evaluate Kant‟s position on the impossibility of 
intellectual intuition is to evaluate his doctrine of legitimate judgments, because if he is right 
about what concepts may not be employed in a legitimate judgment (i.e. conceptions of the thing 
in itself), this gives considerable weight to his position on intellectual intuition. Thus, Chapter 6 
begins with an exposition of Kant‟s doctrine of legitimate judgments (DLJ). At the end of the 
chapter, I consider a potentially devastating rejoinder to Kant‟s position; it seems that Kant‟s 
DLJ depends on the idea that intellectual intuition is impossible because objects can only be 
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given to us through affection, and the only kind of affection is sensible affection. However, as 
Chapter 2 shows, Aristotle believes that objects are given to the intellect through affective 
intuition. It does not appear that Kant, at any point in his career, justifies his belief that 
intellectual intuition could never be affective; hence, his entire position seems to be dogmatic, 
for the DLJ first requires us to believe that intellectual intuition is impossible.  
Chapter 7, however, redeems Kant‟s position on non-omniscience by showing that the 
“antinomies of pure reason” provide an independent (and thus non-dogmatic) justification for his 
position on non-omniscience. Here, the first premise of the argument is that if intellectual 
intuition is possible, then it is possible to know things as they are in themselves. However, when 
we presuppose that there is no difference between appearance and things in themselves, reason 
commits itself to antinomial judgments, which can be made compatible only by dropping the 
presupposition of transcendental realism. This means that we are obligated to accept Kant‟s 
doctrine of the impossibility of human intellectual intuition, and all that this doctrine implies, 
namely transcendental idealism, epistemic conditions, spontaneity, and Kant‟s unique doctrine  
of non-omniscience. 
 
 
  
 2 
 
Chapter One: A Divine Life 
Chapter Summary by Section 
A. The Difficulty of the Divinity Thesis. This chapter concerns the first of three potential 
difficulties in properly accepting Aristotle‟s divinity thesis (that the intellect is divine), 
namely the apparent incompatibility of theoretical rational activity and practical rational 
activity.   
B. Two Excellences. The origin of this problem is that Aristotle identifies two ways that 
humans can engage in excellent rational activity. 
C. Two Excellences, Two Lives. Against the compatibilists, I argue that a single human 
being cannot live lives oriented toward both theoretical and practical excellence. Thus, 
the two excellences require two separate lives. 
D. The Problem with Incompatiblism. Having shown that compatibilism can‟t work, I 
identify three incompatibilists: Cooper, Kraut and Lear. Cooper and Kraut are both forced 
to believe that Aristotle never meant to recommend the practical life, an idea that I find 
implausible. Lear is better here, but he ends up saying that practical excellence is 
recommended insofar as we are soul/body composites, and theoretical excellence is 
recommended insofar as we are mental beings. But in that case, Lear is forced to say that 
Aristotle was not really recommending the life of theoretical excellence to any actual 
person since any actual person is a composite. 
E. Beasts, Humans, Gods: Life Inside and Outside the Polis. Here I argue that the only way 
to resolve this conflict is to believe that Aristotle variously recommended the life of 
slavery, or of practical excellence, or of theoretical excellence based on whichever one of 
the three particular natures that a given person has. Some people flourish in the highest 
degree by being slaves, some flourish through ethical activity, and some flourish through 
philosophy. Thus, my version of incompatibilism avoids the awkward conclusions with 
which the other incompatibilists find themselves. 
 
 3 
 
A. The Difficulty of the Divinity Thesis 
 Jonathan Lear worries that it 
is so hard for a modern reader to take seriously…Aristotle‟s claim that man has a divine 
element in him. If we think of man as that earthy, embodied animal we know so well, it is 
hard not to think that the bulk of the Nicomachean Ethics provides one of the great 
descriptions of all times of the life available to him. From this perspective, the end of the 
Ethics looks like an unworked-out appendage, perhaps (one hopes) tacked on by a witless 
editor (Lear 319).
11
  
 
Lear is referring to book X of the Nicomachean Ethics, where Aristotle makes a shift in 
emphasis which is by all accounts difficult to predict. He has spent the preceding eight books 
affectionately describing the political life, which cultivates practical or ethical excellences, such 
as justice, courage, and generosity. Then with barely one page of warning Aristotle pronounces 
the happiness of this life as happiness “in a secondary degree” (NE 1178a7).
12
 Happiness in the 
highest measure comes from leading the life according to the intellect.
13
 Thus, Lear worries that 
it may seem that the Nicomachean Ethics “remains torn between two ideals, the ethical and the 
contemplative lives” (Lear 319).  
There are two general ways to address this problem. The first may be called 
compatibilism, whose adherents believe that the two ideals are compatible because they are, 
according to Aristotle, properly manifest in the context of a single life. If the best life for humans 
in general is one that both contemplates and participates in the life of the polis, then human 
activity will be divine at times, and human at others. It is perhaps tempting to advance this 
interpretation. After all, it was Aristotle himself who taught us about moderation. Surely life 
                                                          
11
 Lear, Jonathan. (1994) Aristotle: The Desire to Understand. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University 
Press.  
12
 The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation. Edited by Jonathan Barnes. Volume Two. 
Bollington Series LXXI.2; Princeton University Press. Nicomachean Ethics translated by W.D. Ross 
13
 I do not find any of the following phrases to be misleading translations of „ ὁ καηὰ ηὸν νοῦν βίορ‟: the life of 
contemplation, the contemplative life, the life according to the intellect, the life of  intellectual excellence, the 
philosophical life, the life of the philosopher, the life according to the mind, etc. Therefore, I will use them 
interchangeably throughout this work, mostly for rhetorical purposes. In the same measure, I will use several 
renderings of „the political life.‟ 
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would be immoderate if one contemplated all the time while neglecting ethical life entirely. But 
as I will show, Aristotle does not address moderation in the context of contemplation because it 
would have undermined his argument for happiness as the chief good. If contemplation, which is 
the activity of the mind,
14
 is the chief happiness of the philosopher, then at best ethical action 
would merely be a derivative good. That is, any happiness derived from ethical action would be 
good only insofar as it furthered one‟s true goal of contemplation. If true, this would undermine 
any position that identifies the two ideals as part of a single life. 
The other strategy, which is Lear‟s, can be labeled „incompatibism‟ because it is the view 
that two excellences can only be cultivated in two separate lives. The incompatibilist does not 
have the aforementioned problem of the compatibilist because it is not necessary to explain how 
a single person could have two final goods. However, this brings out perhaps a more awkward 
problem. If the life according to ethical excellence is happy in the second degree, then it does not 
seem that anyone should live this life unless it were somehow possible to wish to be less happy. 
It will therefore not be surprising when we encounter three incompatibilists who conclude (or are 
forced to conclude)
15
 that Aristotle‟s ethics are hopelessly fractured. This will prepare the ground 
for my own position that the life one should lead is relative to one‟s particular human nature.  
B.  The Two Excellences 
The origin of the problem can be traced to Aristotle‟s most basic ethical convictions, 
found in the first book of the Nicomachean Ethics. In order for ethics to exist and be objective, 
there must be some standard of evaluation by which an action may be judged. It is possible to 
identify a standard if a thing has a characteristic activity, for if it has a characteristic activity, 
then it is possible to judge whether that characteristic activity is being completed poorly or 
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 Lear thinks that his incompatibilism does not mean that the NE is hopelessly fractured, as other incompatibilists 
do. However, I will argue that his incompatibilism still threatens to undermine the coherency of Aristotle‟s advice. 
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excellently. In the case of an organism such as an eye, it is easy to identify its characteristic 
activity as seeing, and so on with most other parts of a body. A harpist also has a characteristic 
activity, although in most cases only a good music critic would be in a position to evaluate the 
quality of the harping. But even the non-music critic is confident that such a standard exists. 
Unlike harpists or eyes, however, it is not immediately clear if there is a characteristic activity of 
a human qua human, and if there were, how it could be found. 
 Aristotle begins by recognizing that if there is something that characterizes human 
activity, it cannot be an activity that is shared by other species. For example, reproduction cannot 
be the characteristic activity of human beings. That clearly does not set the human species apart 
because we share that characteristic with non-human animals. This also rules out the human 
capability to turn food into nourishment: “the excellence of this seems to be common to all and 
not specifically human” (NE 1102b4). But even though these activities themselves are not 
characteristically human, Aristotle gleans an important observation from them which orients his 
search for a human function. He observes that rational activity permeates all human activity (NE 
1098a3), including the activities that we share with plants and animals. Humans, like plants, take 
in food and turn it into nourishment, but humans deliberate about with what to nourish ourselves. 
It is possible for a person to worry that consumption of junk food will lead to unhealthiness, and 
wishing to avoid this end, we decline the junk food. Similarly, the perceptual capacity of some 
mammals is not significantly different than that of humans in-itself, except that humans are able 
to turn perception into memories, and then experiences, and then ideas.  
Apparently relying on this observation, Aristotle concludes that “the function of man is 
an activity of soul in accordance with, or not without, rational principle…” (NE 1098a6-7). The 
identification of the function as rational activity is easily combined with the arguments that have 
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come before: one can judge another‟s activity by judging whether the characteristic activity is 
being done well or poorly: “human good turns out to be activity of soul in conformity with 
excellence…” (NE 1098a16-7).  
But even if we can agree that human beings should engage in rational activity, there are 
two further difficulties with applying this standard to any particular human life. The first is that 
Aristotle identifies not one but two ways to manifest rational activity. Aristotle identifies one 
kind of activity as rational activity because it is possible to engage our mind, that is, reason, “in 
the strict sense and in itself” (NE 1103a2). This activity can be called theoretical, and it is 
rational activity in-itself. But there is another way in which we can engage in rational activity. 
This is true despite the fact that Aristotle is unable to find another rational element in our soul. It 
cannot be the nutritive faculty, for neither is the nutritive faculty rational, nor does it have a share 
in reason. There is only the appetitive part of our soul remaining: “there seems to be another 
irrational element in the soul – one which in a sense, however, shares in a rational principle” (NE 
1102b13-14).  
The appetitive element shares in the rational part of the soul in the sense that it obeys it or 
not, in the same way that the one has “a tendency to obey as one does one‟s father” (NE 1103a3). 
There is then, another activity that requires the use of our rationality, for only the rational part of 
our soul is able to command the appetitive part and keep it in line: “the appetitive and in general 
the desiring element in a sense shares in [the rational principle], in so far as it listens to and 
obeys it” (NE 1102b30-31). And so there are two ways that human beings participate in rational 
activity. The first is theoretical, since it exercises reason in itself; the other is practical, since in 
controlling desires, it inevitably dictates how one interacts with others: “Excellence, then, [is] of 
two kinds, intellectual and moral” (NE 1103a14). 
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A second problem is that this still does not yield a standard of evaluation by which we 
can judge a particular human as performing its function excellently or poorly. Our situation, 
therefore, is similar to an untrained music critic. We know that there must be an excellent way 
for the flautist to flute, but we do not know that standard well enough to praise a good flautist as 
a virtuoso. In the same way, Aristotle has so far demonstrated that rational activity is the 
characteristic activity of a human being, but we still do not know the criterion that we may use to 
separate excellence from mediocrity. And since there are two excellences, there will be two 
criteria. 
Aristotle does not have trouble in identifying the excellence that obtains of moral activity. 
Aristotle borrows his general method from Plato, for just as Plato thought we could get a clue to 
the condition of the just soul by understanding the condition of a just state because justice is 
more obvious in a state, so also Aristotle says “to gain light on things imperceptible we must use 
the evidence of sensible things” (NE 1104a14). What is obvious is that not only is there an 
excellence of the body, but that excellence is ruined by excess or deficiency: “excessive and 
defective exercise destroys the strength, and similarly drink or food which is above or below a 
certain amount destroys the health” (NE 1104a15-16). Since the state of excellence of the body is 
gained through moderation, so also it is likely that the excellence of the soul does as well. 
Proportionate moral activities such as temperance or courage promote this state of excellence. 
And once this state of the soul has become instilled by habituation, a person will live well by 
exercising this excellent state. There will also be activity that is rational in itself, which Aristotle 
calls contemplation (NE 1177b16). What distinguishes excellent from poor contemplation, 
however, is far less obvious, and can only be discussed after the nature of contemplation is 
understood. 
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C. Two Excellences, Two Lives 
 At first glance, it does not seem problematic that there are two human excellences. It 
seems easy to imagine a life where the practical and theoretical excellences are integrated quite 
well: a man spends most of his time in contemplation, but basically lives a just life and is 
perhaps even actively involved in the life of the polis on occasion. John Cooper calls this a 
“bipartite conception of human flourishing” (147).
16
 And not only is this integrated life 
imaginable, but Aristotle seems to indicate his belief that it is realistic in the Eudemian Ethics:  
…the parts of the soul partaking of reason are two…the one by its natural tendency to 
command, the other by its natural tendency to obey and listen…For, if we speak of him qua 
man, he must have the power of reasoning, a governing principle, action; but reason governs 
not reason, but desire and the passions; he must have these parts. And just as general good 
condition of the body is compounded of the partial excellences, so also is the excellence of 
soul, qua end (EE 1219b29-1221a4).
17
  
 
Aristotle is relying on his well-worn analogy between the excellence of the body and the 
excellence of the soul. The overall well-being of the body is dependent not only on the health of 
the heart, but on having a certain amount of muscle mass, etc. So there are several excellences 
that must obtain if a body can be said to be doing well. By analogy, the two excellences of the 
human soul - intellectual excellence and practical excellence - are necessary for complete human 
flourishing. This, at least, is the overall theme of the Eudemian Ethics and most of the 
Nicomachean Ethics according to Cooper: 
A human being necessarily possesses a mind and also desires, so that he is necessarily at 
once an emotional and intellectual being. Having both intellectual and emotional 
needs…a human being needs both intellectual and moral virtues in order to achieve all 
the good things attaching to the two parts of his nature (Cooper 147). 
 
It is of concern, then, when Aristotle destroys this rosy picture of the integrated life in 
book X of the Nicomachean Ethics:  
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If happiness is activity in accordance with excellence, it is reasonable that it should be in 
accordance with the highest excellence; and this will be that of the best thing in us… the 
life according to intellect is best and pleasantest…[and] happiest. But in a secondary 
degree the life in accordance with the other kind of excellence is happy (NE 1177a11-
1178a10).  
 
Aristotle has constructed a hierarchy between the two excellences, with practical excellence on 
the bottom. By itself, that would be no problem for a life devoted to both sorts of virtues. The 
problem is that Aristotle seems to be saying that devotion to these two different excellences 
requires two different lives, as indicated by the phrase „the life according to the intellect.‟ This 
runs against the bipartite conception, which indicates they can both be cultivated in a single life. 
 There is a second problem that can be derived from this first one. Most analyses of 
Aristotelian ethics take it that Aristotle had a value system that is roughly similar to a 
contemporary Western value system. We laud generosity and courage, and so does Aristotle. We 
discourage murder and robbery, and so does Aristotle. Indeed, it does seem that Aristotle‟s 
conception of a life devoted to practical virtues is acceptable by mainstream ethical standards. 
But if Aristotle is describing a life devoted to the cultivation of the intellect to the exclusion of 
the practical virtues, then it seems that there is nothing to constrain the actions of the 
philosophers. Richard Kraut
18
 expresses (although he does not agree with) this initial concern: 
…the difference (indeed, incompatibility) between the two lives would be far more 
striking than their similarities. Philosophers would not have ethical virtues; instead, they 
would hold themselves ready to do whatever is contrary to virtue in order to increase 
their opportunities for contemplating. By contrast, politicians, being good people, would 
never do anything contrary to virtue (Kraut 22). 
 
Since Aristotle is usually taken as having the same general values as the contemporary West, this 
would be an unacceptable interpretation. 
 The concern that philosophers could lead fundamentally unjust lives should not be taken 
seriously. Aristotle remarks in reference to the person who lives a life of contemplation that “in 
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so far as he is a man and lives with a number of people, he chooses to do excellent acts” (NE 
1178b6-7). This appears to be a description, rather than a prescription. But the worry that these 
philosophers are not truly ethical individuals is still a serious one. Aristotle distinguishes himself 
from the utilitarian by giving special significance to the reason why one does something, not just 
the fact that they do it:  
…honour, pleasure, reason, and every excellence we choose indeed for themselves (for if 
nothing resulted from them we should still choose them), but we should choose them also 
for the sake of happiness, judging that through them we shall be happy (NE 1097b1-5). 
 
 It seems that the philosopher chooses excellent actions neither for himself nor for the sake of 
happiness. Rather, he chooses them, as Aristotle says, only in so far as he lives with other people. 
So while we don‟t have to worry about our philosopher robbing a bank, we cannot expect our 
philosopher to seek out ethical action for the sake of flourishing. His flourishing comes through 
the activity of contemplation, and that is what makes him happy. If we interpret Aristotle as 
advancing two separate lives, therefore, there will be some who are not ethical people. They lead 
ethical lives, but their happiness is not derived from excellent action. Some interpreters find this 
consequence unpalatable, and so seek to show how a „mixed life‟ – one which brings together 
both kinds of virtue – is the one that is happiest for humans. 
For example, Cooper identifies one such argument that holds that “Aristotle is not 
contrasting and ranking two separate modes of life, but two integral parts of a single mode of 
life” (159). In many modern languages, it makes perfect sense to describe one‟s personal life as 
opposed to his public life, his religious life as opposed to his political life, his family life as 
opposed to his communal life. These of course are all aspects of a single life. The argument is 
that one can have both an intellectual life and a political life in the same way as they have both a 
private and public life. Cooper argues that the problem is that the Greek word, βίορ, while 
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properly translated as “life,” cannot be used to pick out an aspect of one‟s general life: “it means 
always “mode of life,” and in any one period of time one can only have one mode of life” (160). 
So when Aristotle describes ὁ καηὰ ηὸν νοῦν βίορ, he means a lifestyle – that towards which 
one‟s life is oriented, rather than a quadrant within a single life.  
Compatibilism also requires that there be two fundamental goods in a single life. This is a 
further reason to be pessimistic about a successful future compatibilist argument, because if there 
are two fundamental goods in one‟s life, there would be no chief good. This is quite opposed to 
Aristotle‟s doctrine of happiness.
19
 In saying that a life which cultivates both practical and 
theoretical excellence is the best life for humans, they are implying that sometimes the best thing 
to do would be to take a break from contemplating. In the context of a single life, these times 
will be inevitable. In Kraut‟s words, this is to place an “upper bound” on contemplation and to 
believe that “a human life can fail to be happiest because the person leading it assigns too much 
weight to contemplation and overestimates its intrinsic worth” (Kraut 31).  
One problem with this thesis is its complete lack of textual support, as Aristotle never 
indicates that it is ever desirable for a philosopher to seek less contemplation. That is, this 
interpretation is an imaginative possibility constructed to fill in the gaps; at best, it is what 
Aristotle meant to say. But what Aristotle actually does say is that “in a secondary degree the life 
in accordance with the other kind of excellence [i.e. practical] is happy” (NE 1178a9-10, my 
italics). Aristotle simply never recommends stopping the happiest activity in order to do the 
second happiest. This is consistent with Aristotle‟s argument that each life will only have a 
single chief good. It is true that both lifestyles will require the necessities (NE 1178a26) - 
obviously the philosopher would die if he never stops his contemplation to eat. But in that case, 
food derives its goodness from contemplation; it is good only insofar as it allows one to 
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contemplate. What we are considering is whether an individual would sometimes pursue 
contemplation for the sake of itself and sometimes take a break and pursue excellent political 
action for the sake of itself. If a person could even live life with two basic orientations that would 
often pull him in different directions, Aristotle never mentions it, and it is not clear how it would 
be possible.
20
  
D. The Problem with Incompatiblism 
Cooper and Kraut have argued convincingly against compatabilism by showing that 
Aristotle really intended the two excellences to be pursued in two different lives.
21
 But what is 
unsatisfying about their analyses is that they have difficulty explaining why Aristotle would 
bother to describe the political life at all. On the one hand, it is obvious that Aristotle has a 
positive view of the political life, for he passionately, articulately, and at great length defends its 
value. On the other hand, Aristotle clearly argues in book X that the life of the philosopher is to 
be preferred to the life of the politician. If the two lives are incompatible, one leads to greater 
happiness, and we human beings have the choice to lead one or the other, it would be insipid for 
anyone to choose the political life. That would be, paradoxically, to wish to be less happy than 
one could be.  
This is most clear in Kraut‟s analysis of the matter. He argues that “the 
opening book [of the Nicomachean Ethics] raises a major question – should we be philosophers 
or politicians?” (Kraut 44). He sees Aristotle as a sort of career counselor: “[t]he two lives – one 
in accordance with understanding, the other in accordance with practical virtue – are the two 
main options between which Aristotle‟s leisured male audience had to choose” (Kraut 27). 
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According to Kraut, we are left without a rigorous clue about which life we should choose until 
the very end of the NE, when Aristotle introduces reasons that Kraut accepts as decisive, leading 
us to conclude that “the more we contemplate the happier we are. Any other way we have of 
being happy must be a second best and imperfect way of living our lives” (Kraut 67). Kraut 
emphasizes that the political life is indeed a happy life, but not a perfectly happy life; perfect 
happiness is reserved for the philosopher. Kraut therefore implicitly believes that when Aristotle 
is describing the political life, he is describing a life that is no human being should want to live. 
Cooper is forced into the same awkward conclusion as Kraut. Cooper tries to resolve the 
dilemma by emphasizing Aristotle‟s words that the “intellect more than anything else is man” 
(NE 1178a8). Cooper insists that the recommendation to lead the life of the philosopher follows 
directly from this admission; all that is necessary is that one “accepts that one is his theoretical 
mind” (Cooper 168). And one should indeed accept this, according to Cooper‟s Aristotle: “In all 
of this, Aristotle contrives to make it appear both impious and stupid for anyone not to regard 
himself as a purely intellectual being” (Cooper 177, my italics). But even if Cooper is right that 
each human being has a „pure‟ intellectual nature, the problem still retains the same force in 
different form: if leading the political life is a perfect waste of time because it is based on a 
wrongheaded understanding of human nature, then why did Aristotle describe a life based on this 
nature in such detail and with such affection? It should be obvious that he was not rehearsing 
some kind of abstract exercise; Aristotle really believed that there are some extant individuals 
who should live the political life.  
It seems that Cooper simply finds fault with Aristotle here. He surprisingly never takes 
back his harsh words of „impious‟ and „stupid,‟ and he lets this be the end of the matter: 
“…whereas in the Eudemian Ethics such a life [i.e. the mixed life] is the highest ideal conceived, 
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in the Nicomachean Ethics, in the final analysis, Aristotle both conceives and prefers another, 
intellectualist, ideal…Many will find much to regret in this” (Cooper 179-180). Cooper, 
apparently, takes Aristotle to have been inconsistent, and leaves Aristotle to answer for his own 
supposed mistakes. Furthermore, it does not seem as though Cooper is optimistic that this 
difficulty can even be explained. Cooper is therefore faced with Kraut‟s problem: they both must 
believe that Aristotle had wasted his time in describing the life of the politician. One will only 
live that life if one fails to identify oneself with the intellect. And a person who fails to do this is, 
in Cooper‟s words, both „stupid‟ and „impious.‟ 
Jonathan Lear gives an answer which at first seems more promising. He argues that the 
choice between the political life and the philosophical life is not a genuine choice, for “if [a 
person] is in a position to live a divine life, there is no question but that he should” (Lear 315). 
One comes to be in this position, according to Lear, if two things align, for “either by material 
necessity or by lack of ability, most men are excluded from the life of contemplation. It is the 
rare person who has both the material means and the intellectual ability to pursue the 
contemplative life…” (Lear 313). So Lear believes that there is no choice in the matter. Both of 
the lives are happy lives, but the life of contemplation is happier. One would never choose the 
less happy life. Rather, whether one lives the life of political activity is decided by factors that 
are more or less out of one‟s control. 
Lear is circling the truth of the matter, but his analysis still commits him to an 
unpalatable conclusion. An indication is that he still finds it necessary to attribute a curious 
paradox to Aristotle, the master of logic: “Aristotle‟s man is most himself when he is least 
himself” (316). Lear is referring to Aristotle‟s apparently contradictory claims that people are 
political animals and thus will be happiest when living the ethical life in the polis, and also that 
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people will be happiest when living the life of contemplation outside of communal life. This is 
Aristotle‟s “highly paradoxical conception of man: as driven by his nature to transcend his 
nature” (Lear 309).  
Lear, however, believes that the paradox will fall away if we attend to Aristotle‟s views 
on the nature of soul, for “his metaphysical analysis of man as a composite of form and matter 
enables him to conceive man as radically divided. Man is a composite, and yet he is most truly 
the highest element in his form” (Lear 319). In order to give a complete analysis of a person, one 
must give an account of the form and a separate one of the matter. This is because the human 
form or soul is not like the essence of „concavity,‟ which shows up sometimes in wood, 
sometimes in metal, etc. In the case of concavity, it is appropriate to examine its essence apart 
from any concave things, since its material constitution is not an essential part of it. But the 
human soul is like „snub,‟ which only shows up enmattered in the nose; that is, there are snub 
noses, but there are no other instances of snub. This indicates that snubness has flesh as part of 
its essence. What Lear seems to be saying, then, is the paradox could be circumvented this way: 
Aristotle meant that man qua composite is a political animal, but man qua mind is not a political 
animal - a philosophical animal, perhaps.  
This only resolves the paradox at great cost. It is one thing to consider man in two ways – 
as a composite on one hand, and as a mind on the other. But the Ethics is intended to be a 
practical document. Aristotle is trying to articulate and analyze the kind of life that will most 
contribute to human flourishing. Lear has taken Aristotle to be saying that man qua form has the 
mind as his highest element. But there are, in fact, no human beings who are form only; all of us 
humans are compounds of form and matter. Lear, then, has committed the opposite mistake that 
Cooper did. Cooper‟s Aristotle describes the political life, but claims that it is a life that no one 
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should live. Lear‟s implications would require us to conclude that what Aristotle describes as the 
philosophical life is a life that no one should live, since all people are in fact „composites.‟ 
E. Beasts, Humans, Gods: Life Inside and Outside the Polis 
The key to a proper resolution of this conflict is to understand Aristotle‟s association of 
the life one should lead with his notion of a human nature. In recommending the political life, 
Cooper points out that Aristotle is assuming a certain conception of human nature, namely, that a 
person is “an intellectual…but also an emotional being. For anyone who has this conception of 
himself, the moral virtues and their exercise would also seem an essential good to be aimed at in 
any suitable life” (Cooper 156). This allows us some insight into X.7, when Aristotle appears to 
change course unannounced by insisting that one should live the intellectual life and not the life 
of the politician. The only way that such a dramatic change could be understood is if Aristotle is 
also changing his conception of human nature. And indeed, that is what we see him doing in this 
passage when he states that the intellect “more than anything else is man” (NE 1178a9). The 
intellectual life, then, can be identified as the life of greatest flourishing only because Aristotle 
can also identify human beings with their intellect. 
What orthodox analyses of Aristotelian ethics have in common is that they assume that 
there is only one human nature for Aristotle. This assumption has led to problematic attempts to 
answer the question of how the two lives are related, and so it is prudent to examine the 
possibility that Aristotle understood that there was more than one human nature. It may be 
helpful first to note that the theory of multiple human natures was familiar to him, for it is Plato 
who first gave it powerful expression. Socrates famously expresses it mythical form in the 
Republic:
22
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…God in fashioning those…who are fitted to hold rule mingled gold in their generation, 
for which reason they are the most precious – but in the helpers silver, and iron and brass 
in the farmers and other craftsmen…the first injunction god lays upon the rulers is that of 
nothing else: they are to be such careful guardians and so intently observant as of the 
intermixture to them with an infusion of brass or iron…they shall by no means give way 
to pity in their treatment of them, but shall assign to each the status due to his nature… 
(415a-c, my italics). 
 
Plato is advocating the idea that nature has given each person one of three natures, and each of 
those natures equips one for a certain life. One‟s proper role in life, therefore, is not determined 
by one‟s own choices. There is some evidence that shows that Aristotle does retain at least traces 
of this idea.  
For instance, that there are at least two human natures for Aristotle is not controversial. 
Aristotle states his belief very plainly when examining the institution of slavery. Importantly, the 
kind of slavery Aristotle defends is natural slavery. He does not believe that those who are not 
slaves by nature should be enslaved: “one cannot use the term „slave‟ properly of one who is 
undeserving of being a slave; otherwise we should find among slaves and descendents of slaves 
even men of the noblest birth, should any of them be captured and sold” (POL 1255a25-8).
23
 A 
man is a natural slave if “he participates in reason so far as to recognize it but not so as to 
possess it” (POL 1254b21). What Aristotle is committed to is the existence of human beings, so 
identified by their biological characteristics, who are by nature born without the ability to 
possess reason.  
Furthermore, he characterizes this life as a bestial life: “the use made of slaves hardly 
differs at all from that of tame animals: they both help with their bodies to supply our essential 
needs” (POL 1254b24-5). Elsewhere, Aristotle seems to take the bestial, slavish, and hedonistic 
life as similar, if not identical: “…most men, and men of the most vulgar type, seem (not without 
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some reason) to identify the good, or happiness, with pleasure…Now the mass of mankind are 
evidently quite slavish in their tastes, preferring a life suitable to beasts…” (NE 1095b14-5, my 
italics). So it is that the life of pleasure is a synonym for the bestial life which is in turn 
synonymous with the slavish life. 
 Armed with the knowledge that Aristotle did not believe that there was a single human 
nature because one was bestial, we should consider it possible that when Aristotle spoke of 
beasts, humans, and gods, he was referring to three types of human natures: “Whatever is 
incapable of participating in the association which we call the state, a dumb animal for example, 
and equally whatever is perfectly self-sufficient and has no need (e.g. a god), is not part of the 
state at all” (POL 1253a27-9). Aristotle gives two examples of beings that do not belong in the 
state – a „dumb animal,‟ and a „god.‟ Human slaves are not dumb animals, but their life is bestial.  
What is the state of the soul of someone who by nature lives this life? Aristotle has 
identified a slave as one who does not possess reason but can recognize it, so it follows that this 
person must be dominated by an irrational element in his soul. For Aristotle, there are two 
irrational parts of the soul, the nutritive part, which has no share in reason, and the appetitive 
part, which does share in reason “in so far as it listens to and obeys it” (NE 1102b31). This 
paternal language of the interaction of the rational part and the appetitive part is explicit: the 
appetitive part has “a tendency to obey [the rational part] as one does one‟s father” (NE 1103a3). 
This is not vaguely reminiscent of Aristotle‟s analysis of the relationship between the master and 
the slave: “…the [slave] must be ruled, [while] the other should exercise the rule for which he is 
fitted by nature, thus being the master…and the slave is in a sense a part of his master, a living 
but separate part of his body” (POL 1255b7-11). Aristotle believes that it is unjust to enslave 
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those who are not slaves by nature. Conversely, it would be unjust to let natural slaves live as 
free people; therefore it is an act of justice to enslave a person who is a natural slave.  
Most historical defenders of the institution of slavery understood slavery as essentially 
exploitative, but found justification for it on other grounds. Aristotle‟s defense of slavery is of a 
different character entirely. Far from being exploitative, it is mutually beneficial. The master and 
the slave need each other no less than the appetitive and rational element in the soul need each 
other. Therefore, that Aristotle either intended or would at least endorse the analogy between the 
slavish (or hedonistic or bestial) life and the appetitive part in the soul is clear. And it could not 
be the case that the slave does not at all possess the rational part of his soul, for if that were 
lacking, he would actually be a beast. But he is only a beast insofar as the constitution of his soul 
forces him to lead a bestial life. It must be, then, that the rational part of his soul is there, but it is 
simply not the authoritative or dominant part of his soul. Aristotle forces us to this conclusion: 
this person is a human qua biology, but is a beast qua psychology. 
 This notion that the slave has the rational part of his soul but does not have it as the 
authoritative part of his soul contradicts the usual understanding of Aristotle. The relevant text is 
from NE X.7, which is worth quoting at length: 
But we must not follow those who advise us, being men, to think of human things, and, 
being mortal, of mortal things, but must, so far as we can, make ourselves immortal, and 
strain every nerve to live in accordance with the best thing in us; for even if it be small in 
bulk, much more than it does in power and worth surpass everything. This would seem to 
be each man, since it is the authoritative and better part [ηὸ κύπιον καὶ ἄμεινον] of him. It 
would be strange, then, if he were to choose not the life of himself but that of someone 
else. And what we said before will apply now; that which is proper to each thing is by 
nature best and most pleasant for each thing; for man, therefore, the life according to the 
intellect is best and pleasantest, since intellect more than anything else is man. This life 
therefore is also the happiest (NE 1177b31-1178a8). 
 
About the intellectual part of the soul, the translation has it that “This would seem actually to be 
each man, since it is the authoritative and better part of him…”, and again, “…therefore the life 
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according to intellect is best and pleasantest, since intellect more than anything else is man” (NE 
1178a, my italics). Many English translations make it appear as though Aristotle is here 
identifying the essence of each human being with the intellectual part of his soul. For all human 
beings, then, the intellectual life is best. It may be this sort of translation which has led many 
commentators to assume this sort of reconstruction:  
1) If the intellectual part is the authoritative and better part (ηὸ κύπιον καὶ ἄμεινον) of all 
humans, then all humans should live the intellectual life.  
 
2) The intellectual part is the authoritative and best part for all humans.  
3) Therefore the intellectual life is the best life for all humans. 
Before parsing the text, a reminder may be useful. Whatever Aristotle meant 
in this passage, it could not have been that all men have the intellectual part of their soul as the 
most authoritative and best part, for slaves are men, and they do not have the intellectual part as 
their most authoritative part. This should be a clue that this translation is misleading. In Greek, 
Aristotle‟s phrase „since this is the authoritative and better part‟ is „εἴπεπ ηὸ κύπιον καὶ ἄμεινον.‟ 
While it is true that εἴπεπ can be used as a word of conclusion, it can also introduce a condition, 
and so it is also appropriate to render εἴπεπ as „if really,‟ or „if indeed,‟ yielding this as an 
alternative translation: “It would seem that each person is his intellectual part if he really has this 
part as the authoritative and better part.”  
What this translation leaves room for is the possibility that while some person X does in 
fact possess the intellectual part (for all those in the human species do by definition), in X’s case 
it is not the authoritative part. A few lines later, εἴπεπ  shows up again when Aristotle says “So 
also for a human being the intellectual life is best, εἴπεπ this most of all is the human being.” 
Orthodox commentators would suggest that the intellectual part is in fact the higher and better 
part in all humans. But I am suggesting the possibility that we must attend to the nature of 
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whatever particular human we are examining before dispensing ethical advice. Perhaps the 
person that we are examining here, Z, does in fact have the intellectual part as the authoritative 
and better part. In that case the best life for Z is the contemplative life; that is the life in which Z 
will flourish to the greatest degree. There is something else we know about Z, namely that while 
he is a biological human being (just like the slave), in another sense, he is a god because the 
intellectual life is “too high for man; for it is not in so far as he is man that he will live so, but in 
so far as something divine is present in him” (NE 1177b26-7). He is therefore a human being qua 
biology, but a god qua psychology. 
And we know that Aristotle insists that there is at least one other type of person, for X 
happens to be a slave by nature since he does not have the intellectual part of the most 
authoritative part of his soul. Of course, no one disputes that Aristotle means that the intellectual 
part of the soul is the best. This competing interpretation does not contradict this. It merely 
follows that the slave does not have the best life available to him because he does not have the 
best part as the authority in his soul, and this is due to nature, not habituation. For X, the life of 
contemplation would be miserable, which is why there is a “feeling a friendship between master 
and slave, wherever they are fitted for this relationship…” (POL 1255b12-3). The slave is 
dependent on the rational nature of the master, for the master is one who does have the 
intellectual part as the authoritative part of his soul.  
We are now in position to examine whether there is a third human nature. If such a third 
type existed, and the nature of this type is suited for the political life because that it the life in 
which it flourishes in the highest degree, then we would be able to avoid both Cooper‟s 
conclusion that Aristotle wasted his time describing the political life, and Lear‟s equally 
problematic conclusion that Aristotle wasted his time describing the intellectual life. This person 
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would not be a human not only biologically but also according to his psychological nature. It 
should be recalled that Cooper notices the necessary association between one‟s nature and the 
type of life in which one will flourish to the highest degree. He says that the life of 
contemplation  
would not seem reasonable at all to anyone who regards himself, as Aristotle seems to do 
in the Eudemian Ethics, as not merely an intellectual but also an emotional being. For 
anyone who has this conception of himself, the moral virtues and their exercise would 
also seem an essential good to be aimed at in any suitable life (Cooper 156). 
 
Cooper here correctly identifies political activity as an essential element in the life of a person 
who is essentially partly emotional and partly intellectual.
24
 Cooper is also right to point out that 
when Aristotle lists the reasons why the life according to the intellect is higher (NE 1177a18-
b26), it only shows that it is “the best among human activities…[It] certainly does not tend to 
show that this activity would reasonably be pursued as a dominant end in anyone‟s life” (Cooper 
156-7). That is, this argument acquires force only if one‟s nature is identified as purely 
intellectual. So Cooper‟s Aristotle, in book X, “means to challenge this assumption…that a 
human being is to be conceived of not merely as an intellectual but also an emotional being” 
(Cooper 157). An element in the life of human being, therefore, is the political life if and only if 
a person‟s nature is partly intellectual and partly emotional. But Cooper‟s Aristotle believes that 
such people do not exist. This is why Cooper must conclude that almost all of Aristotle‟s ethical 
and political corpus is awkwardly describing a life that only a stupid and impious person would 
lead. 
 This, of course, must be a mistake. The answer is that those who are human beings 
biologically and psychologically should exercise excellence through political activity, because 
there is actually no rival option: “the activities in accordance with this [life] befit our human 
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 Cooper defends his interpretation of to suntheton, the compound, that it is a nature mixed with emotion rooted in 
the body and the intellect, in a footnote on 157. 
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estate” (NE 1178a10). Excellence through contemplation is simply not human excellence; it is 
divine excellence in which divine human beings participate and flourish. People have no real 
choice in the matter, nor is it a question of habituation. A slave, by habituation, cannot come to 
have the intellectual part of his soul as the authoritative part, and neither can the true man. They 
are by nature destined to flourish in the highest degree in the bestial and political life, 
respectively. What people with either of these two natures have in common is that it would be a 
mistake for either to attempt to engage in a life of contemplation. Given the true man‟s nature as 
at least partly an emotional being, he will not flourish through such an attempt. A slave, who is 
even more distant from his rational part, would certainly be miserable attempting to live the life 
of contemplation; in fact, it would be an injustice against him to force him into it, since he will 
necessarily be unsuccessful. But if one finds oneself with an intellectual nature, then it will 
necessarily be that the political life will only yield flourishing in the second degree (NE 1178a9). 
As Lear correctly points out, nature will exclude most men from the contemplative life because 
they possess a “lack of innate ability” (Lear 313).  
The safest conclusion that we can make, then, is that rational activity as contemplation is 
not human excellence at all. It is divine excellence, and it is only tempting to refer to it as human 
excellence because human beings sometimes engage in it. But insofar as they do, they are 
literally non-human in an important way: psychologically. The life of contemplation, then, is 
divine excellence in which some humans – the ones with divine natures – can and should 
participate, because it is in such a lifestyle that they will flourish in the highest degree. 
The type of solution I have given explains why Aristotle recommends both the political 
life and the contemplative life at different times; it is because his recommendation is relative to 
the nature of the one to whom he is speaking. Therefore some should live a divine life because 
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they have the intellectual part as the most authoritative part of their soul. For the sake of their 
happiness, they therefore must live „ὁ καηὰ ηὸν νοῦν βίορ.‟ It is they, Aristotle apparently among 
them, who “must [strive], so far as we can, to make ourselves immortal” (NE 1177b33). 
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Chapter Two: Aristotle on the Human Intellect 
Chapter Summary by Section 
A. Introduction. In this chapter, I address the second barrier to understanding Aristotle‟s 
divinity thesis, which is a misunderstanding of the nature of human contemplation. I will 
argue that contemplation is active intellectual intuition. 
B. Laying the Groundwork: Observations About Nοῦς as a Substance. Nοῦρ is a substance 
that is a separate substance from the human composite. What is important to observe at 
this point in my argument is that ηὸ νοεῖν and ηὸ θευπεῖν are activities of νοῦρ, while ηὸ 
διανοεῖζθαι is an activity of the human composite. 
C. An Account of Tὸ Nοεῖν. Aristotle reserves the term „ηὸ νοεῖν‟ for passive intellectual 
intuition, which is a process in which humans acquire the intellectual form that is latent in 
physical objects. 
D. An Account of Tὸ Θεωρεῖν. Here I argue that the phrase “thought thinks itself” should be 
interpreted as „mind intuits itself.‟ This is important because the mind just is the 
intellectual forms; the mind was nothing before its intuition of them. Therefore ηὸ 
θευπεῖν is intuition that is no longer passive but active, and it is active because its 
actualization is internal to it; ἡ θευπία does not depend on encountering a particular in 
the world in which the form resides. It is therefore νοῦρ‟ intuition of itself. 
E. The Non-Identity of Tὸ Διανοεῖσθαι and Tὸ Θεωρεῖν. Commentators often fail to make 
the distinction sections that C and D argue that Aristotle did make, and thus conflate ηὸ 
διανοεῖζθαι and ηὸ θευπεῖν. This is illegitimate because ηὸ θευπεῖν is intuitive, not 
discursive. 
F. The Non-Identity of Tὸ Διανοεῖσθαι and Tὸ Nοεῖν. Translating ηὸ διανοεῖζθαι and ηὸ 
νοεῖν with the same word, „thinking,‟ has the effect of making Aristotle‟s texts illogical. 
This is further evidence that the distinctions that I first recognized in sections C and D are 
distinctions that Aristotle intended to make. 
G. The Mind Insofar as it Makes. In DA III.5, Aristotle introduces his doctrine of the mind 
insofar as it makes. I argue both that this mind is introduced in order to account for the 
mind‟s two actualizations, and that this doctrine is in accord with my distinction between 
passive and active intuition. 
H. Traditional Translations, Traditional Problems, New Solutions. Here I summarize the 
implications of my findings so far. If we fail to notice the different ways that Aristotle 
uses the three terms for mental activity, then it seems that we must conclude that there is 
a qualitative difference between divine and human contemplation. If, however, we keep 
them properly segregated, a different picture emerges. 
I. The Life of Contemplation. One difficulty in accepting my interpretation that active 
intellectual intuition is the highest good is that active intellectual intuition seems rather 
boring. How can this be the best life? Wasn‟t Aristotle trying to say that the best life 
involved philosophic, discursive reasoning with others? Here I offer a solution. 
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A. Introduction 
In the ethical life, νοῦρ has the task of controlling the appetites. In itself, however, its 
activity will be something else: „contemplation‟ (θευπηηικὴ) is Aristotle‟s word for “the activity 
of the mind” (NE 1177b16). The divinity thesis identifies the life of contemplation as divine, but 
what makes this life divine? There are at least three (non-exclusive) possibilities: human 
contemplation would be divine if 1) humans are engaged in the same activity in which God‟s 
νοῦρ engages when we contemplate, 2) νοῦρ is a divine substance, or 3) our intellectual life is our 
attempt to imitate the activity of God‟s life, in the same way that animals imitate God‟s activity 
through reproduction. It is not controversial that Aristotle affirms the latter two possibilities,
25
 
but his acknowledgment of the first is not widely recognized.  
It seems obvious that Aristotle should argue for the first possibility since he says in 
reference to contemplation that “God is always in that good state in which we sometimes are” 
(Meta 1072b24). This seems to be a straightforward indication that he sees a continuum between 
human and divine contemplation: human contemplation is divine contemplation, writ small. 
However, this is a difficult claim to accept because of some obvious and important asymmetries 
between human and divine thinking. Although I will not take up the nature of God‟s mode of 
contemplation directly until Chapter Three, it is evident that Aristotle‟s God, whatever else is 
true, contemplates eternally (Meta 1072b29). God also does not make discoveries because God 
does not encounter forms or make inferences, for that implies potentiality, and God is pure 
actuality (Meta 1072b29). Furthermore, the fact that God does not use sensation seems to 
exclude the possibility that God uses phantasms – images derived from sense experience – to 
think. The problem is that a brief observation of this list of divine characteristics makes it seem 
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implausible on the face of it that human contemplation could be like divine contemplation in any 
way. Is human contemplation not tied to a body and thus destructible? Does it not make 
discoveries? Does it not rely on images? The issue, then, is not whether there is an asymmetry 
between the human and divine mind, but the nature of this asymmetry. It may be thought that 
this asymmetry shows that human contemplation is essentially different from divine 
contemplation. The present chapter argues the opposite point, namely that Aristotle seeks to 
establish that human and divine contemplation are the same kind of activity. 
This can be shown by attending to Aristotle‟s understanding of the functions of the 
human mind. Two phrases he uses, ηὸ διανοεῖζθαι and ηὸ νοεῖν, are often both translated as 
„thinking.‟ But it may turn out that translating both words as „thinking‟ commits an important 
equivocation. An analysis of his uses of these words in context is necessary to determine whether 
they have different philosophical roles. I seek to establish that ηὸ νοεῖν is better translated as 
„intellectual intuiting,‟ while „thinking‟ should be reserved only for ηὸ διανοεῖζθαι , since 
Aristotle uses it to pick out the discursive function of νοῦρ; in English, the phrase „discursive 
thinking‟ is essentially redundant, since thinking already indicates judging and inferring. This 
distinction is important because as I will demonstrate, the failure to distinguish them leads some 
commentators to conflate contemplating (ηὸ θευπεῖν) and thinking (ηὸ διανοεῖζθαι), and it is this 
conflation that gives rise to the problem of misunderstanding the asymmetry of human and 
divine contemplation.  
B. Laying the Groundwork: Observations About Nοῦς as a Substance 
Before analyzing the functions of mind, it is necessary to begin by understanding the 
nature of νοῦρ itself. Aristotle clearly believes that it is a divine substance. He articulates this 
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view when discussing the soul‟s capacities in general, in De Anima.
26
 Unlike many uses of the 
term, Aristotle uses „soul‟ simply as a way to pick out that which is alive; „soul‟ functions as the 
mark of difference between natural bodies that are alive and those that are not: “Of natural 
bodies some have life in them, others not; by life we mean self-nutrition and growth and decay. 
It follows that every natural body which has life in it is a substance in the sense of a composite” 
(DA 412a12-15). In this sense plants have a soul, for they are capable of growth and decay, and 
growth and decay are types of motion. All things that have soul have this capacity for self-
nutrition, but there are other capacities which are part of some souls, namely “the appetitive, the 
sensory, the locomotive, and the power of thinking” (DA 414a32). The sensory and appetitive 
capacities do not belong to plants, but to humans and non-human animals. And in addition to all 
these capacities, human beings are distinguished from all other species in that they also possess 
„the power of thinking.‟  
It is easily shown that the capacities of soul besides thinking necessarily only exist 
enmattered: “If we consider the majority of [the capacities], there seems to be no case in which 
the soul can act or be acted upon without involving the body; e.g. anger, courage, appetite, and 
sensation generally” (DA 403a6-7). Aristotle is pointing out that it would not be possible to be 
courageous, for example, without a body. But it is not immediately clear that all psychic 
capacities are like this: “are [the capacities] all affections of the complex body and soul, or is 
there any one among them peculiar to the soul itself? To determine this is indispensable but 
difficult” (DA 403a3-5). Aristotle gives an immediate yet inconclusive answer: if there is one, it 
would be thinking. Aristotle chooses to leave this question unanswered for now, but he does 
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 Unless otherwise noted, all translations of De Anima are from: The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised 
Oxford Translation. Edited by Jonathan Barnes. Volume One. Bollington Series LXXI.2; Princeton University 
Press, 1984 ed. On the Soul translated by J.A. Smith. As I will argue throughout the chapter, I regard this translation 
as mistaken and misleading in important ways. However, I will use the Revised Oxford Translation until I have 
established a better translation, after which time I will re-translate the controversial words, while retaining the rest of 
Smith‟s translation.  
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warn us that “if this too proves to be a form of imagination or to be impossible without 
imagination, it too requires a body as a condition of its existence” (DA 403a8-10).  
Aristotle prepares the ground for a solution in DA I.4: “But νοῦρ seems to be some 
substance born in us…” (DA 408b18).
27
 His use of the word „substance‟ (οὐζία) is significant. 
Aristotle is clear that the body and soul – soul understood in all its capacities mentioned so far - 
are not two conjoined substances. They are rather one substance, a composite, related as the 
power of sight is to the eye: “every natural body which has life in it is a substance in the sense of 
a composite” (DA 412a15-16). So any particular living thing is itself one substance composed of 
soul and body. Therefore, his use of „οὐζία‟ signifies that he is speaking of a substance that 
inheres in the human composite. And it is not human, but divine, as the passage concludes: 
“[νοῦρ] is, no doubt, something more divine and impassible” (DA 408b29).  
Nοῦρ, therefore, is a substance distinct from the composite. One reason he distinguishes it 
as a separate substance is because νοῦρ differs from the rest of the composite with respect to the 
duration of its existence: 
If it could be destroyed at all, it would be under the blunting of old age. What really 
happens is, however, exactly parallel to what happens in the case of the sense organs; if 
the old man could recover the proper kind of eye, he would see just as well as the young 
man… Thus it is that thinking [ηὸ νοεῖν] and reflecting [ηὸ θευπεῖν] decline through the 
decay of some inward part and are themselves impassible [ἀπαθέρ]. Thinking [ηὸ 
διανοεῖζθαι], loving, and hating are affections not of thought, but of that which has 
thought, so far as it has it. That is why, when this vehicle decays, memory and love cease; 
they were activities not of thought, but of the composite which has perished; thought [ὁ 
νοῦρ] is, no doubt, something more divine and impassible (DA 408b18-31). 
 
Aristotle has already said that all of our psychic capacities require a composite, although he has 
left the possibility that νοῦρ may not. One consequence of psychic powers being essentially part 
of the composite is that they would be corruptible, for all matter is corruptible. Therefore, if there 
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since I am still establishing what it is. 
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is a capacity which is not necessarily enmattered, it may not be subject to decay. And indeed, 
Aristotle has just stated that “thought [νοῦρ] seems to be…incapable of being destroyed” (DA 
408b18).  
This notion seems to contradict the appearances. We can observe the powers of mind 
declining with old age, and being entirely corrupted on the occasion of death along with all other 
psychic capacities. In this passage, Aristotle is acknowledging this obvious fact, but reconciling 
it with his notion that some mental activity is not corruptible. In the preceding paragraph, 
Aristotle has laid the groundwork for this insight: “…to say that it is the soul which is angry is as 
if we were to say that it is soul that weaves or builds houses. It is doubtless better…to say that it 
is the man who does this with his soul” (DA 408b13-14). In the same way, the substantial change 
that we observe is not necessarily of the substance of νοῦρ itself, but of the substance in whom 
νοῦρ is born – this particular man. Since he is the possessor of νοῦρ, his substantial decay means 
that this particular substance which formerly carried νοῦρ is no longer capable of thinking. 
However, νοῦρ is not part of the substance which is this particular composite. With the phrase “in 
so far as it [i.e. the composite] has it [i.e. νοῦρ],” Aristotle seems to be reaffirming the existence 
of νοῦρ as an independent substance; it is something that the composite possesses, but its 
possession of it does not exhaust the substance of νοῦρ.
28
 
So not only is νοῦρ a different substance than the composite, but it is a different kind of 
substance. An essential characteristic of the composite is its corruptibility. Since νοῦρ is not 
corruptible, but ἀπαθέρ, it belongs to a different genus. And since ηὸ νοεῖν and ηὸ θευπεῖν are 
affections of νοῦρ, those functions in particular are incorruptible; since ηὸ διανοεῖζθαι is an 
affection of the corruptible composite possessing νοῦρ, it does in fact perish. Aristotle makes 
clear in II.2 that his comments about the incorruptibility of νοῦρ in I.4 were not errant, nor were 
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they a summary of another philosopher‟s views:
29
 “We have no evidence as yet about thought 
[ηοῦ νοῦ] or
30
 the power of reflexion [ηῆρ θευπηηικῆρ]; it seems to be a different kind [γένορ 
ἕηεπον] of soul, differing as what is eternal from what is perishable” (DA 413b25-26). Aristotle 
is again contrasting νοῦρ and its activity with the “powers of self-nutrition, sensation, thinking 
[διανοηηικῷ], and movement” (DA 413b12), and so emphasizing his distinction between what is 
properly an affection of the composite and what is a function of eternal substance. I turn now to 
accounts of the three functions of νοῦρ (or the possessor of νοῦρ) given in DA 408b18-31: ηὸ 
νοεῖν, ηὸ θευπεῖν, and ηὸ διανοεῖζθαι. 
C. An Account of Tὸ Nοεῖν 
Before our experience with the world, our mind
31
 is actually nothing, for it does not come 
stocked with ideas.
32
 In order for thinking to begin, then, our mind must have contact with 
reality. Because the mind is related to the world in this way, Aristotle is sometimes taken to be 
committed to empiricism.
33
 For the empiricist, sensation puts us into contact with reality, and 
through a process of induction, ideas come to exist in the mind. Thus, nothing but sensible 
intuition is required to account for our mind‟s contact with reality. However, this is not 
Aristotle‟s account
34
 and is an impediment to a proper understanding of Aristotle‟s account of ηὸ 
νοεῖν, for ηὸ νοεῖν is also a process that puts the soul in immediate contact with reality even 
though it is not sensation.  
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 A contention could be that in I.4, what Aristotle seems to describe as his own position is actually someone else‟s. 
Indeed, Book II opens by characterizing Book I “as our account of the views concerning the soul which have been 
handed on by our predecessors. Let us now make a completely fresh start…” (412a1-2). Thus, the present comments 
in II.2 are significant. 
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 The Greek is kai, indicating that this “or” is not to be taken as exclusive. 
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 Throughout the rest of this chapter, I will translate “νοῦρ” as mind, even in Smith‟s text. 
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 Cf. DA 429b30-430a2,  Prior Analytics 99b24-b31 
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 Cf. Barnes, Jonathan. (1975). Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics. Oxford: Claredon Press, and  
Lesher, James H. “The Meaning of Νοῦρ in the Posterior Analytics.” Phronesis 18 (1973): 44-68. 
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When I speak of ηὸ νοεῖν putting our mind in contact with reality, I am referring to ηὸ 
νοεῖν as it is used in DA III.4. This is in sharp contrast to Aristotle‟s use of ηὸ νοεῖν in the 
previous passage, III.3. In that section, Aristotle considers whether the „ancients‟, who “go so far 
as to identify thinking and perceiving” (DA 427a22) could be correct. He states their case as 
forcefully as he can: 
There are two distinctive particularities by reference to which we characterize the soul – 
(1) local movement and (2) thinking [ηὸ νοεῖν], understanding [θπονεῖν], and perceiving 
[ηὸ αἰζθάνεζθαι]. Thinking and understanding are regarded as akin to a form of 
perceiving; for in the one as well as the other the soul discriminates and is cognizant of 
something which is (DA 427a17-21). 
 
One difficulty in considering whether ηὸ νοεῖν is a type of perception is that there are at least two 
possible meanings of ηὸ νοεῖν (to which a third will be added in the subsequent division): 
“Thinking is…held to be part imagination [θανηαζία], in part judgment [ὑπόλητιρ]” (DA 
427b28).  
Thinking in the sense of judging cannot be „akin‟ to perceiving:  
…thinking [ηὸ νοεῖν] is…distinct from perceiving – I mean that in which we find 
rightness and wrongness – rightness in understanding, knowledge, true opinion, 
wrongness in their opposites: for perception of special objects of sense is always free 
from truth and error…while it is possible to think [διανοεῖζθαι] falsely as well as truly, 
and thought is found only where there is discourse of reason (DA 427b9-14). 
 
In this passage, Aristotle has implied much about his position on ηὸ νοεῖν: ηὸ νοεῖν in this sense 
makes „rightness and wrongness‟ possible, because it makes judgments (DA 427b15). Aristotle 
recognizes the uniqueness of this type of ηὸ νοεῖν enough to give it its own name, ηὸ διανοεῖζθαι; 
importantly, then, Aristotle‟s concept of ηὸ διανοεῖζθαι just is ηὸ νοεῖν insofar as it judges. 
Furthermore, it is also impossible that ηὸ νοεῖν, insofar as it is imagining, can be like perceiving 
for three reasons:  
[s]ense is either a faculty or an activity…: imagination takes place in the absence of both, 
as e.g., in dreams. Again, sense is always present, imagination not. If actual imagination 
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and actual sensation were the same, imagination would be found in all brutes: this is held 
not to be the case…Again, sensations are always true, imaginations are for the most part 
false (DA 428a5-13).  
 
This last consideration, that sensations are incorrigible while imaginings are not, also can be 
extended to exclude the possibility that understanding could be akin to perceiving, since 
understanding can often falls into error (DA 427b7). The common opinion of the ancients, then, 
that “[t]hinking and understanding are regarded as akin to a form of perceiving” (DA 427a20), is 
false. 
 Aristotle has thus used DA III.3 to prove that „judging-ηὸ νοεῖν,‟ „imagining-ηὸ νοεῖν,‟
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and understanding are all unlike perceiving. III.4 now considers whether the opinions of the 
ancients might be true in another sense: 
If thinking [ηὸ νοεῖν] is like perceiving [ηὸ αἰζθάνεζθαι], it must be either a process in 
which the soul is acted upon by that which is capable of being thought, or a process 
different from but analogous to that (DA 429a15-16). 
 
Two features of Aristotle‟s analysis deserve attention here. First, the former uses of ηὸ νοεῖν in 
III.3 are given specific names because of their unique functions, and thus the locution “ηὸ νοεῖν” 
is no longer used in those cases. And second, his current (and subsequent) use of ηὸ νοεῖν is 
something that is akin to perceiving. 
Since he models this new sense of ηὸ νοεῖν on perceiving (ηὸ αἰζθάνεζθαι), an account to 
ηὸ αἰζθάνεζθαι in is order. Sensation is an inherently passive process: “[s]ensation depends, as 
we have said, on a process of movement or affection from without, for it is held to be some sort 
of change of quality” (DA 416b32-34). Since our soul changes from a state of not-perceiving to 
perceiving, there is necessarily a movement. Movement, for Aristotle, is always from a 
potentiality to an actuality. And since our soul was brought to a state of actually perceiving, its 
potentiality must have been actualized by something external to it. Victor Kal‟s summary is 
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helpful: “[b]y the movement one pole gains that which the other already has. It receives, suffers, 
or undergoes the effect which proceeds from the other, the cause of the movement” (Kal 68).
36
 
The two ends of the movement are the soul‟s power of sensation and the object of 
sensation. The potential end is the power of sensation, and the actual end is the object that is 
perceived: “what has the power of sensation is potentially like what the perceived object is 
actually” (DA 418a3-4). Like any movement, before the movement starts the ends of the 
movement are in one sense dissimilar and in another similar. They are dissimilar because one 
side is potentially what the other is actually; they are similar because they are potentially 
identical: “while at the beginning of the process of its being acted upon the two interacting 
factors are dissimilar, at the end the one acted upon is assimilated to the other and is identical in 
quality with it” (DA 418a4-5). 
In sensation, unlike other kinds of movement, the movement that takes place is 
immaterial, for the form (εἰδῶν) enters the soul without the matter (ἄνες ηῆρ ὕληρ): 
Generally, about all perception, we can say that a sense is what has the power of 
receiving into itself the sensible forms of things [ηῶν αἰζθηηῶν εἰδῶν] without the matter, 
in the way in which a piece of wax takes on the impress of signet-ring without the iron or 
gold;…in a similar way the sense is affected by what is colored or flavored or sounding 
not insofar as each is what it is, but insofar as it is of such and such a sort and according 
to its form [ηὸν λόγον] (DA 424a16-23). 
 
This is despite the fact that what is affected is material, for “a primary sense-organ is that in 
which such a power is seated” (DA 424a24). In the case of sense perception, the sense organs 
receive the sensible form, and so not only are they passive but also capable of receiving the form 
in an unenmattered state which previously only existed as enmattered. Sensation is therefore 
intuitive: it is taking in an object which in this case is a sensible form.  
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Although ηὸ νοεῖν in the sense of judging and imagining could not be modeled on 
perception, this sense of ηὸ νοεῖν can: 
If thinking [ηὸ νοεῖν] is like perceiving [ηὸ αἰζθάνεζθαι], it must be either a process in 
which the soul is acted upon by that which is capable of being thought, or a process 
different from but analogous to that. The thinking part of the soul must therefore be, 
while impassible, capable of receiving the form of an object [ηὰ νοηηά]; that is, must be 
potentially identical in character with its object without being the object. Thought must 
be related to what is thinkable, as sense is to what is sensible (DA 429a15-18). 
 
The mind, in this function, is passive in the same way that sensation is, for the movement that 
our soul undergoes from potentiality to actuality is initiated by the object. The object in this case 
is not the sensible form (ηῶν αἰζθηηῶν εἰδῶν), but the intelligible form (ηὰ νοηηά). For Aristotle, 
both kinds of forms affect our mind through intuition. Τὸ νοεῖν is therefore intellectual intuiting, 
and „thinking‟ is only an appropriate translation of „ηὸ νοεῖν‟ if „thinking‟ can mean „intuiting.‟ If 
one takes DA III.3 as proof that Aristotle takes ηὸ νοεῖν as a discursive capacity because ηὸ νοεῖν 
is a capacity for judging , one would be taking things quite out of context; DA III.3 presents a 
theory that Aristotle rejects, and ηὸ διανοεῖζθαι is presented as a more appropriate term for the 
judging mind.
37
 Intuiting is a movement, but the actuality exists entirely in the object, for the 
mind is nothing before being actualized by the intelligible form.  In this sense, then, the mind is 
passive, and it is clear, at least, that it is active in discursivity; Aristotle, however, will argue that 
there are two ways for the mind to be active, and one of those is contemplating (ηὸ θευπεῖν). 
A final note: Aristotle says that although ηὸ νοεῖν is a function of a substance, νοῦρ, 
which is a divine substance, ηὸ νοεῖν is not divine because God‟s intellect is essentially active, 
but ηὸ νοεῖν is essentially passive.
38
 It is a movement, but the movement does not originate in the 
mind, for the mind is nothing before being actualized by the intelligible form (ηὰ νοηηά). 
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Aristotle is clear that there is nothing passive about God‟s intellect, and therefore, if Aristotle‟s 
divinity thesis expresses continuity between the human and divine intellect, he must explain the 
manner in which νοῦρ is active. Aristotle argues that contemplating (ηὸ θευπεῖν) is such an 
activity. 
D. An Account of Tὸ Θεωρεῖν 
 Aristotle says that after “mind has become each thing” – i.e. after its passive intuition of 
the form - “mind is then able to think (νοεῖν) of itself” (DA 429b9). Elsewhere, he identifies this 
activity as the most worthwhile kind of activity,
39
 and names it contemplation.
40
 Since 
contemplation is the mind‟s activity, νοεῖν in this case must not be passive. What I want to 
suggest is the following possibility: the phrase sometimes translated as „thought thinking itself‟ 
is still an intuitive act of νοῦρ, but it is no longer passive intuition, for there are no external, 
enmattered forms actualizing it. The difference is that νοῦρ is intuiting unenmattered intelligible 
forms that are the complete constitution of itself. It is now active intuition because it is 
actualizing itself; that is to say, the source of its actualization is not external to it. Indeed, 
Aristotle even worries why this sort of actualizing is not always happening, because this 
actualization comes from the mind itself
41
 rather than being dependent on the occasion of 
encountering an enmattered form (DA 430a5-6). I am suggesting that rendering „αὑηὸν νοεῖ ὁ 
νοῦρ‟ as „thought thinks itself‟ is as misleading as translating ηὸ νοεῖν with „thinking.‟ Therefore, 
the meaning of „αὑηὸν νοεῖ ὁ νοῦρ‟ when considered in context should be, according to my 
claim, „mind intuits itself‟; rendering νοεῖ(ν) as „thinking‟ is misleading, for thinking is normally 
understood as judging, and Aristotle has already made a decision to use a separate word to pick 
out the capacity for judgment. My argument for this position constitutes sections D & E. 
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Before receiving ηὰ νοηηά, the mind was purely potential. It had no existence to speak of, 
and only became actualized by ηὰ νοηηά: “What the mind intuits must be in it just as characters 
may be said to be on a writing-table on which nothing as yet actually stands written: this is 
exactly what happens with mind” (DA 429b33-430a2). This is why Aristotle calls the mind “the 
place of forms” (DA 429a27). The mind had no actuality, and so was distinguished from a thing 
like a flower insofar as flowers have no potential to receive intelligible forms at all. That is, 
neither the human mind before experience nor the flower possessed intelligible forms, but the 
mind is distinguished because it has the potential to receive the forms.  
Aristotle re-affirms his notion that the mind only has potential existence before its 
reception of the forms at least twice: “Thus that in the soul which is called mind…is, before it 
intuits, not actually any real thing…It was a good idea to call the soul „the place of forms‟…” 
(DA 429a22-28). The point is that before the intuition, the mind was pure potential; its present 
actuality, insofar as it is actual, is due entirely to the intuition of the forms. Aristotle makes the 
same point in the Metaphysics: 
[a]nd mind intuits itself because it shares the nature of the object of intuition; for it 
becomes an object of thought in coming into contact with and intuiting its objects, so that 
mind and object of intuiting are the same. For that which is capable of receiving the 
object of intuition, i.e. the substance, is mind (Meta 1072b20-22). 
 
After the intelligible forms „write‟ on the mind, the mind is in a sense actualized, but it 
remains potential in another sense, for at times when it is not being used, it is not fully 
actualized: “its condition is still one of potentiality, but in a different sense from the potentiality 
which preceded the acquisition of knowledge by learning or discovery” (DA 429b7-9). The mind 
at this stage thus admits of both actuality and potentiality. It is actual because the mind that has 
received intelligible forms actually becomes those forms. It remains potential, however, insofar 
as the forms constituting the mind are not currently being intuited. A person that knows “is now 
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able to exercise the power on his own initiative” (DA 429b7), which of course in no way implies 
that he is currently doing so; he simply may do so whenever he chooses.  
After the mind has received the intelligible forms and thus has become them, it can 
actively intuit those forms that it „knows‟ without depending on encountering them in their 
material instantiation or in images.
42
 This is why “there are two kinds of actuality corresponding 
to knowledge and reflecting” (DA 412a22).This process is explicitly referred to as 
contemplation. Contemplation, then, is the mind‟s active possession of the forms:  
…that which is capable of receiving the object of intuition…is mind. And it is active 
when it possesses [ἔσυν] this object. Therefore the latter rather than the former is the 
divine element which mind seems to contain, and the act of contemplation [ἡ θευπία] is 
what is most pleasantest and best (Meta 1072b22-24). 
 
Aristotle therefore denies that νοῦρ, in its passive employment - ηὸ νοεῖν - is divine. This sort of 
intuition of the intelligible form is passive because its change is actualized by a form that is 
external to it. In this sense, its intuition is a reception. All intuition is affection by something 
simple. This is obviously true in the sensible and intelligible intuition of the enmattered forms, 
but this also seems to be true in the case of contemplation. The mind is still being affected by 
intelligible forms, although now the mind just is those forms, and so this affection is a self-
affection. What makes intuition passive, therefore, is receptivity, not affection. While 
contemplation is divine because it is the activity of a divine substance, νοῦρ, ηὸ θευπεῖν is divine 
in that sense and also in a much more important sense; it is intuition that is no longer passive but 
active, and it is active because its actualization is internal to it; ἡ θευπία does not depend on 
encountering a particular in the world in which the form resides. It is therefore νοῦρ‟ intuition of 
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itself.
43
 This process, as I will argue in Chapter 3, is the same activity in which God engages 
completely and eternally.  
E. The Non-Identity of Tὸ Διανοεῖσθαι and Tὸ Θεωρεῖν 
Νοῦρ has a passive function (ηὸ νοεῖν) in intuiting the intelligible forms, and an active 
one (ηὸ θευπεῖν) in possessing them. I have characterized both processes as essentially intuitive. 
But it is obvious that the human mind is active in another way, for we have discursive mental 
powers: we can make judgments, analyze arguments, connect or separate premises, make 
inferences, and change our conclusions in the face of new data. It is possible to believe, because 
„contemplation‟ is Aristotle‟s term for the activity of the mind, and discursive reasoning is a type 
of mental activity, that discursive reasoning must be identical with or at least a form of 
contemplation. I will reject that possibility; ηὸ διανοεῖζθαι is the term that Aristotle reserved to 
refer to discursive as opposed to intuitive processes. Accordingly, I will argue that ηὸ 
διανοεῖζθαι is not identical with ηὸ θευπεῖν, nor a species of it.  
Kosman is one who does not draw a distinction between human contemplating and 
discursive reasoning. His position may be observed when he describes what divine 
contemplation is not: 
Aristotle‟s god is not a scientist, nor a philosopher, and divine thought is not a cosmic 
form of ratiocination or brilliantly articulated scientific theory. For theoria is not theory; 
it is simply the principle of awareness…, the divine full self-manifesting and self-
capturing of consciousness, of which scientific activity and philosophical speculation are 
to be sure particularly subtle forms, but of which the ruder and more incorporate 
activities of perception and nutrition are equally images… (Kosman 356).
44
 
 
Although Kosman is not explicitly characterizing human contemplation, his comments about 
divine contemplation indicate his position. He is right, of course, that Aristotle‟s God does not 
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reason discursively in contemplation. But Kosman implies a contrast that is not sustainable: 
divine contemplation is not discursive, but human contemplation is. Thus, human and divine 
contemplating are different activities. This is why Kosman is forced to argue that human 
contemplation is divine in another way, for when humans engage in “scientific activity and 
philosophical speculation,” we are attempting to imitate God‟s contemplation through a shared 
“principle of awareness” (Kosman 356). God is aware when God is contemplating, and when 
humans contemplate, even though it is discursive, it is also a manifestation of awareness. This 
then, is the connection between human and divine contemplation for Kosman. This is to deny the 
uniqueness of human contemplation, for there are many ways besides thinking to share the 
divine principle of awareness. Indeed, this principle of awareness that we have in discursivity is 
echoed throughout all of biology, for the “activities of perception and nutrition are equally 
images” of the divine‟s principle of self-awareness (Kosman 356). Discursivity is not different in 
this sense from reproduction; both are vague reflections of perfect, divine awareness.  
It therefore appears that Kosman conceives of ηὸ θευπεῖν and ηὸ διανοεῖζθαι as identical 
in humans. This conception, however, is simply not faithful to the texts: 
[t]hus it is that intuiting [ηὸ νοεῖν] and contemplating [ηὸ θευπεῖν] decline through the 
decay of some inward part and are themselves impassible [ἀπαθέρ]. Discursive reasoning 
[ηὸ διανοεῖζθαι], loving, and hating are affections not of mind, but of that which has 
mind, so far as it has it. That is why, when this vehicle decays, memory and love cease; 
they were activities not of mind, but of the composite which has perished; mind [νοῦρ] is, 
no doubt, something more divine and impassible” (DA 408b18-31). 
 
It is true that God‟s contemplation is intuitive, but it is false that human contemplation is 
 discursive. Aristotle has made this clear by drawing an important distinction between ηὸ θευπεῖν 
and ηὸ διανοεῖζθαι. They differ to the same degree as that which is temporal and destructible 
differs from that which is eternal and impassible, for contemplation is a property of νοῦρ, while 
discursive reasoning is a property of the composite; although the composite has νοῦρ, νοῦρ is not 
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exhausted by its instantiation in the composite.
45
 This textual evidence by itself does not indicate 
how discursivity is related to contemplation, but it does make it clear that they are not identical.  
F. The Non-Identity of Tὸ Διανοεῖσθαι and Tὸ Nοεῖν 
Kosman has made a mistake by identifying ηὸ διανοεῖζθαι and ηὸ θευπεῖν; a similar error 
is to conflate ηὸ διανοεῖζθαι and ηὸ νοεῖν. This mistake is made in effect by those who translate 
ηὸ διανοεῖζθαι and ηὸ νοεῖν with the same word. For instance, when Aristotle mentions some of 
the capacities of soul, he names “the appetitive, the sensory, the locomotive, and the power of 
discursive reasoning [διανοηηικόν]” (DA 414a32). But when Aristotle considers the possibility 
that some mental activity may be not an actuality of the body, he does not use the articular 
infinitive of διανοηηικόν - „ηὸ διανοεῖζθαι‟ - but „ηὸ νοεῖν‟ (DA 403a3-5). This observation 
shows that Aristotle‟s use of different words is consistent with our discovery that ηὸ διανοεῖζθαι 
is a perishable function of the human composite, while ηὸ νοεῖν is „divine‟ and „impassible.‟  
This equivocation exposed in the previous paragraph is one thing, but there are places in 
which this equivocation shows up that make Aristotle simply illogical. I will reprint the relevant 
passage again, this time without my insertions of the Greek: 
 …thinking and reflecting decline through the decay of some inward part and are 
themselves impassible. Thinking, loving, and hating are affections not of thought, but of 
that which has thought, so far as it has it. That is why, when this vehicle decays, memory 
and love cease; they were activities not of thought, but of the composite which has 
perished; thought is, no doubt, something more divine and impassible (DA 408b18-31). 
 
If there is really no philosophically important difference between ηὸ διανοεῖζθαι and ηὸ νοεῖν, 
then J.A. Smith, our present translator, is justified in translating both as „thinking.‟ But even 
without an analysis of their philosophical uses in other contexts, this passage already announces 
a difference, namely, that one is passible while one is not. It is no doubt better to believe that 
Aristotle purposely used different words because he was attempting to pick out distinct 
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processes. He repeats this distinction DA 414b18: “Certain kinds of animals possess…the power 
of discursive reasoning and intuiting [ηὸ διανοηηικόν ηε καὶ νοῦρ].”
46
  
But if ηὸ διανοεῖζθαι is a mental function that picks out neither passive nor active 
intuition of the forms, then what does the term signify? We have just observed Aristotle use the 
terms „διανοεῖηαι‟ and „ὑπολαμβάνει‟ together in DA 429a23-4, apparently as synonyms, and this 
is consistent with the position that I support, namely, that ηὸ διανοεῖζθαι is Aristotle‟s term for 
„discursive reasoning.‟
47
 This mental function is unique because it judges, which in turn gives 
rise to the possibility of truth and error. Aristotle makes this explicit when contrasting discursive 
reason and imagination: 
…for perception of the special objects of sense is always free from error, and it found in 
all animals, while it is possible to reason discursively [διανοεῖζθαι] falsely as well as 
truly, and thought is found only where there is discourse of reason. For imagination is 
different from either perceiving or discursive thinking [διανοίαρ]… (DA 427b11-14). 
 
Διανοίαρ not only judges, but is “the mind inasmuch as it reasons, argues, or orders.” (Kal 9). 
This is simply the mind insofar as it engages in an explicit or implicit syllogism, a process which 
Aristotle analyzes at length: deduction is an argument in which, certain things being laid down, 
something other than these necessarily comes through them” (Topics 100a25-6).
48
 There are, 
broadly, two types of syllogisms based on the nature of the premises: “It is a demonstration, 
when the premises from which the deduction starts are true and primitive…and it is a dialectical 
deduction if it reasons from reputable opinions” (Topics 100a26). Demonstrations are the sort of 
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syllogisms that will be the concern of lovers of wisdom, since starting with true premises, they 
will, if sound, end with true conclusions about the subject matter. The conclusion of the 
dialectician‟s argument, however, will only be true insofar as the reputable opinions are true. 
G. The Mind Insofar as it Makes 
But there is still a mystery here; Aristotle has said both that the substance of νοῦρ 
perishes qua instantiated substance, but itself is impassible. I argue that the best explanation of 
this doctrine occurs in the infamous „maker mind‟ passage. In Aristotle‟s discussion of 
perception, he had said that the mind‟s change from being potentially all the forms to intuiting 
itself requires not one but two actualizations: 
[b]ut we must now distinguish different senses in which things can be said to be potential 
or actual; at the moment we are speaking as if each of these phrases had only one sense. 
We can speak of something as a knower either as when we say that man is a 
knower…And there is a man who is already reflecting – he is a knower in actuality and in 
the most proper sense is knowing, e.g., this A (DA 417a22-30). 
 
But how are these changes affected? This difficulty arises because of Aristotle‟s doctrine of 
change; for Aristotle, change is always movement from potentiality to actuality, and such 
movement can only be accounted for by something already actual. That is, what is moving is 
never a self mover, but is moved by a prior actuality.  
So we may have anticipated that there is more to the story, for Aristotle has thus far not 
described this prior actuality that necessarily exists. Finally, Aristotle addresses this issue in 
III.5; there he says that we need  
a cause which is productive in the sense that it makes [all the particulars included in the 
class]…And in fact mind [νοῦρ], as we have described it, is what it is by virtue of 
becoming all things, while there is another which is what it is by virtue of making all 
things (DA 430a12).
49
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Aristotle‟s reference to νοῦρ in the first sense is by now familiar as a central theme of Aristotle‟s 
philosophy of mind, for the mind becomes what it is by becoming the intellectual forms that it 
intuits. But what exactly is this making mind? Aristotle says that it is a state [ἕξιρ], and suggests 
an analogy to the state of light because making mind and light do the same job, “for in a sense 
light makes potential colors actual colors” (DA 430a16-7). Furthermore, νοῦρ “in this sense of it 
is separable, impassible, unmixed, since it is in its essential nature activity” (DA 430a 17). 
Previously, Aristotle has said that νοῦρ is a substance “born in us” - that is, in the composite 
substance (DA 408b18). In this, he is in accord with any substance dualist
50
 who argues that the 
mind and the body are separable.  
But Aristotle is not saying that the making mind is merely conceptually separable from 
the composite, but genuinely separable; it keeps existing even when the composite and the 
composite‟s passive and discursive mind perishes: “[w]hen separated it is alone just what it is, 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
things that are potentially thought, and the only candidate here is the intellectual forms. So Kosman proposes that 
Aristotle meant that the making mind “makes everything that is potentially thought actually thought” (Kosman 344).  
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is really quite a statement. Kahn initially says that Aristotle is above the hopeless dualist paradoxes, but a page later 
he says very clearly that Aristotle is right in the middle of that fray. Although I am not here arguing against dualism, 
I am merely pointing out that Aristotle has the same challenges as any substance dualist, despite whatever 
differences his doctrine of νοῦρ might have.  
 45 
 
and this above is immortal and eternal (we do not remember because, while this is impassible,
51
 
passive νοῦρ is perishable)” (DA 430a24-5). Aristotle seems to be changing his story about νοῦρ 
slightly here. In DA 408b, he very clearly states that passive mind – that is, the mind that intuits 
the intelligible forms and thus become them – is impassible:  
[t]hus it is that intuiting [ηὸ νοεῖν] and contemplating [ηὸ θευπεῖν] decline through the 
decay of some inward part and are themselves impassible [ἀπαθέρ]. Discursive reasoning 
[ηὸ διανοεῖζθαι], loving, and hating are affections not of mind, but of that which has 
mind, so far as it has it. That is why, when this vehicle decays, memory and love cease; 
they were activities not of mind, but of the composite which has perished; mind [ὁ νοῦρ] 
is, no doubt, something more divine and impassible (DA 408b18-31).  
 
Just as clearly, however, here in III.5 passive mind perishes with the composite, while only 
active, making mind is impassible. The best explanation here is to note that in 408b, ηὸ 
διανοεῖζθαι is an affection of the composite in which νοῦρ resides, while ηὸ νοεῖν and ηὸ θευπεῖν 
are divine affections because they are affections of νοῦρ proper. By the time Aristotle gets to 
430a, he simply seems to believe that it is more sensible to think of ηὸ νοεῖν as an affection of 
the composite also. This latter doctrine is in accord with Metaphysics 1072b22-24, where ηὸ 
νοεῖν is not divine specifically because it is passive.  
 But as noted, there are two actualizations here; the second is when mind intuits itself in 
contemplation. So what affects this change? It seems that making mind also is responsible for 
this actualization. Since making mind is “in its essential nature activity,” Aristotle calls its 
knowing actual knowing (DA 430a19-21). He says that  
[a]ctual knowledge [ἡ καη' ἐνέπγειαν ἐπιζηήμη] is identical with its object: in the 
individual, potential knowledge is in time prior to actual knowledge, but absolutely it is 
not prior even in time. It does not sometimes think and sometimes not think. When 
separated, it is alone just what it is, and this above is immortal and eternal…” (DA 
430a20-24, my italics).  
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Actual knowledge is thus considered in two senses: as it exists „in the individual,‟ and as it exists 
„absolutely.‟ Both kinds of actual knowledge are properly described as active intellectual 
intuiting, since actual knowledge is „identical with its object.‟ But there are also important 
differences. Actual knowledge in the individual 1) is occasional: it sometimes is actual and 
sometimes not because the mind does not continually intuit itself; we have to eat and sleep, after 
all. And 2), actual knowledge in the individual is obviously posterior to potential knowledge. 3), 
it perishes; this is why Aristotle says that “contemplating [ηὸ θευπεῖν] decline[s] through the 
decay of some inward part and [is itself] impassible [ἀπαθέρ]” (DA 408b18). 
 But absolute actual knowledge is none of those things. It is 1) continual, because its 
essential nature is activity, 2) prior to potential knowledge, and 3) impassible: “[w]hen separated 
it is alone just what it is, and this above is immortal and eternal” (DA 430a24-5). Making mind, 
therefore, is mind that is eternally active, separable, and divine, posited for the sake of 
accounting for both actualizations of the mind, for “without this, nothing intuits [νοεῖ]” (DA 
430a25). This is why Aristotle is able to say both that νοῦρ perishes and that it does not perish; it 
is because sometimes he is speaking of actual knowledge as it exists in the individual (i.e. the 
composite) and sometimes he means absolute actual knowledge. 
H. Traditional Translations, Traditional Problems, New Solutions 
I began this analysis by noting some apparent problems with Aristotle‟s statement that 
“God is always in that good state in which we sometimes are” (Meta 1072b24), namely, the 
apparent temporality, discursivity, and reliance on images that characterize the human mind and 
that are all the opposite features of the divine mind. These features of human thinking would 
seem to exclude the possibility that humans are ever is the same state as God. I will now show 
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how these traditional problems dissolve by attending to the proper translations of ηὸ νοεῖν, ηὸ 
διανοεῖζθαι, and ηὸ θευπεῖν. 
First, I will simply note that the concern that human thinking is discursive while God‟s 
thinking is intuitive has already been answered; human contemplation is an intuitive activity that 
is completely distinct from discursive activity. Second, there is the problem that God 
contemplates eternally while human contemplation is temporal. Aristotle explicitly addresses this 
issue in DA 408b18-31. Aristotle is clear that ηὸ διανοεῖζθαι will perish with the composite man 
unlike ηὸ νοεῖν and ηὸ θευπεῖν; the latter functions belong to a person only indirectly; properly 
speaking, they are affections of νοῦρ. The composite, however, only participates in νοῦρ, and so 
ηὸ νοεῖν and ηὸ θευπεῖν are affections of the composite only insofar as the composite has νοῦρ. 
Nοῦρ is an independent substance that is not exhausted by its instantiation in the composite. This 
is reconcilable with the eternality of νοῦρ because ηὸ διανοεῖζθαι is not an affection of νοῦρ, but 
of the man who has νοῦρ. („insofar as he has it‟). Thus the question of the eternality of νοῦρ is 
easily answered by attending to the distinction between ηὸ νοεῖν and ηὸ διανοεῖζθαι.  
A final barrier to my thesis that human contemplation is like divine contemplation is that 
while God never contemplates in images (i.e. phantasms), the possession of images is a 
necessary condition for thinking in the human soul: “[t]o the thinking soul images serve as if 
they were contents of perception…That is why the soul never thinks without an image” (DA 
431a15-17). There can be no mental activity for human beings unless we first perceive; in this 
sense, our mind is dependent on an initial contact with the external world. Usually, however, 
when we think, we are not standing in front of our object. This kind of direct perception, 
however, is not necessary because of our ability to recall images of the particulars. Comportment 
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toward images, then, is a substitute for comportment toward particulars, which is why „images 
serve as if they were contents of perception.‟ 
Charles Kahn explains Aristotle‟s reasoning about phantasms as a logical consequence of 
his analysis of the conditions of a composite existence: 
In order for [any minimally rational train of thought] to take place the first condition – 
call it condition A – is empirical consciousness or sentience, what human beings share 
with animals…Sentience in the subjective side of aisthesis…The second condition, 
Condition B, is the specific capacity of nous, access to the noetic domain…The 
requirement of phantasms is a direct consequence of Condition A, our existence as 
sentient animals. As sentient, embodied beings, we cannot think even of noeta, 
intelligible objects, except by way of phantasms, the hylomorphic basis of our thought… 
(Kahn 362).
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Kahn correctly recognizes that νοῦρ is of divine origin, and that contemplating itself is not 
essentially tied to images. This means that God, who is not bound by Condition A, does not need 
images in order to contemplate. So while human contemplation is necessarily tied to phantasms, 
it is not because of the nature of intelligible objects. Rather, it is because as hylomorphic beings, 
our having of intelligible objects is necessarily dependent on specific acts of passive intuition. 
Kahn therefore believes that the way that humans have intelligible objects is a consequence of 
our embodiment and that we „collect‟ the forms one by one. If God‟s contemplation can be taken 
to be complete and eternal possession of the noetic domain, then God‟s contemplation will be in 
essence different from human contemplation. 
Once again, we have a difficulty that can be cleared up by attending to Aristotle‟s 
complex vocabulary. What Aristotle actually says is that “[i]mages serve as objects of perception 
to the soul undertaking discursive reasoning” (ηῇ διανοηηικῇ).
53
 Kahn‟s position is that “Aristotle 
insist[s] that we cannot think without phantasms…” (Kahn 362). In itself, this statement is true, 
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but it is true in a way that Kahn does not even realize, for he, no less than Kosman, assumes that 
„thinking‟ is just a general way to describe the activity of the mind and the mind‟s possession of 
intelligible objects. As I have argued, there is an important philosophical distinction between ηὸ 
διανοεῖζθαι and ηὸ θευπεῖν; the first term is Aristotle‟s term for (discursive) thinking, but the 
second picks out active intuiting of intelligible objects. What Aristotle does not say is that active 
intuiting in humans, i.e. contemplating, depends on images. But since the thesis that discursive 
thinking was divine was never under consideration, nothing Aristotle says in DA III.7 indicates 
that human and divine contemplation are essentially different.
54
  
I. The Life of Contemplation 
My analysis of Aristotle‟s cognitive psychology has been in the interest of discovering 
the meaning of his divinity thesis. I have found that when Aristotle praises the life of the activity 
of the intellect as divine, he means to exclude ηὸ νοεῖν and ηὸ διανοεῖζθαι, because they are 
affections of the composite. Tὸ θευπεῖν is divine, and although it is divine because it is activity 
of a divine substance and because it imitates God‟s activity, it is divine primarily because it is the 
same activity in which God engages. My conclusion that discursive reasoning does not constitute 
the life of the intellect may seem odd; one reason that Aristotle‟s claim that the life according to 
the intellect is the highest life is plausible is the oft-recognized pleasure of engaging in discursive 
reasoning with others.  
But this is not to say that ηὸ διανοεῖζθαι or ηὸ νοεῖv have no value. It‟s just that the value 
that they have is primarily derivative because they are good insofar as they make possible the life 
of contemplation. In body/soul composites, Aristotle believes that contemplation is dependent on 
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thinking. This is because thinking is the process through which the soul comes to possess 
knowledge, and contemplation depends on the soul being in a state of knowledge before it 
contemplates. As Aristotle says,  
…there are two kinds of actuality corresponding to knowledge [ἐπιζηήμη] and to 
reflecting [ηὸ θευπεῖν]. It is obvious that the soul is an actuality like knowledge; for both 
sleeping and waking presuppose the existence of soul, and of these waking corresponds 
to reflecting, sleeping to knowledge possessed but not employed, and knowledge of 
something is temporally prior (DA 412a22-26). 
 
In equal measure, thinking is dependent on passive intuition, for before the soul thinks or judges, 
it must first intuit (DA 429a23-4). So it is easy to see how passive intuiting also has derivative 
value. 
It may be thought that this conflicts with Aristotle‟s famous words at the opening of the 
Metaphysics that “All men by nature desire to know. An indication of this is the delight we take 
in our senses; for even apart from their usefulness they are loved for themselves.” (980a21-22). 
Aristotle is clear here that perception is loved in part for itself, which perhaps implies that 
thinking and intellectual intuiting are too. I suggest this possibility: passive intuiting and thinking 
may be goods in themselves and also derivative goods if they are good in the same way as 
courage, for example. In one sense, courage is loved for its own sake; in another sense, it is loved 
because it contributes to the life of political flourishing. The same may be true with discursive 
reasoning: in a sense it is loved because of itself. In another, it is loved because it makes 
contemplation possible. 
I have removed two major barriers to properly understanding Aristotle‟s divinity thesis 
by showing how it is possible to live a divine life in the context of a human life (Chapter 1) and 
how human contemplation can be understood as a divine activity (Chapter 2). There is a further 
problem, however, because if it turns out that God contemplates only God‟s own mind to the 
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exclusion of the intelligible forms, then our former worry about the qualitative difference 
between human and divine contemplation will be reestablished.  What, then, is the nature of 
God‟s ηὸ θευπεῖν?  
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Chapter Three: The Nature of Divine Contemplation 
Chapter Summary 
A. Introduction. There are two rival models about the nature of God‟s cognition – the self-
contemplation model and the omniscience model. This is an important argument because 
my contrast between Aristotle and Kant depends on the notion that Aristotle‟s God‟s 
contemplation is of the same kind as human contemplation.  
B. The Meaning of the Self-Contemplation Model. The self-contemplation model, here 
explained by Oehler, holds that when God thinks, God‟s only object is itself. According 
to Oehler, this is what Aristotle means when he says in reference to God that “Its thinking 
is a thinking on thinking.‟ Thus, God is not aware of the world in any way. 
C. Traditional Arguments for the Self-Contemplation Model.  
D. Traditional Arguments for the Omniscience Model. Norman and George make the case 
that God‟s contemplation is of God‟s mind, but God‟s mind is not content-less; it is 
constituted by the forms of the world, and hence, God‟s contemplation amounts to 
omniscience. 
E. Does Omniscience Compromise God’s Ontological Status as the Highest Being? Oehler‟s 
argument depends on three presuppositions, the first of which is that God‟s 
contemplation cannot be of the forms, because that would make the forms ontologically 
prior to God, which cannot be the case for a perfect being. I argue that the ontological 
priority of the universe only holds for human contemplation. 
F. Does Omniscience Contradict Immutability? Oehler also believes that if God is 
omniscient, then God‟s thoughts would be in flux, contradicting Aristotle‟s clear belief 
that God is immutable. But I point out that there are two interpretations of omniscience – 
historical and nomological – and only historical omniscience would contradict God‟s 
immutability. 
G. Conclusion 
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A. Introduction 
I argued in Chapter 1 that flourishing by contemplating requires the full devotion of a 
single life, and that only those with certain mental endowments flourish by living this life. Since 
this life is divine, anyone fit to live it has a divine nature. In Chapter 2, I characterized 
contemplation as active intellectual intuiting; it is intuiting because it is simple apprehension and 
affection, and it is intellectual because what it intuits are the intellectual forms, and it is active 
because the mind intuits itself since the mind just is the intellectual forms. Furthermore, I 
suggested, although I did not argue, that this is the very nature of God‟s activity; that argument 
constitutes the present chapter.  
My interpretation of human and divine contemplation as active intellectual intuiting fits 
the relevant texts easily. For instance, Aristotle says that  
And mind is active when it possesses its object. Therefore…[it] is the divine element 
which thought seems to contain, and the act of contemplation [θευπία] is what is most 
pleasant and best. If, then, God is always in that good state in which we sometimes are, 
this compels our wonder; and if in a better this compels it yet more. And God is in a 
better state (Meta 1072b23-26).  
 
Aristotle seems to believe that we are sometimes in the state in which God is, although our 
version of it is incomplete in two ways: we are not always in it, and it is of inferior quality. This 
seems to imply that God is omniscient, since God would be contemplating all the forms 
eternally.  
B. The Meaning of the Self-Contemplation Model 
My claim that Aristotle‟s God is omniscient, however, is controversial. Indeed, it is more 
common to believe that for Aristotle, God‟s contemplation is of God‟s own mind instead of the 
universe and its forms. The primary textual evidence for this position, henceforth called the self-
contemplation model, seems to be this statement of God‟s mental activity, often translated this 
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way: “…its thinking is a thinking on thinking” (Meta 1074b33-34). Armed with this quote, many 
commentators insist that Aristotle is suggesting that God intuits only God‟s own mind to the 
exclusion of the universe and its contents. Klaus Oehler, for instance, believes that this quote 
“clearly excludes from the Prime Mover any knowledge of something which is not itself. This 
appears to exclude from the Prime Mover all knowledge of the world” (Oehler 501).
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It is possible to believe that the self-contemplation model is doomed from the start since 
it seems to undermine Aristotle‟s notable ethical claim that human beings should aspire to the 
contemplative life of God: “one ought so far as possible to act as an immortal and do everything 
with a view to living in accordance with what is highest in oneself…” (NE 1177b30-33). And 
Aristotle seems to indicate that this is not only an ideal, but one that may actually be achieved: 
“God is always in that good state in which we sometimes are” (Meta 1072b24). In other words, 
the self-contemplation model may be at odds with Aristotle‟s „divinity thesis,‟ which seems to 
indicate that Aristotle did believe that some human beings actually participate in the same 
activity in which God does.  
Rolf George criticizes the self-contemplation model along these lines:
56
  “there are…an 
embarrassingly large number of passages inconsistent with this interpretation” (George 62).
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The most important contradiction is found in “Nicomachean Ethics X, where the summum 
bonum of human life is said to be contemplation identified as divine activity” (George 63). 
Richard Norman diagnoses the same problem with the self-contemplation model: “the activity of 
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the Prime Mover is the summum bonum of human life. To suppose that in making this the ideal 
Aristotle is urging men to rapturous self-admiration is as false as it is ludicrous” (Norman 72).
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Although I ultimately will join George and Norman in criticizing Oehler, I do not share 
their belief that the self-contemplation model is ruled out simply by observing Aristotle‟s ethical 
ideals. This is because there is another way to take the divinity thesis that can be derived from a 
passage from De Anima:  
[the nutritive soul‟s] functions are reproduction and the use of food; for it is the most 
natural function in living things…to produce another thing like themselves – an animal to 
produce an animal, a plant a plant – in order that they may partake of the everlasting and 
divine in so far as they can; for all desire that, and for the sake of that they do whatever 
they do in accordance with nature (DA 415a26-415b1). 
 
According to one possible interpretation of the divinity thesis, when Aristotle claims that human 
contemplation is divine, he means only that human contemplation is our best attempt to 
approximate the activity of the divine. Human contemplation is in this respect the same kind of 
activity as reproduction, because it is rooted in a desire to „partake in‟ the divine, but the activity 
itself is not divine. This is because God‟s contemplation is only of God‟s own thoughts; we 
humans, however, contemplate the world and the forms and essences that it contains. Thus, 
human contemplation is only divine in the sense that it is the manifestation of a desire to be like 
God, much like an animal produces an animal in an attempt to participate in the eternal nature of 
the divine. Since neither model of God‟s contemplative life is ruled out by the texts, we must 
seek a resolution elsewhere. 
C. Traditional Arguments for the Self-Contemplation Model 
Klaus Oehler distinguishes two general types of interpretation of God‟s activity. They are  
…the formal and the material. The material type regards the self-knowledge of the Prime 
Mover as one which, in thinking itself, also refers to the idea of being…so that his self-
thought also, indirectly, thinks the world. The formal type takes the self-thinking of the 
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Prime Mover as a sign of the self-reference of the thought, however self-reference may 
be understood (Oehler 493). 
 
What these rival interpretations have in common is a shared emphasis on the reflexivity of God‟s 
thinking. Reflexivity is undeniable, given that Aristotle‟s God is thought that thinks itself. The 
difference therefore is not found in whether one believes that God‟s thinking is reflexive, but 
rather the degree to which it is. On the material interpretation, the reflexivity of God‟s thought is 
weaker, since it also references the world. The formal model takes reflexivity in the stronger 
sense, since God only thinks of God‟s own self. Oehler plans to argue for the self-contemplation 
model by showing that Aristotle meant God‟s reflexivity in the stronger sense, while human 
thinking implies reflexivity in the weaker sense. 
 Oehler first focuses on a different relationship than reflexivity, namely, identity. There is 
a relation of identity between the unenmattered objects of thought and the mind which has 
received them. Before being known, the intelligible forms are only potential objects of thought, 
since they exist as enmattered in some particular substance and do not exist in anyone‟s mind: 
“For in the case of objects which involve no matter each of the objects is only potentially 
present” (DA 430a7). The intelligible forms exist, but in a potential form. They are actualized 
only when they are intuited by a mind. When they exist as unenmattered and actualized in the 
mind, they constitute the mind, because the mind is nothing actual before the reception of the 
intelligible forms: “…thought is in a sense potentially whatever is thinkable, though actually it is 
nothing until it has thought[.] What it thinks must be in it just as characters may be said to be on 
a writing-table on which as yet nothing actually stands written” (DA 429b31-430a2). Since the 
mind just is the forms which it has received, it follows that “what thinks and what is thought are 
identical” (DA 430a4). 
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 Although Aristotle names an identity relation between the human mind and the forms 
constituting it, Oehler cautions that this is not identity simpliciter because intelligible forms that 
exist in the mind are a sort of refection of the intelligible forms in the world. Thus there is an 
“epistemological simultaneity of knowledge and the known….[but there is still a] lack of 
ontological simultaneity between knowledge and reality” (Oehler 496). Nevertheless, this 
epistemological identity is significant because of the role it plays in self-reference, for it is 
through our perception (whether sensible or intellectual) of objects that we are aware of 
ourselves. 
 But what is important to note in the case of human beings is that “the real function of 
mental acts is understood by Aristotle to be intentional, not reflexive,” and thus “their self-
reference can only be accidental or secondary” (Oehler 497). The idea is that our thinking and 
perceiving makes it possible to be aware of ourselves. However, this is merely a by-product of 
the perception of the object: “But evidently knowledge and perception and opinion and 
understanding have always something else as their object, and themselves only by the way” 
(Meta 1074b36). Or, as Oehler says bluntly, “in thinking an intelligible form thought may „on the 
side‟ be aware of its own relation to itself” (Oehler 497). So it is true in the case of human beings 
that self-reflexive thought refers not only to itself but to its object, for its reflexivity is built upon 
intentionality. As Oehler sees it, this is to be contrasted with the way the divine mind works: “the 
divine Mind knows itself not incidentally but as its only object, whereas the human mind knows 
itself in so far as it is conscious of its object” (Oehler 498, my italics). The divine mind, 
according to Oehler, simply cannot have this two-fold relation of intentionality toward the forms 
of the world on the one hand, and consciousness of itself through that intentionality on the other, 
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for intentionality implies having an object, and having an object implies that the thinking was 
actualized by the object:  
…the object of [the Prime Mover‟s] thought, which activated it, would have a higher 
ontological status than it; and, since this object could be something of little value, the 
activity of thought would not be the best possible. The Nus of the Prime Mover, since it 
is the most powerful and most divine…and the object of its thought is not just anything 
but something which confirms its ontological status. Hence it can only be itself…In 
contrast to human thought about thinking the thought of the Prime Mover is not just 
reflexive „on the side‟ but has no other object than itself (Oehler 500). 
 
Reflexivity is therefore of two kinds. There is reflexivity in the weak sense, which is the 
reflexivity of any mental content built on intentionality, such that reflexivity is through having an 
object. The mental capacity, whether it be thought or perception, becomes aware of itself. As 
Oehler points out, this seems to be the way of all human reflexivity. But according to him, this 
cannot be the manner of God‟s thinking, for if God thought the essences of the universe, then 
God‟s thought would be actualized by something prior to it, and hence of a higher ontological 
status. But Aristotle is clear that nothing has a higher ontological status than God, and so we 
must conclude that God‟s manner of self-referential thinking is quite unlike the incidental self-
referential thinking of humans. It is self-referential because it is its own object – itself. 
D. Traditional Arguments for the Omniscience Model 
Richard Norman gives what Oehler would characterize as a material interpretation of the 
reflexivity of the thinking of Aristotle‟s God, since Norman advances the position that in 
thinking God‟s self, God also thinks the world. Norman wishes to argue that God‟s mental 
activity is of the same general kind as ours insofar as it contemplates the world: “when Aristotle 
refers to the Prime Mover with the phrase auton noei [it thinks itself] he wishes to indicate 
simply that activity of abstract thought in which humans also engage” (Norman 71). This is, 
therefore, the other way to take the divinity thesis, for on this interpretation, when Aristotle says 
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that the human intellect is divine, he means that the human intellect engages in the same kind of 
activity as the Prime Mover. 
The heart of Norman‟s interpretation is his notion that Aristotle diagnoses two kinds of 
thinking: “In the first sort of thinking, the intellect takes in the forms and, being itself mere 
potentiality, it is actualized by becoming those forms. And it is now capable of performing the 
second sort if thinking; having become ta noeta is it now able to think itself” (Norman 65). 
Norman is relying on the same text from the De Anima (III.4) that Oehler does; furthermore, 
their beginnings of their interpretations of the text does not differ. Mind is nothing but pure 
potential before it encounters the intelligible forms. Before the encounter, the mind and the forms 
have nothing in common with the significant exception that the mind is the forms potentially. 
One point of difference with Oehler is that Norman makes much of what the mind does 
after this the reception of the forms. He quotes Aristotle‟s analysis:  
When thought has become each thing in the way in which a man who actually knows is 
said to do so (this happens when he is able to exercise the power on his own initiative), 
its condition is still one of potentiality, but in a different sense from the potentiality which 
proceeded the acquisition of knowledge by learning or discovery; and thought is able to 
think itself (DA 429b6-9). 
 
When a person comes to know anything (in the sense of having knowledge or having a skill), her 
mind must have been potentially that thing. For example, if she comes to know how to do 
algebra, it proves that her mind was potentially the skill of algebra before the knowledge 
acquisition; after the acquisition she actually knows how to do algebra. However, when she is 
playing tennis, her knowledge of algebra is still potential in a sense, even though it is has been 
actualized; it is potential because she is actually not using it. There are thus two senses of 
potentiality and two of actuality. First, there is the pure potential that obtained at the time when 
she was ignorant of algebra. This is a different sort of potentiality that obtains when she 
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possesses knowledge of algebra but is currently not using it. Therefore, in this stage potentiality 
and actuality are both present. Only in cases when she is currently doing algebra does pure 
actuality obtain, for not only does she actually possess it, but she is actually using it.  
There are thus two movements – one from pure potentiality to a mixture of potentiality 
and actuality, and one in which the possessed-but-latent knowledge is actualized. Norman takes 
these two movements to symbolize Aristotle two-fold analysis of thinking (ηὸ νοεῖv): “the first 
kind of thinking is dependent upon something external – it is paschein…whereas the second is 
entirely self-sufficient and nous that thinks itself” (Norman 65). Thinking in the first sense is like 
the movement of our math student from ignorance to knowledge. This movement is passive from 
the perspective of the mind, for the mind is affected by a teacher. In the same way, the mind, 
when it becomes an intelligible form, is affected by that form. But thinking in the second stage is 
different, since the mind “is already identical with [to noeta] and therefore thinks itself” (Norman 
65). This is the case because the mind was nothing before its reception of the forms, and is thus 
constituted entirely of forms. Therefore when the mind contemplates, or thinks of forms, it is 
thinking itself. According to Norman this should be characterized as self-knowledge rather than 
self-contemplation, for “[m]ind thinks itself, because it thinks those noeta which it has become 
through the earlier kind of thinking” (Norman 65). 
Norman uses this analysis to reconstruct the thinking of Oehler and other „formalists‟ this 
way: “The PM thinks that which is best. The PM is that which is best. Therefore the PM thinks 
itself” (Norman 71). But according to Norman, this line of reasoning, if it can be said even to be 
Aristotle‟s, need not be taken to mean that the forms of the world are external to God‟s mind; 
what is it important for Aristotle is that God‟s thinking is not like the movement from pure 
potentiality to a stage in which potentiality is mixed with actuality. If God‟s mind were affected 
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this way, then the objects which affected God‟s mind are of higher worth, which as Oehler 
correctly pointed out cannot be the case. Rather, “the Prime Mover‟s thinking is entirely of the 
theoretic kind and not at all of the receptive kind” (Norman 69). So when Aristotle characterized 
God as thought that thinks itself, he is not identifying a third way of thinking unique to God, 
above and beyond the two-fold way of human thinking. Aristotle is simply saying that God‟s 
thinking is of the second kind, and entirely unmixed with the first kind. Human thinking 
becomes like divine thinking when it contemplates. This is why Aristotle says that 
“[d]ivinity…belongs to mind as actualization rather than to mind as potential, and „theoretic‟ 
thought is what is pleasantest and best” (Meta 1072b). Just like the mind intuits itself when 
contemplating the intelligible forms of the world which it is, so too the divine mind thinks itself 
when it thinks the objects of its mind, because the divine mind just is all of the intelligible forms 
of the world.  
E. Does Omniscience Compromise God‟s Ontological Status as the Highest Being? 
 Oehler characterizes his own model as „formal,‟ since it characterizes the reflexivity of 
thought thinking itself in the stronger sense. That is, God‟s thinking has only God‟s self as its 
object, to the exclusion of any feature of the world. Following Norman, I have called this the 
„self-contemplation‟ model, and it excludes the possibility of omniscience. Norman has given an 
argument that God is omniscient, since God, as pure thought thinking itself, is simply 
contemplating all the intelligible forms at once and for eternity. I want to give two considerations 
in favor of the omniscience model, both of which attack what are apparently the most important 
reasons that Oehler has for holding the „self-contemplation‟ model. As I count them, Oehler 
holds two relevant presuppositions that make the self-contemplation necessary: 1) God‟s 
knowledge of the universe would compromise God‟s status as the highest being, and 2) God‟s 
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omniscience is incompatible with God‟s immutability. My responses to these concerns constitute 
sections E and F respectively. 
Oehler‟s criticism of the omniscience model is in part based on concern that the perfect 
Being of God would be compromised if God were to know about the world: “the essences of the 
things in the world are of a lower rank than the essence of the First Being. Therefore, in spite of 
being the first to other beings, it does not know them by knowing itself: according to Aristotle, it 
must not even know them” (Oehler 502). If Aristotle‟s God were forced to contemplate the 
essences of the world, then his knowledge would be dependent on things in the world, and 
therefore God‟s ontological status would be degraded. But Aristotle regards God as a perfect 
Being, not ontologically dependent on anything: “We have to learn that for Aristotle the 
perfection of the First Being does not consist in knowing everything but in the freedom from the 
necessity to be obliged to know everything. The Divine Mind is so perfect that it can only know 
itself” (Oehler 502). Oehler believes that this follows from the insight that “according to 
Aristotle‟s assumptions the essences of things in the world are of a lower rank than the essence 
of First Being” (Oehler 502). 
Oehler cites (but does not quote) a passage which he considers relevant from the 
Eudemian Ethics as support for his claim. There, Aristotle says that 
according to this argument the virtuous man will not think of anything; for God's 
perfection does not permit of this, but he is too perfect to think of anything else beside 
himself. And the reason is that for us well-being has reference to something other than 
ourselves, but in his case he is himself his own well-being (EE 1245b16-18). 
 
By citing this passage, Oehler implies that it supports his belief that God would be degraded if 
God‟s object were external to God. But the doctrine that Oehler is trying to reject - reflexivity in 
the weak sense - does not advance the position that the essences of the world are external to God. 
Indeed, Norman argues that the objects of God‟s thinking “cannot be any visible entities in the 
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external world. Therefore they must be invisible, purely mental entities – abstract matter-less 
noeta…Where and what are these noeta? They are in the mind, of course, and in fact they must 
be that mental stuff of which the mind is composed” (Norman 66).  
What Oehler is right to worry about is that if God‟s mind were actualized by external 
objects, then those intelligible forms would be ontologically prior to God‟s mind. This is so 
because in this case, the intelligible forms would be able to exist without God‟s mind (although 
not unenmattered), but God‟s mind would not be able to exist without the intelligible forms. 
Certainly it is true that human contemplation always presupposes a time when the mind was 
actualized by the potential forms. And certainly, Oehler is right to make much of Aristotle‟s 
doctrine of the primacy of reality over knowledge. But while reality is certainly primary over 
human thinking because our minds are actualized by something external to it in reality, Norman 
is not arguing that God‟s mind is actualized by something else. What distinguishes divine from 
human thinking is that God‟s contemplation, unlike human contemplation, never depends on 
previously being affected. There was, so to speak, never a time when God became acquainted 
with the forms through an act of passive intellective intuiting. 
Oehler seems to believe that this kind of thinking is not possible; in order to know the 
intelligible forms, they must be first actualized in the mind. This is just the doctrine of the 
primacy of reality over knowledge – knowledge depends on reality, but reality does not depend 
on knowledge. Let me attempt to reconstruct Oehler‟s reasoning: „if thinking is thinking of the 
forms, then they must have been actualized in the mind previously. But this cannot be the case 
when it comes to God‟s mind, for if God‟s mind were actualized then it would not be the most 
perfect thing. Therefore God‟s thinking is never of intelligible forms.‟ But this rests on an 
important assumption, namely that the doctrine of the primacy of reality over knowledge would 
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extend also to God‟s knowledge. The world contains essences that are only potentially known by 
human cognizers. But actuality always precedes potentiality for Aristotle, and he is consistent 
about this even in the case of intelligence: 
[s]pontaneity and chance are causes of effects which, though they might result from 
intelligence or nature, have in fact been caused by something accidentally. Now since 
nothing which is accidental is prior to what is per se, it is clear that no accidental cause 
can be prior to a cause per se. Spontaneity and chance, therefore, are posterior to 
intelligence and nature. Hence, however true it may be that the heavens are due to 
spontaneity, it will still be true that intelligence and nature will be prior causes of this 
universe and of many things in it besides (Physics 198a1). 
 
In this context, he is talking about intelligence as a priori cause of the world; while I am not 
concerned with causes in this context, this does imply that divine intelligence is prior to the 
world. This contradicts Oehler‟s assumption that Aristotle‟s doctrine of the primacy of reality 
over knowledge can be extended to God‟s knowledge. 
F. Does Omniscience Contradict Immutability? 
In addition to this first argument concerning God‟s ontological status, Oehler argues that 
omniscience should be decided against on other grounds, namely, its incompatibility with God‟s 
immutability. If they are indeed incompatible, and God‟s immutability is not in question, then we 
will be back at the thesis that God‟s contemplation is only of God‟s own mind.  
Oehler‟s present concern with omniscience is that Aristotle‟s arguments for God‟s 
immutability rule out any logical possibility that Aristotle‟s God is omniscient. He is forced into 
defending his position on this front because as even he points out, his argument against divine 
omniscience is not derived from decisive texts, for “Aristotle did not define the content of the 
Prime Mover‟s thought…” (Oehler 503). According to Oehler, therefore, Aristotle does not 
explicitly rule out omniscience. A main reason that Oehler is compelled to reject the omniscience 
model is not textual, then, but logical: “there are strong arguments for the logical incompatibility 
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of immutability and omniscience” (Oehler 502). Oehler‟s textual analyses, therefore, do not 
directly attack the omniscience model; his arguments, rather, strengthen the cogency of 
Aristotle‟s claim that the Unmoved Mover is immutable. It is only because he believes that 
immutability is incompatible with omniscience that omniscience must go: “It is not to be 
forgotten that Aristotle maintains and gives detailed reasons for the Prime Mover‟s immutability 
but is very reticent about its knowledge and says nothing that might allow us to conclude that he 
wanted to claim omniscience for it” (Oehler 503). This objection depends, then, on whether 
omniscience is logically compatible with immutability, for if they are compatible, then on 
Oehler‟s own admission, there is no reason why he cannot view God as omniscient since this 
possibility is not eliminated by any text.  
Oehler has argued that the reflexivity of God‟s thinking does not simultaneously 
reference the essences of the world. But Oehler realizes that his textual analysis has left logical 
space for the position that insists that reflexive thinking of God is indeed omniscient after all. 
Oehler summarizes this allegedly mistaken view:  
the Prime Mover‟s self-knowledge would contain all the objects of episteme, [and] this 
means that the Prime Mover by thinking itself thinks the essences of all being and by that 
the structure of the world…[T]he reflexive thought of the Prime Mover makes reference 
to the world in such a way that in thinking itself it thinks the world, and hence…its self-
knowledge is knowledge of everything (Oehler 502). 
 
This allows the „erroneous‟ commentators to reconcile God‟s omniscience, that is, his knowledge 
of the forms and causes in the universe, with Aristotle‟s notion of God as thought thinking itself.  
So if God‟s knowledge of the world is constantly in flux, then God is mutable; Aristotle‟s God, 
then, cannot be omniscient. 
But what exactly does Oehler mean by „omniscience?‟ We should be disappointed with 
Oehler‟s lack of explanation here, for as George makes clear, there are at least two definitions of 
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omniscience. The first is articulated by Aquinas, who insisted that Aristotle “conceived of God 
as a creator who provisionally cares for his creation…[which] implies nomological and historical 
knowledge of the world” (George 61),
59
 meaning that not only does God know the forms and 
causes of the world, but is acquainted with its particular, historical, and accidental features. This 
is to be contrasted with Averroes‟ interpretation of Aristotle‟s God who “has only nomological 
knowledge of the world…[because] he knows only the laws and forms of things, not individuals 
or their states” (George 61).  
When Oehler complains that the doctrine of omniscience threatens to undermine the 
immutability of the Unmoved Mover, he never clarifies in which of the two senses he means 
„omniscience.‟ This seems to be quite important, because if he means omniscience in Aquinas‟ 
sense, he is right to worry, for if God is constantly caring about the details of the world, then 
God‟ state of mind is constantly changing, and hence, so is God. George, however, rejects the 
possibility that God could have been omniscient in this way. In support, George cites Aristotle‟s 
comment that God has no knowledge of things „in detail” (Metaphysics 982a10), which is to 
dismiss Aquinas‟ contention that God knows the particulars of the world. Omniscience, if it is 
confined to nomological omniscience as Averroes holds, is compatible with immutability. God 
would in fact know everything about „the laws and forms of things,‟ but since the laws and forms 
are immutable, God‟s knowledge of them also would be immutable. That Oehler does not reject 
the latter version of omniscience is obvious, since he even approvingly references the argument 
against historical omniscience given by Averroes.
60
 So we are left to conclude that Oehler is 
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guilty of an equivocation by confusing nomological and historical omniscience.
61
 Ruling out 
historical omniscience in no way testifies to any problems with nomological omniscience.  
So despite the appearance that Oehler‟s doctrine is incompatible with the doctrine of the 
omniscience of the Unmoved Mover, there is conceptual space to unite them. This is so because 
even if we generally accept Oehler‟s analysis of reflexivity, there is still room to think of 
Aristotle‟s God as omniscient. Oehler, by contrast, believed that acceptance of reflexivity 
requires rejecting omniscience. By Oehler‟s own testimony, “Aristotle did not define the content 
of the Prime Mover‟s thought” (Oehler 503), and so if there is no conflict between nomological 
omniscience and immutability, and Aristotle‟s ethics and politics only make sense by positing an 
omniscient God, then interpreting Aristotle‟s God as omniscient is the best interpretation. 
But there is still one potential objection from the formalist camp, namely, that Aristotle‟s 
comments seem to indicate that unchanging active contemplation of the intellectual forms is 
impossible. Lear observes that this is so because  
if each higher-level activity of contemplating essence is indivisible, it would seem that, 
were God to be thinking the essences whose lower-level counterparts are found embodied 
in the world, he would have to think many distinct indivisible thoughts. It seems, 
however, that it is precisely because he thinks himself that his thought is not composite 
and does not change, as if he were to think the distinct parts of the whole” (Lear 303). 
 
Lear‟s concern is that God or God‟s thought cannot change, and as Aristotle notes, “if [the object 
of thought were composite], thought would change in passing from part to part of the whole…” 
(Meta 1075a6). If contemplating the intellectual forms indicates change, then Oehler must be 
right to conclude that God does not contemplate forms at all, for God “thinks that which is most 
divine and precious, and it does not change” (Meta 1074b25-6). Hence, God thinks only himself. 
And there is a second problem here that is unique to my interpretation. We know that human 
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thought changes because “human thought…is thought of composite objects” (Meta 1075a7). If 
so, then there would be an essential difference between human and divine contemplation.  
Lear addresses both problems at once by noting that the way in which humans are 
constrained to have the intellectual forms is significant. He argues that human contemplation is 
different, but not because we somehow have different objects; rather, the difference lies in the 
way in which humans are constrained to have these same objects or essences that God does: 
[i]t is possible for us to think this essence, then think that essence: the essences found in 
the world would then be actually divided…And so it is at least possible for our 
contemplation to be of composites and to occur in some time and yet for it still to be true 
that both we and God are contemplating the same essences – in the one case as divided, 
in the other case as indivisible. Aristotle‟s conception of God thinking himself would 
then be as rich as the conception of contemplating the world as a whole (Lear 305-6). 
 
Since we encounter the essences in time, they are actually divisible; this is in accord with what 
Aristotle says. But for God, the essences, while actually divisible, are had all at once. Hence, 
while contemplation of the essence in time implies that thought changes insofar as it moved 
“from part to part of the whole” (Meta 1075a6), God already has them as a whole. Hence, it is 
not necessary to believe that God‟s contemplation changes, even though this contemplation 
counts as divine omniscience:  
[s]ince he thinks himself, the object of his thought is actually indivisible. It does not 
follow that his thinking bears no relation to the world of that his self-contemplation is 
barren. For the possibility lies open that God thinks the (essences embodied in the) world 
as a whole (Lear 305, my italics). 
 
G. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I considered the merits of both the self-contemplation and omniscience 
models of God‟s contemplation. I argued that Aristotle‟s straightforward statements about God‟s 
mental activity did not make either of these models obviously correct, although I noted that the 
burden of proof was on Oehler‟s doctrine of divine self-contemplation. I then argued that 
Oehler‟s position rested on two criticisms, namely that God could not be ontologically dependent 
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on the world, and that Aristotle would never have attributed mutability to God. Having found 
both ideas to be compatible with omniscience (or at least nomological omniscience), I reject 
Oehler‟s interpretation. This serves my interpretation about the divinity thesis that it is indeed 
possible for some humans to think God‟s thoughts.  
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Chapter Four: The Origin of Kant‟s Doctrine of Non-Omniscience 
Chapter Summary 
 
Overall Goal: In this chapter I explain Kant‟s epistemological commitments that lead him to 
his doctrine of kind non-omniscience. This argument, coupled with our conclusions from the 
first three chapters, has the effect of showing why Kant and Aristotle have incompatible 
doctrines of non-omniscience. 
A. Introduction 
B. The Empiricists and the Quid Juris Problem. Kant successfully criticizes the empiricists 
for being unable to explain the ground of the relation of conceptual representations to the 
object of which it is a representation.  
C. The Rationalists and the Quid Juris Problem. Kant successfully criticizes the rationalists 
for being unable to explain how the doctrine of innate ideas can explain how any 
knowledge is our knowledge, rather than knowledge belonging to the „implanter‟ of 
innate ideas.  
D. Creative Intuition and the Quid Juris Problem. Kant makes it clear that the sort of 
spontaneity he is arguing for has nothing to do with the sort of spontaneity that creates its 
own object. Spontaneity in this sense is reserved for the divine intellect with intellectual 
intuition. 
E. Spontaneity, for the First Time. I make clear how Kant‟s doctrine of spontaneity makes 
his epistemology different from all other epistemologies. 
F. Kantian Finitude 
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A. Introduction 
 
 In his correspondence with Marcus Herz, Kant describes a problem that  
…I, as well as others, had failed to consider and which in fact constitutes the key to the 
whole secret of metaphysics, hitherto still hidden from itself. I asked myself this 
question: What is the ground of the relation of that in us which we call representation to 
the object? (CK 10:130).
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He had previously worked on this problem, but without the rigor required by the complexity of 
the task: “[i]n my dissertation I was content to explain the nature of the intellectual 
representations in a merely negative way, namely, to state that they were not modifications of the 
soul brought about by the object” (CK 10:130-1).
63
 Despite this, he was convinced that “[t]he 
sensuous representations present things as they appear, the intellectual representations present 
things as they are” (CK 10:130). It appears, then, that the pre-critical Kant believed that 
cognitions could be either sensible or intellectual. But now, he is concerned that since intellectual 
representations cannot be “given to us[,]…whence comes the agreement that they are supposed 
to have with objects…?” (CK 10:131). In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant finds the typical 
empiricist, rationalist, and idealist positions unable to explain this agreement. The purpose of this 
chapter is 1) to clarify the sense in which Kant believes that all previous attempts to answer the 
question of the ground of the relation of representation to object were insufficient (B, C, D) and 
2) to show how Kant‟s own solution is responsible for his doctrine of kind non-omniscience (E, 
F). Thus, the beginnings of Kant‟s redefinition of finitude can be traced to his attempt to solve 
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the problem of the ground of the relation of conceptual representations to their putative objects 
that he had first raised in his letter to Herz (LH).  
B. The Empiricists and the Quid Juris Question 
 
Kant returns to the question he raised in the LH some years later in the opening lines of 
the transcendental deduction (TD) of the Critique of Pure Reason: 
[j]urists, when they speak of entitlements and claims, distinguish in a legal matter 
between the questions about what is lawful (quid juris) and that which concerns the fact 
(quid facti), and since they demand proof of both, they call the first, that which is to 
establish the entitlement or the legal claim, the deduction (A84/B116).
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In certain legal cases, a lawyer has to prove not only that this crime was committed, but that this 
sort of thing should count as a crime given the current law. And the second proof may be 
characterized as a deduction because the lawyer must show how the established law necessarily 
applies to the act in question, thus making clear why the act is an illegal act. In an 
epistemological context, it is possible merely to assume that the categories apply to objects; but 
with what right (quid juris) do we make this assumption? If we wish to deduce the right, we must 
show that our conceptual representations necessarily apply to objects; this is objective validity. 
This is the deduction that Kant has set out to give in the TD. I take it that this is another version 
of the question that Kant earlier asked in his letter to Marcus Herz - “What is the ground of the 
relation of that in us which we call „representation‟ to the object?” – because those questions 
may be elided without changing the meaning of either. The new form may be this: “With what 
right do we believe that the relation between our representation and its putative object is 
grounded by necessity?” In other words, do we have a right to assume that our representation is 
necessarily of its putative object? I will henceforth refer to this as the quid juris question. 
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 At first glance, it seems odd that Kant frames the TD with the quid juris question, for the 
deduction is apparently directed at least partly at the empiricists, and Kant seems to imply both 
in the LH and in the TD that the empiricist is not obligated to answer this question:  
[i]f a representation comprises only the manner in which the subject is affected by the 
object, then it is easy to see how it is in conformity with this object, namely, as an effect 
accords with its cause, and it is easy to see how this modification of our mind can 
represent something, that is, have an object. Thus the passive or sensuous representations 
have an understandable relation to objects, and the principles that are derived from the 
nature of the soul have an understandable validity for all things… (CK 10:130). 
 
[w]e may make use of a multitude of empirical concepts without objection from anyone, 
and take ourselves to be justified in granting them a sense and a supposed signification 
even without any deduction, because we always have experience ready at hand to prove 
their objective reality (A84/B116). 
 
For the empiricist, the object is the cause and our representation of it is the effect. This is the sort 
of relation that Kant believes that our intuition has to objects, and since Kant is clear that no 
transcendental deduction is necessary if the object is the cause and the representation is the effect 
(A93/B125), it is possible to believe that the empiricist is required merely to give an empirical 
deduction. An empirical deduction is simply a quid facti question: „From which of our particular 
experiences did this concept arise?‟ (A85/B117).  
 But empiricism is not thereby a live option. Kant notices both in the LH and the TD that 
this is the relation with which the empiricist accounts for all representations, not just the sensible 
representations that Kant allows:  
…the object [is not] the cause of our intellectual representations in the real sense (in 
sensu reali). Therefore the pure concepts of the understanding must not be abstracted 
from sense perceptions, nor must they express the reception of representations through 
the senses… (CK 10:130). 
 
[a]mong the many concepts, however, that constitute the very mixed fabric of human 
cognition, there are some that are also destined for pure use a priori (completely 
independently of all experience), and these always require a deduction of their 
entitlement, since…one must know how these concepts can be related to objects that they 
do not derive from any experience (A85/B117). 
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These quotes are both outlines of the Metaphysical Deduction and highlight the point of the MD, 
namely, that it is simply false that all of our ideas could be a posteriori; hence, an empirical 
deduction will not satisfy the quid juris question.  
But empiricism has more problems than that it is not able to explain the acquisition of 
concepts. Kant mentions how both Locke and then Hume stand with regard to the quid juris 
question: 
[t]he famous Locke, from neglect of this consideration, and because he encountered pure 
concepts of the understanding in experience, also derived them from this experience, and 
thus proceeded so inconsistently that he thereby dared to make attempts at cognitions that 
go far beyond experience (A95/B127). 
 
Although it may be that Locke cannot account for how we acquire representations, Kant is 
concerned with a very different problem here. The problem is that even if Locke could explain 
how all concepts can be derived from experience, he still would not be able to explain how these 
concepts could be applied beyond experience. Locke assumes this, but with what right? 
 Hume shares a general commitment to empiricism with Locke, but Hume‟s empiricism 
is, according to Kant, more reflective; indeed, it is not stretching matters to say that Humean 
epistemology anticipated Kantian epistemology in an important way. It will be useful to recall 
that in the LH, dated 1772, Kant said that “…I, as well as others, had failed to consider…this 
question: What is the ground of the relation of that in us which we call “representation” to the 
object?” (CK 10:130). Somewhere between 1772 and 1783 (the publication date of the 
Prolegomena), Kant must have realized that he hadn‟t said that quite right because Hume before 
him had addressed something like the quid juris question: 
[t]he question was not, whether the concept of cause is right, useful, and, with respect to 
all cognition of nature, indispensable, for this Hume had never put in doubt; it was rather 
whether it is thought through reason a priori, and in this way has an inner truth 
independent of all experience, and therefore also a much more widely extended use 
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which is not limited merely to objects of experience…The discussion was only about the 
origin of this concept, not its indispensability in use; if the former were only discovered, 
the conditions of its use and the sphere in which it can be valid would already be given 
(Pro 4:258-259).
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Hume asks: „With what right do we utilize the concept of cause and effect to explain experience 
since we did not get this concept from experience?‟ Locke before him thought it unproblematic 
to call the idea of cause and effect an a posteriori idea; thus, its objective validity is 
unproblematic in the same measure. Hume, however, realized that we never actually observe 
causation, but merely the conjunction of two events; hence, cause and effect are not a posteriori 
concepts in the sense that they were not directly observed, but neither are they a priori concepts. 
Instead,  
…he concluded that reason completely and fully deceives herself with this concept, 
falsely taking it for her own child, when it is really nothing but a bastard of the 
imagination, which, impregnated by experience, and having brought certain 
representations under the law of association, passes off the resulting subjective necessity 
(i.e., habit) for an objective necessity (from insight). From which he concluded that 
reason has no power to think such connections, not even merely in general, because its 
concepts would be mere fictions (Pro 4:257-8). 
 
Because Hume posed this critical question to himself, he “subsequently proceeded quite 
consistently in declaring it to be impossible to go beyond the boundary of experience with these 
concepts and the principle that they occasion” (A95/B127). Of course, Hume did not need to go 
this far, because “it never occurred to him that perhaps the understanding itself…could be the 
originator of the experience in which it is encountered…” (A95/B127). But given Hume‟s 
assumptions, he was right to advance the skepticism that he did; and if the term „critical 
philosophy‟ may be extended to describe anyone who confronted the quid juris question, then 
Hume was a critical philosopher before Kant. 
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C. The Rationalists and the Quid Juris Question 
 In Kant‟s mind, this elevates Hume above the rationalists; Kant has some rather pithy and 
harsh things to say about that tradition: 
Plato assumed a previous intuition of divinity as the primary source of the pure concepts of the 
understanding and of first principles. Malebranche [sic] believed in a still-continuing perennial 
intuition of this primary being…Crusius believed in certain implanted rules for the purpose of 
forming judgments and ready-made concepts that God implanted in the human soul just as they 
had to be in order to harmonize with things…However, the deus ex machina is the greatest 
absurdity one could hit upon in the determination of the origin and validity of our cognitions… 
(CK 10:131, my italics). 
 
Kant characterizes the epistemologies of Plato, Malebranche, and Crusius as relying on 
explanations deus ex machina. This criticism is apparently analogous to the one given of a 
scientist, who when confronted with a problem that he cannot solve at the moment, concludes, 
„God must have done this.‟ Kant has in mind, no doubt, the sort of explanation of the origin of 
innate ideas that Plato gives in the Meno:  
…the divine among our poets…say…this…: As the soul is immortal, has been born often 
and has seen all things here and in the underworld, there is nothing which it has not 
learned; so it is in no way surprising that it can recollect the things it knew before… 
(Meno 81b-c).
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Although it is true that Plato is not committed to this particular explanation, he does not give an 
alternate one, thus leaving himself open to Kant‟s charges. Instead of a deduction, there is an 
appeal to an unknown, and more significantly, unknowable, origin of our ideas. But if this origin 
is unknowable, then why do we have a right to conclude that the ideas gained in this way before 
birth apply necessarily to objects? Kant believes that Plato cannot answer this question. 
One insufficiency of the LH criticism is that it is not at all clear that Kant is actually 
referring to the rationalist tradition in general, so it is significant that he takes up this criticism 
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again in the final section of the second edition of the TD. Kant imagines one who defends the 
view that the categories are  
subjective predispositions for thinking, implanted in us along with our existence by our 
author in such a way that their use would agree exactly with the laws of nature along 
which experience runs (a kind of pre-formation system of pure reason)…[I]n such a case 
the categories would lack the necessity that is essential to their concept. For e.g., the 
concept of cause…would be false if it rested only on a subjective necessity, arbitrarily 
implanted in us…  (B167). 
 
It at first seems that this passage must be taken as a reference, once again, to Hume, since Hume 
directly confronts the issues of subjective necessity and causation. But a closer examination 
yields a different conclusion. First, Kant‟s language of an „author‟ of our existence who 
„arbitrarily implanted‟ concepts in us is an echo of the references to „God‟ and explanations 
„deus ex machina‟ in the LH. Second, the subjective necessity of the TD passage is a 
„predisposition,‟ by which Kant indicates something that arrived before experience. In contrast, 
Hume referred to subjectively necessary ideas such as causation as bastards implanted by 
experience. These considerations make it unlikely that Kant was addressing Hume here.  
The best evidence, however, that Kant is not addressing the empiricists in the 
„implantation passage‟ is gained by examining Kant‟s biological analogues in that same section 
(§27): 
…either the experience makes these concepts possible or these concepts make the 
experience possible. The first is not the case with the categories (nor with the pure 
sensible intuition); for they are a priori concepts, hence independent of experience (the 
assertion of an empirical origin would be a sort of generatio aequivoca) (B167). 
 
Kant therefore encourages us to think of the first possibility, that the objects make the concepts 
possible, on analogy with the biological theory of generatio aequivoca. This is simply the theory 
of “spontaneous generation”, and holds that “generation is the process by which the material 
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takes the form of the living organism… without the agency of other living organisms.”
67
 The 
Guyer/Wood translation of the Critique calls this “[t]he generation of one sort of thing out of 
something essentially different, e.g., the supposed generation of flies from rotting meat” (264fn). 
In epistemology, this is what the empiricists propose, for elements of perception (one thing) are 
said to generate experiences and concepts in the mind (something essentially different).  As a 
blank slate, the mind contributes nothing to this generation.  
Kant‟s swift dismissal of the generatio aequivoca model is explained by recalling his 
previous conclusion concerning the empirical unity of consciousness, namely that “no cognitions 
can occur in us, no connection and unity among them, without that unity of consciousness that 
precedes all data of the intuitions…” (A107).  According to Kant, spontaneous generation and 
empiricism suffer for the same reason; they are partners in absurdity. In addition, spontaneous 
generation is incompatible with something he calls „preformation theory.‟ Preformation theory is 
then analogized with whatever Kant is talking about in the „implantation passage‟; hence, the 
implantation passage is not referring to empiricism. But what is preformation theory?  
Like generatio aequivoca, preformation theory is a model of evolutionary development. 
This model, however, is more complicated because it was taken seriously by science and was 
controversial in Kant‟s day. This theory holds that “the supreme world-cause…would only have 
placed in the initial products of its wisdom the initial predisposition by means of which an 
organic being produces more of its kind and constantly preserves the species itself (CJ 5:422).
68
 
God did not create the world in its current form, but God did create the elements necessary for 
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evolutionary development along pre-determined patterns. For example, the preformationist 
would give this analysis of reproduction: 
[p]reformation assumed that all livings things had been formed by God at the beginning 
of time and then encased in seeds or germs, either in the ovaries…or in the 
sperm…Conception merely awakened one of these sleeping forms…” (Reill 170).
69
 
 
Kant contrasts preformation theory with the evolutionary theory which he actually prefers, 
namely epigenesis. The theories differ because in epigenesis, any given living thing is a product 
generated by some other living being; in contrast, preformation theory characterizes any given 
living being as an educt (CJ 5:423).  The difference between products and educts can be 
characterized by speaking of the opposite modes of forces, formative and motive, that arose when 
speaking of the difference between things with natural purposes and those without; formative 
forces yield products, while motive forces yield educts.  
Kant says that the preformationists are set apart as the ones who denied “every individual 
from the formative power or nature in order to allow it to come immediately from the hand of the 
creator” (CJ 5:423). In that case, purposes are not natural but supernatural. The beings which are 
generated have already been given formative force by God and therefore do not need the 
capacity for self-formation; if this were true, the term „formative force‟ is no longer appropriate 
when describing organisms. Among other things, this implies “that the paternal contribution in 
generation is miniscule, merely setting in motion the development of structures already present 
in the egg…” (Lenoir 81).
70
 If this is how the force required to produce the organism is analyzed, 
then it is a motive force producing an educt.  
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If, on the other hand, we do attribute a formative impulse to organisms, the “receptivity of 
the organism to external stimuli and the interconnected ability to set its organs in motion” is 
taken seriously (Lenoir 85).  In contrast to the educt theory, on which there were “severe limits 
placed on this adaptive power by the original organization…” (Lenoir 85), the organisms could 
form themselves by adapting to external stimuli; because they form themselves, their mode of 
force is formative. In the end, Kant rejects preformation theory specifically because it does not 
respect the formative force that he attributes to nature: 
Kant is saying that organic nature must be construed not merely as evolutionary – as self-
evolving according to the preformation theory – but also exhibiting a certain creative 
activity – as self-evolving and relatively autonomous in its overall developmental process 
(Genova 265).
71
 
 
If preformation were an epistemological theory, sense experience would be the paternal 
contribution and innate ideas the maternal contribution. This is, then, to attribute passivity to our 
conceptual capacity, which for Kant would mean that it is the categories that are purely passive: 
in that case, the categories would be nothing but „subjective predispositions…implanted in us.‟ 
In terms of force, the categories would have motive as opposed to formative force. That this is an 
analogue to rationalism is made by clear by noting two Leibnizian theories of which Kant would 
have been aware: 
[s]ince Leibniz believed that souls are immortal, his theory is that all thoughts a mind will 
ever think were preformed at the Creation, when all souls were created. He also held a 
preformation theory of biology. He thought it analogous to his theory of mind and 
important for his theory of pre-established harmony, since it provided for the parallel 
between activities of living bodies and mind (Wubnig 150).    
 
Since Leibniz championed preformation theory both in epistemology and biology, and since 
Kant would have been familiar with both of Leibniz‟ positions, Kant must have had Leibniz at 
least partly in mind in the TD passage. But since I have demonstrated the continuity between the 
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LH passage and the TD passage, we now can observe that Kant thought his criticism caught up 
both Plato and Leibniz. It is not stretching things, therefore, to believe that Kant was attempting 
to characterize rationalism in general in those passages. 
It is rationalism, then, that undermines objective validity according to Kant. His concern 
about objective validity may be demonstrated by examining another analogy suggested in the LH 
but not carried through: “[v]arious moralists have accepted precisely this view with respect to 
basic moral laws. Crusius believed in certain implanted rules for the purpose of forming 
judgments…” (CK 10:131). Kant is implicitly critical of this kind of moral theory because if the 
rules for moral judgments are implanted, then we have no right to characterize those judgments 
as our moral judgments. We are, so to speak, a conduit, a moral robot programmed by our maker 
who at best judges and subsequently acts in accordance with the moral law. The important point 
is that we are not justified in concluding anything about the judgment because we cannot explain 
why the judgment is the right one. It turns out that we are not the moral actors who deserves the 
moral praise (or blame), for if God ordered our moral judgments, then God is responsible for the 
origin of the judgment. We simply cannot be held responsible for our judgments and subsequent 
actions if we could not have judged otherwise. 
A similar story can be told about implanted innate ideas. It may be that the judgments 
springing forth from our innate ideas „harmonize‟ with the world perfectly. Perhaps, but whether 
they do or do not is necessarily unknown to us. The most I can say is that “I am so constituted 
that I cannot think of this representation otherwise than as so connected…” (B168). Karl 
Ameriks puts the matter this way: “Kant stresses that even for God to put a thought into us, there 
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must be a ground within us, a capacity to receive and have the thought; otherwise, there would 
be no point to say that it is we rather than God who have the thought” (Ameriks 263).
72
 
Let‟s consider the most optimistic case, namely, that our implanted representations of 
objects do indeed map onto the world perfectly. In that case, there would be a causal story to be 
told about my knowledge: experience causes my representations, but it does so by activating 
latent, implanted capacities, which are themselves effects, for God causes their existence. 
Therefore, similar to the moral case, the knower is not really us but God. And that is the best 
case; there is still the possibility that our implanter is Descartes‟ evil genius, purposely causing 
mismatches between our implanted representations and the world. So Kant‟s original question 
has perhaps the most force when altered to apply to rationalism: “With what right do we believe 
that our implanted ideas map onto the world?” 
  D. Creative Intuition and the Quid Juris Problem 
 
 Kant‟s statements are provocative, and it would have been helpful for him to have said 
more about rationalism and preformation theory. But it is clear that he meant that the rationalist, 
just like the empiricist, grounds the relation of the representation and its putative objects by 
cause and effect. For the empiricist, the cause of our knowledge is experience; for the rationalist, 
the causes of our knowledge are experience and the implantation of innate ideas. Thus, for the 
empiricist, the determinateness necessary to turn sense perception into real experience must lie in 
the object; for the rationalist, the determinateness may be attributed to the „implanter.‟ Neither 
position captures Kant‟s formula that “the representation alone makes the object possible.” 
(A92/B124-5).  
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What Kant is describing is not a one-directional causal relationship, for Kant asks us to 
consider the possibility that the representation makes the appearance possible in the first place. 
As we have seen, this is analogous to considering an evolutionary theory other than generatio 
aequivoca or preformation theory. This is the possibility that “…the understanding itself, by 
means of [the categories], could be the originator of the experience in which its objects are 
encountered…” (A95/B127). This sounds at first like the reverse of empiricism, and thus another 
instance of a cause and effect relationship, particularly since Kant has characterized the 
dichotomy between his own preferred theory and empiricism in that way: “[e]ither…the object 
alone makes the representation possible, or…the representation alone makes the object possible” 
(A92/B124-5). However, the cause/effect model would be an inappropriate way to understand 
this possibility: 
…if that in us which we call “representation” were active with regard to the object, that 
is, if the object itself were created by the representation (as when divine cognitions are 
conceived as the archetypes of things), the conformity of these representations to their 
objects could also be understood (CK 10:130). 
 
Previously, we had been considering the empiricist theory that the representation is caused by the 
object. If the causal relationship is simply reversed, the representation causes the existence of the 
object. This is the model of idealism (but not transcendental idealism), a model that Kant plainly 
ruled out: the “representation in itself (for we are not here talking about its causality by means of 
the will) does not produce its object as far as its existence is concerned…” (A92/B125). 
The reason that Kant rules out this possibility is that it would require a type of intuition 
that humans do not have. The relevant feature of human intuition is that it is only part of human 
cognition: “there are two stems of human cognition…namely sensibility and understanding,” 
which can be analyzed separately because they have distinct tasks: “[t]hrough [sensibility] 
objects are given to us, but through [understanding] they are thought” (A15/B29). Human 
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cognition is thus made up of two distinct yet mutually dependent elements: “Thoughts without 
content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind” (A51/B75). The understanding thinks 
or judges, but it must have intuited objects lying before it about which to make judgments: “…all 
thought…must…ultimately be related to intuitions…since there is no other way in which objects 
can be given to us” (A19/B33).  
This, however, is only one possible conception of intuition: “…I cannot presuppose that 
in every such being thinking and intuiting…are two different conditions for the exercise of its 
cognitive faculties” (CJ 5:403). This is a reference to Kant‟s notion of an infinite intellect. For 
finite beings, knowledge of an object requires the work of two different faculties: intuition and 
thinking. In contrast, the intuition that Kant imagines that an infinite being would have is already 
intellectual. For an infinite mind, intellectual intuition (B68) and intuitive understanding (B145) 
would be synonyms. This “original being” (B72) therefore does not think in the sense that 
humans think, where thinking is a process separate from and dependent on intuition. 
Furthermore, this sort of intuition is not dependent on the existence of its objects, and hence is 
necessarily creative. The intuition of a finite being, intuitus derivativus, is an intuition that “is 
dependent on the existence of the object…” (B72); that is to say, there must already be an object 
for it to be affected. The intuition of the original being is intuitius originarius, which is an 
intuition “through which the existence of the object of intuition is itself given” (B72); that is to 
say, the intuitius originarius creates its own objects.  
E. Spontaneity, for the First Time 
It turns out then that Kant‟s notion that “the representation makes the object possible” 
(A92/B124-5) cannot mean that the representation creates its own object; making in this sense is 
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not creating. It would be accurate to say that divine intuition is spontaneous, which is quite 
different from the role of human intuition in cognition:  
[o]ur cognition arises from two fundamental sources in the mind, the first of which is the 
reception of representations (the receptivity of impressions), the second the faculty for 
cognizing and object by means of the representations (spontaneity of concepts) 
(A50/B74). 
 
Divine cognition is spontaneous, creative intuition; therefore thinking (i.e. spontaneous 
intellectual activity) is superfluous for divine cognition. Human cognition, however, involves 
both spontaneity and receptivity; thought is spontaneous, while sensibility is receptive.
73
 Both 
elements are necessary for knowledge. 
 The spontaneity/receptivity distinction offers us another way to characterize empiricism. 
Kant criticizes empiricism for characterizing human cognition as purely receptive. But as Kant 
points out, if the powers of the mind are merely receptive, then there is no feature of the mind 
capable of the power of synthesis, for synthesis requires spontaneity. Without synthesis, 
however, even the weakest of experiences would not be possible: 
[i]f every individual representation were entirely foreign to the other, as it were isolated 
and separated from it, the there would never arise anything like cognition, which is a 
whole of compared and connected representations. If I therefore ascribe a synopsis to 
sense, because it contains a manifold in its intuition, a synthesis must always correspond 
to this, and receptivity can make cognitions possible only if combined with spontaneity 
(A97).  
 
By not attributing any kind of spontaneity to human cognition, Kant points out, the empiricists 
cannot explain how raw sensation can even become the kind of intuition that be conceptualized; 
“the appearance would lack connection in accordance with universal and necessary laws, and 
would thus be intuition without thought…” (A111). 
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So Kant believes that his insight that “receptivity can make cognitions possible only if 
combined with spontaneity” (A97) rules out rigorous „blank slate‟ empiricism.
74
 By itself, the 
rationalist may agree with this statement. However, the mind that has been implanted with 
„innate ideas‟ is just as passive as the model of mind proposed by the empiricist. Kant would say 
that the rationalists had the good sense to posit a priori ideas, and thus do not have to rely on the 
unexplained determinateness of sense-data, but they believe that the spontaneity which 
necessarily exists when a priori ideas apply to experience does not spring from the a priori ideas 
themselves. Rather, the spontaneity of implanted innate ideas belongs to their author. Again, the 
evolutionary analogy rings true; in the preformation theory of evolutionary development, nature 
is inert, while God is active; the ideas that come to exist are therefore analogous to educts and 
not products. What appears to be the activity of nature is simply an „awakening‟ or what God had 
already encased. But for Kant, in order for objective validity to obtain of human cognitions, the 
spontaneity must be human spontaneity. If the spontaneity belongs to the implanter it would not 
be ours.  
What Kant has done, therefore, is to formulate a new model of spontaneity: the 
empiricists do not recognize spontaneity, the rationalists are forced to attribute spontaneity to the 
implanter, and the (non-transcendental) idealists must posit a type of spontaneous intuition that 
Kant believed that humans do not have.
75
 Objects must conform to the mind and not vice-versa 
because the condition for the possibility of having objects at all is that they conform to the mind. 
But since they conform to the mind‟s epistemic conditions, what the human mind cognizes are 
appearances of objects, not the objects as they are in themselves. This is the inevitable 
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consequence of making “…that in us which we call „representation‟…active with regard to the 
object” (CK 10:310). Furthermore, we simply have no basis for assuming that the object as it 
appears to us is the object as it is in itself: “[f]or if the senses merely represent something to us as 
it appears, then this something must also be a thing in itself and an object of non-sensible 
intuition, i.e., of the understanding” (A249). Therefore, while it is accurate to say that the 
epistemic conditions of the mind are constitutive of the appearance of the object, it is quite false 
to say that the mind has any existential causal role.  
F. Kantian Finitude 
 
 What does this imply about human cognition? Henry Allison attempts to locate Kant‟s 
radical redefinition of the limits of human thinking in Kant‟s theory of transcendental idealism, 
which he opposes to transcendental realism:  
I understand by the transcendental idealism of all appearances the doctrine that they are 
all together to be regarded as mere representations and not as things in themselves…To 
this idealism is opposed transcendental realism, which regards space and time as 
something given in themselves (independent of our sensibility). The transcendental realist 
therefore represents outer appearances…as things in themselves (A369).
76
 
 
Transcendental realism, then, is simply a general label for any ontology that does not recognize a 
distinction between things as they appear and things as they are in themselves. According to 
Kant, therefore, all epistemology is either transcendentally idealistic or transcendentally realistic, 
for any epistemology either recognizes this distinction or it does not. Kant, apparently for the 
first time in Western philosophy, recognizes such a distinction; as Allison says, “[o]nly the 
„critical philosophy‟ has succeeded in getting this distinction right” (Allison 16).
77
 This is to say 
that Kant believes (and Allison shows) that all non-critical philosophies are, at bottom, varieties 
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of transcendental realism; this is true of thinkers as widely varied as Descartes, Newton, 
Berkeley and Hume.
78
 
It is in this context that Allison argues that Kant, for the first time, articulates a 
conception of the human mind that is genuinely human. Allison takes Kant‟s description of the 
Copernican Revolution as a straightforward statement of transcendental idealism: 
[u]p to now it has been assumed that all our cognition must conform to the objects; but all 
attempts to find out something about them a priori through concepts that would extend 
our cognition have, on this presupposition, come to nothing. Hence let us once try 
whether we do not get farther with the problems of metaphysics by assuming that the 
objects must conform to our cognition… (Bxvi). 
 
This is a statement against transcendental realism because “the „objects‟ to which our knowledge 
presumably conforms must be characterized as things in themselves in the transcendental sense” 
(Allison 29). Furthermore, Allison detects in this formula a different way to understand the 
nature of transcendental realism: “we can be said to know objects just to the extent to which our 
thought conforms to their real nature, or equivalently, to God‟s thought of these same objects” 
(Allison 29). Allison thus introduces another name for transcendental realism: the theocentric 
view of knowledge. An epistemology is theocentric if it presupposes a “hypothetical “God‟s eye 
view” of things [that] is used as a standard in terms of which the “objectivity” of human 
knowledge is analyzed” (Allison 19).   
 Symmetrically, Allison re-describes transcendental idealism as an „anthropocentric view 
of knowledge,‟ “the defining characteristic of which is that the cognitive structure of the human 
mind is viewed as the source of certain conditions which must be met by anything that is to be 
represented as an object by such a mind” (Allison 29). The connection is that if one uncritically 
presupposes that that the mind conforms to objects, then one assumes that there are no conditions 
to which the object must conform if it is to be an object for us. And if there are no such a priori 
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conditions for human knowledge, then the object that appears is the object as it is in itself. 
Similarly, if there are no conditions which make the appearance a uniquely human appearance, 
then there is no qualitative difference between human and divine knowledge. As Allison says, 
“[t]o say that objects conform to our knowledge is just to say that they conform to the conditions 
under which we alone can present them as objects” (Allison 29). Allison gives these conditions a 
special name: „epistemic conditions.‟ Allison therefore believes that transcendental idealism 
implies a doctrine of epistemic conditions; transcendental realism implies no such thing. 
These two models of knowledge, in turn, imply two models of finitude. For the 
transcendental realist (or theocentric epistemologist), “human knowledge is judged by the ideal 
standard of divine knowledge and found wanting” (Allison 22). Importantly, this is merely a 
standard that in no way commits the one using it to affirm the existence of divine knowledge; it 
simply wonders how close non-omniscient thinkers are to omniscience. In the case of 
transcendental realism, there is no difference between how a finite intellect grasps an object and 
how it would be apprehended by an infinite, god-like intellect. Hence, the condition of non-
omniscience in this case implies that the list of things we know is merely not as long as God‟s 
list, although the things that we do know appear in the same way on God‟s list as well. This 
means that human knowledge is divine knowledge writ small; reciprocally, divine knowledge is 
human knowledge writ large.  
But for Kant, the accumulation of cognitions does not get us closer to omniscience. This 
would only be true if our cognitions were of things in themselves, and thus, of things as they are 
apprehended by God.
79
  But since objects must conform to the conditions set by human 
spontaneity, we can be guaranteed that this can never be the case. Human spontaneity is thus a 
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blessing and a curse: it makes the cognitions of objects possible while simultaneously making 
them mere appearances. If it were appropriate to measure “human knowledge…by the ideal 
standard of divine knowledge…”, then our finitude would be theocentric (Allison 22). But to use 
that measuring stick would be to use the wrong standard of measurement, for human and divine 
cognition are different sorts of things. Kant, then, by articulating a model of human cognition 
that cannot be measured by its proximity to divine cognition, has made possible a model of 
knowledge that Allison correctly characterizes as anthropocentric, for our knowledge can only be 
measured against the standard of other human cognizers. In this way, the anthropocentric model 
of knowledge carries with it a commitment to a unique type of finitude; thus, Kant has redefined 
finitude. 
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Chapter 5: Kant and Aristotle in Dialogue 
 
Chapter Summary by Section 
A. Introduction 
B. Kant’s ‘Intellectus Archetypus’ In Chapters 2 and 3, I argued for my interpretation of the 
nature of Aristotle‟s Contemplator. Here, I discuss Kant‟s intellectus archetypus. 
C. Aristotle and Kant’s Doctrine of Omniscience. Aristotle and Kant have relevantly similar 
conceptions of omniscience, which is important because this shows that their different 
conceptions of non-omniscience are more easily contrasted. Specifically, both thinkers 
posit beings that are omniscient insofar as they possess eternal, active, intellectual 
intuition that has the world in mind. 
D. Aristotle and Kant’s Doctrine of Non-Omniscience. In 4.E and F, I identified spontaneity 
as the key for understanding Kantian finitude.  Here I show the connection between 
Kant‟s denial of (human) intellectual intuition, and its connection to spontaneity. 
E. Conclusion 
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A. Introduction  
 In Chapter 3, I described Aristotle‟s God – a divine intellect that actively and eternally 
intuits the complete set of the intellectual forms of the world. In the present chapter I will 
describe Kant‟s God – the intellectus archetypus (B), and show that Kant and Aristotle have 
relevantly similar conceptions of this omniscient intellect (C). But their conception of a non-
omniscience intellect is the issue here, and D explains the epistemological commitments that led 
them to argue incompatible versions of human cognition. 
B. Kant‟s Intellectus Archetypus 
Kant considers the possibility of another type of cognition in three places: in the letter to 
Herz, after the discussion of the mechanism/teleology antinomy in the third Critique,
80
 and in 
various places in the first Critique.
81
 Perhaps the most obvious feature uniting all three 
discussions is that an alternate cognition is posited for the sake of better understanding human 
cognition. For example, after examining the nature of human understanding in the third Critique, 
Kant asks us to consider “a possible understanding other than the human one (as in the Critique 
of Pure Reason we had to have in mind another possible intuition if we were to hold our own to 
be a special kind, namely one that is valid of objects merely as appearance)” (CJ 5:405). Kant 
refers to this possible being in 1790 as an “intellectus archetypus” (CJ 5:408), a term he had 
already used in his 1772 letter to Herz. And while he did not use the term „intellectus archetypus’ 
in either edition of the first Critique (1781 and 1787) – there he focuses on the intuition and 
prefers the term “intuitus originarius” (B72) -  he does say that this type of intuition already 
implies a unique type of understanding: “[a]n understanding, in which through self-
consciousness of all the manifold would at the same time be given, would intuit; ours can only 
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 A27/B43, A42/B59, B68, B71-2, B135, B145, A255/B310 
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think and must seek the intuition in the senses” (B135). So even though the first Critique is most 
concerned with imagining a possible non-human intuition, it is clear that Kant never meant to 
separate this non-human intuition from the non-human understanding that he mentions in his 
letter to Herz and develops in the third Critique. I will thus refer to a possible being with a non-
human mode of cognition as the intellectus archetypus. 
Our understanding, Kant emphasizes, is a discursive understanding that cannot judge 
without the intuited manifold. Thus, “it must of course be contingent what and how different 
must be the particular that can be given to it in nature and brought under its concepts” (CJ 
5:406). That is, whatever manifold that is subject to concepts can only be the manifold (the 
particular) that is first intuited. Thus, the spontaneous power of the understanding is first 
dependent on an act of receptivity by the intuition. This type of intuition gives rise to a type of 
self-consciousness that is distinguished from the self-consciousness that would accompany an 
intellectual intuition:  
[c]onsciousness of itself (apperception) is the simple representation of the I, and if the 
manifold in the subject were given self-actively through that alone, then the inner 
intuition would be intellectual. In human beings this consciousness requires inner 
perception of the manifold that is antecedently given in the subject, and the manner in 
which this is given in the mind without spontaneity must be called sensibility on account 
of this difference (B68).  
 
And so a receptive intuition is always a sensible intuition. But since it is possible to imagine “a 
complete spontaneity of intuition…and thus an understanding in the most general sense of the 
term, one can thus also conceive of an intuitive understanding (negatively, namely merely as not 
discursive)…” (CJ 5:406). And this intuitive understanding is non-discursive not because it lacks 
this capacity, but because it has no need for it: 
[f]or if I wanted to think of an understanding that itself intuited…., then the categories 
would have no significance at all with regard to such a cognition. They are only rules for 
an understanding whose entire capacity consists in thinking, i.e., in the action of bringing 
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the synthesis of the manifold that is given in intuition from elsewhere to the unity of 
apperception… (B 145). 
 
Kant has pointed out that our understanding is discursive because it is limited by whatever 
manifold is intuited. We find the intellectus archetypus, then, “in the contrast…with our 
discursive, image-dependent understanding (intellectus ectypus)” (CJ 5:408).  
C. Aristotle and Kant‟s Conception of Omniscience  
 In Chapter 3, I argued that Aristotle‟s God has the sort of cognition that is eternal active 
intellectual intuiting of the complete set of intellectual forms, and that this counts as 
omniscience, provided omniscience is not understood as historical but nomological omniscience. 
In the previous section, I sketched an outline of Kant‟s intellectus archetypus; now we are in a 
position to wonder whether these conceptions of divine cognition are relevantly similar. That 
there is at least one difference is clear, for Aristotle is committed to the existence of his 
Contemplator, while Kant states several times that he is not committed to the existence of the 
intellectus archetypus. Certainly, Kant finds it useful to posit the idea of such a cognition, but 
this does not imply that the existence of a being with this cognition is posited. Rather, “…I 
cannot presuppose that in every such being thinking and intuiting…are two different conditions 
for the exercise of the cognitive faculties” (CJ 5:402, my italics). And certainly, not being able to 
rule out the existence of the intellectus archetypus is different than arguing for it. And, as if to 
obviate criticism that he may become engaged in metaphysical speculation, Kant says that “…it 
is not at all necessary to prove that such an intellectus archetypus is possible, but only that in the 
contrast of it with our discursive, image-dependent understanding (intellectus ectypus) and the 
contingency of such a constitution we are led to this idea (of an intellectus archetypus)…” (CJ 
5:408). 
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Besides this difference, there are several important similarities, such as that in both cases 
God‟s cognition is unerring. For Aristotle, the perfection of God‟s cognition is an implication of 
the fact that it is intuitive, for intuition cannot err:  
…thinking is…distinct from perceiving – I mean that in which we find rightness and 
wrongness – rightness in understanding, knowledge, true opinion, wrongness in their 
opposites: for perception of special objects of sense is always free from truth and 
error…while it is possible to think falsely as well as truly, and thought is found only 
where there is discourse of reason (DA 427b9-14). 
 
Aristotle here specifically refers to sensible intuition, which is always passive. However, there is 
no reason not to extend this point to both forms of intellectual intuition as well; what makes 
perception unerring is not that it is sensible, but that it is simple affection by an object. 
Kant shares Aristotle‟s view of divine intuition. While the intellectus archetypus has 
objects, it has them in a unique way: “…we can also conceive of an understanding which, since 
it is not discursive like ours but is intuitive, goes from…the whole to the parts…and in whose 
representation of the whole, there is no contingency of the combination of the parts” (CJ 5:407). 
And not only would contingency not be a problem, but the concern that “things can be possible 
without being actual,” is only a concern for a cognition with “two heterogeneous elements” (CJ 
5:402-3). But things are different for an intuitive understanding: 
…if our understanding were intuitive, it would have no objects except what is actual. 
Concepts (which pertain merely to the possibility of an object) and sensible intuitions 
(which merely give us something, without thereby allowing us to cognize it as an object) 
would both disappear (CJ 5:402). 
 
It is impossible for Aristotle‟s Contemplator to err, then, because its cognition is intuitive. Kant 
would undoubtedly agree, but he goes further by arguing that there is no difference between 
possible and actual objects for an intellectus archetypus, and hence, no possibility of error.  
 Chapter 3 shows that God‟s contemplation is eternal and of the complete set of 
intellectual forms, and that this constitutes omniscience. Does Kant also believe that God has the 
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world in mind? In the letter to Herz, Kant talks about representations that a divine cognition 
would have: 
if that which is called representation in us were active in relation to the object, i.e., if the 
object itself were created by the representation (as when divine cognitions are viewed as 
the archetypes of things), the conformity of these representations could be understood 
(CK 10:130). 
 
In this context, Kant is pointing to the quid juris question: with what right do we human 
cognizers believe that the representations of objects with which we find ourselves conform to the 
objects themselves? But this question dissolves if the „object itself were created by the 
representation.‟ This is the kind of idealism that Kant denied was possible in the case of human 
cognizers; while we make possible the form of experience, we cannot create the content. Hence, 
any human idealism is merely transcendental idealism. But since divine cognition creates objects 
in themselves, its cognition is archetypical. Indeed, this is why the intellectus archtypus is so-
called.  
 In the first Critique, although Kant does not use the phrase „intellectus archetypus,‟ he 
nevertheless emphasizes that the human intuition is called „intuitus derivatus‟ and the non-
human intuition is „intuitius originarius’ because of how they stand with respect to the existence 
of objects; for the original intuition, “the existence of the object of intuition is itself given,” while 
human intuition “is dependent upon the existence of the object” (B72). Kant also uses the 
language of production: 
[f]or if I wanted to think of an understanding that itself intuited (as, say, a divine 
understanding, which would not represent given objects, but through whose 
representation the objects would themselves at the same time be given, or produced), 
then the categories would have no significance at all with regard to such a cognition. 
(B145, my italics). 
 
Merold Westphal points to an analogy. He notes that for Kant,  
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[t]he definitions, axioms, and demonstrations which are possible in mathematics result 
from a direct insight we have into mathematical objects. One might say that we simply 
read off their properties. But this is possible only because in mathematics we have first 
constructed or created our objects in spatial or temporal intuition which is pure…a 
knower whose intuition was creative would have a knowledge of nature like our 
knowledge of mathematical objects (Westphal 123). 
 
In mathematics, there is only form and no content, which makes our intuition creational in this 
case. Although we don‟t know what it might be like to create content, at least we know what it is 
like to create form, and so this analogy may be useful. And while it would be pressing things to 
think of Aristotle‟s God as a creator in a similar sense (the Unmoved Mover famously is the first 
mover of the universe by being an object of desire,
 82
 not by making it),
83
 this difference is 
unimportant for my present investigation. The point I am making is that the intellectus 
archetypus, as much as Aristotle‟s God, has the world in mind; the proof is that for the 
intellectus archetypus, creating the world and having it in mind are identical events. This is 
omniscience that is unerring and intuitive. 
And, significantly, while the divine, non-discursive cognitions of Kant and Aristotle have 
the world in mind, they do not have recourse to imagination. Kant is explicit about this: the 
intellectus archetypus contrasts “with our discursive, image-dependent understanding…” (CJ 
5:408). But does Aristotle‟s God ever imagine? Aristotle says that “imagination is different from 
either perceiving or discursive thinking, though it is not found without sensation, or judgment 
without it” (DA 427b14-15). Obviously, perception gives rise to imagination, although not 
necessarily so, since “imagination [is not] found in all brutes…e.g. it is not found in ants or bees 
or grubs” (DA 428a9-10). The difference is that human cognition is also discursive, and images 
are necessary for discursivity: “[t]o the thinking soul [ηῇ διανοηηικῇ τςσῇ] images serve as if 
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 1072a25-26 
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 Kosman argues that the interpretation that the „maker mind‟ could be a description of God creating the universe 
by thinking it is unsupported by the text. See “What does the Maker Mind make?” p. 344. 
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they were contents of perception…That is why the soul never thinks without an image” (DA 
431a15-17). There can be no mental activity for human beings unless we first perceive; in this 
sense, our mind is dependent upon something being given. Usually, however, when we think, we 
are not standing in front of our object. This kind of direct perception, however, is not necessary 
because of our ability to recall images of the particulars. Comportment toward images, then, is a 
substitute for comportment toward particulars, which is why „images serve as if they were 
contents of perception.‟ 
Charles Kahn explains Aristotle‟s reasoning about phantasms as a logical consequence of 
his analysis of the conditions of a composite existence: 
[i]n order for [any minimally rational train of thought] to take place the first condition – 
call it condition A – is empirical consciousness or sentience, what human beings share 
with animals…Sentience in the subjective side of aisthesis…The second condition, 
Condition B, is the specific capacity of nous, access to the noetic domain…The 
requirement of phantasms is a direct consequence of Condition A, our existence as 
sentient animals. As sentient, embodied beings, we cannot think even of noeta, 
intelligible objects, except by way of phantasms, the hylomorphic basis of our thought… 
(Kahn 362).
84
 
 
Kahn correctly recognizes that contemplating itself is not essentially tied to images. This means 
that God, who is not bound by Condition A, does not need images in order to contemplate. Thus, 
Kahn believes that while human contemplation is necessarily tied to phantasms (although this 
part of his analysis is mistaken),
85
 it is not because of the nature of intelligible objects, but the 
way that they are acquired.
86
 Thus, both Kant and Aristotle propose the sort of unerring 
omniscience that has the world in mind, but does not have recourse to either imagination or 
discursivity; thus, both Aristotle‟s God and the intellectus archetypus know the world 
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 Kahn, Charles. “Aristotle on Thinking.” Essays on Aristotle’s De Anima. Edited by Martha Nussbaum and 
Amelie Rorty. Claredon Press, Oxford, 1992, ed. 
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 As hylomorphic beings, our having of intelligible objects is necessarily dependent on specific acts of passive 
intuition. Thus, the way that humans have intelligible objects is a consequence of our embodiment and that we must 
„collect‟ the forms one by one. If God‟s contemplation can be taken to be complete and eternal possession of the 
noetic domain, then God‟s contemplation does not require imagination. 
 99 
 
intuitively.
87
 Since both thinkers posit beings that are omniscient because they possess active, 
intellectual intuition, their conceptions of non-omniscience may be contrasted.  
D. The Importance of Intellectual Intuition 
Thus far, I have proved that while Kant and Aristotle share a conception of divine 
omniscience, they have incompatible interpretations of non-omniscience. In Chapter 4.F, I 
argued that it is Kant‟s notion of epistemic conditions that sets his doctrine of non-omniscience 
apart from the tradition; for Kant, any intuited content is subject to epistemic conditions arising 
from spontaneity. While this is true, it is also potentially misleading; for example, Aristotle has 
identified sensible intuition, passive intellectual intuition, discursive reasoning, and active 
intellectual intuition (i.e. contemplation) as conceptually separable functions of human cognition, 
and the last two functions can be thought of as spontaneous in a certain sense. The important 
difference is that cognitive spontaneity may be either a priori or a posteriori. Aristotle‟s doctrine 
is that the self-intuiting of the intellectual forms (i.e. the mind‟s intuition of itself) is the likely 
(or perhaps inevitable) consequence of previously intuiting the intellectual forms in experience, 
since the mind is constituted by the forms that it intuits in experience. In this way, active 
intellectual intuition (and a similar story can be told about discursivity) is spontaneous a 
posteriori. But when Kant talks about the capacity of human cognition for spontaneity, he always 
means a priori spontaneity.  
The reason for this, I argue, begins with his beliefs about intuition. Kant characterizes 
human intuition and divine intuition as intuitus derivativus and intuitius originarius, 
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with or compatible with the God of ordinary theism?‟ Rather, my concern is whether Kant and Aristotle have a 
relevantly similar conception of divine cognition. I have shown that there is such a similarity. 
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respectively. But a Latin Aristotle also could have easily used the term „intuitus derivativus,‟ 
provided that we recognize its two species – sensible derived intuition and intellectual derived 
intuition. The difference is that for Kant, any derived intuition is necessarily non-intellectual; any 
intellectual intuition is already creative and active. As he says, even if the pure forms of intuition 
in some other kind of being with intuitus derivativus were not space and time, “this kind of 
intuition would not cease to be sensibility, for the very reason that it is derived” (B72, my 
italics). For Kant, then, there is a logical connection between the derivativeness of the intuition 
and its sensibility, such that any receptive intuition is necessarily sensible. By positing 
intellectual intuition that is nevertheless passive, Aristotle has taken a position irreconcilable 
with Kant‟s.  
Early in his career, Kant held a position closer to Aristotle‟s. In the Inaugural 
Dissertation,
88
 he says that 
[i]ntelligence is the faculty of a subject in virtue of which it has the power to represent 
things which cannot by their own quality come before the sense of that subject. The 
object of sensibility is the sensible; that which contains nothing but what is to be 
cognized through the intelligence is intelligible. In the schools of the ancients, the former 
was called a phenomenon and the latter a noumenon…It is thus clear that things which are 
sensible are representations of things as they appear, while things which are intellectual 
are representations of things as they are (ID 2:392-3). 
 
That is, by intellectual intuition, “the concepts themselves, whether of things or relations, are 
given, and this is their real use” (ID 2:393).  
 Of course, Kant completely reversed himself in his mature work, as it became 
fundamental for the critical philosophy that the faculty of sensibility was, for humans, the only 
faculty that could intuit: 
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[t]he capacity (receptivity) to acquire representations through the way in which we are 
affected by objects is called sensibility. Objects are therefore given to us by the 
sensibility, and it alone affords us intuitions; but they are thought through the 
understanding, and from it arise concepts. But all thought…must ultimately be related to 
intuitions, thus, in our case, sensibility, since there is no other way objects can be given to 
us (A19/B33, my italics). 
 
Later in the first Critique, Kant frames his identification of passive intuition and sensible 
intuition by again bringing up the distinction between phenomena and noumena: 
[a]ppearances, to the extent that as objects they are thought in accordance with the unity 
of the categories, are called phaenomena. If, however, I suppose there to be things that 
are merely objects of the understanding and that, nevertheless, can be given to an 
intuition, although not to sensible intuition (as coram intuiti intellectuali [by means of 
intellectual intuition]), then such things would be called noumena” (A248-9, my 
insertion). 
 
For the critical Kant, the understanding has access to objects intuited by sensibility, but 
this means that its mode of access is always mediated. What Kant is considering in the following 
quote, as above, is immediate intuitive intellectual access: 
[w]ith regard to appearances, to be sure, both understanding and reason can be used; but 
it must be asked whether they would still have any use if the object were not appearance 
(noumenon), and one takes it in this sense if one thinks of it as merely intelligible, i.e., as 
given to the understanding alone and not to the senses at all… The question is thus: 
whether beyond the empirical use of the understanding…a transcendental one is also 
possible, pertaining to the noumenon as an object - which question we have answered 
negatively (A257/B313). 
 
Kant argues that the understanding has an essential role to play in unifying the manifold of 
intuition (this is what he refers to here as its empirical use), but the question before us now is 
whether the understanding has any objects proper to it that it acquires through intuition (this is 
what he here calls its transcendental use, i.e. when an intellectual object is given to the 
understanding). This is the possibility that Kant rejects in the case of human beings. Aristotle, 
however, answers Kant‟s question in the affirmative. He does believe that there are intellectual 
objects that are intuited.  
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This analysis suggests that Kant‟s noumena and Aristotle‟s ta noeta are relevantly 
similar. They are 1) objects (or things), 2) objects that are given to the intuition, and therefore 3) 
passively intuited objects, 4), objects that are inaccessible to the sensible intuition and therefore 
5) objects that can only be intuited by the intellect; of course the difference is that for Kant, 
noumena, whatever their ontological status, cannot be accessed by human cognition. There is a 
role for the understanding in Kantian epistemology; this is why Kant says that “[w]ith regard to 
appearances, to be sure, both understanding and reason can be used (A257/B313). But this use of 
the understanding requires a priori spontaneity, which is importantly different from the „real use‟ 
suggested by some rationalists (and by the early Kant), where objects are intuited by the 
understanding. For Kant, therefore, the spontaneity attributed to cognition is a priori, and this is 
because of his rejection of intellectual intuition.
89
 
E. Conclusion 
In Chapters 1-5, I have shown that 1) Kant and Aristotle have incompatible conceptions 
of non-omniscience, and that 2) the root of this disagreement is their incompatible positions on 
the possibility of passive intellectual intuition. Chapters 6 and 7 now have the task of evaluating 
these two positions. Two things are clear about Kant‟s position on passive intellectual intuition: 
at the beginning of his career, he thought that both sensible and intellectual intuition was possible 
because objects could be given either to sensibility or the understanding, depending on the nature 
of the object. Yet just as clearly, he rejected intellectual intuition by the advent of the critical 
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philosophy. In this present chapter, I have argued that this makes all the difference for his 
position on the nature of non-omniscience. So is Kant justified in this restriction? 
In Chapter 6, I investigate this issue by first examining Kant‟s analysis of the difference 
between a legitimate and an illegitimate judgment, and I will call his conclusion on this matter 
his „doctrine of legitimate judgments‟ (DLJ). The connection between Kant‟s DLJ and the 
possibility of passive intellectual intuition is that one way for a judgment to be illegitimate is if it 
presupposes that the understanding does not simply have the task of unifying the manifold given 
by sensible intuition. It has, in addition, what Kant called in the Inaugural Dissertation a „real 
use,‟ namely, the cognition of objects that are given to it independently of sensibility. This 
amounts to a commitment to the human capacity to cognize (and not just think) noumenal 
objects, which means not only that humans can cognize things as they are themselves,
90
 but also 
metaphysical ideas, namely, God, the soul, and the true nature of the world.
91
  
Thus, if one fails to restrict human intuition to sensibility, then we have the right to any 
judgment whatsoever – including metaphysical ones - provided we have justified our judgment. 
Therefore, if Kant is able to show that humans can merely think about (and not truly cognize) 
things in themselves and metaphysical ideas, then Kant will be justified in rejecting passive 
intellectual intuition. In Chapter 6, I explore the meaning of the DLJ, and find that Aristotle‟s 
unique doctrine of intellectual intuition renders Kant‟s argument(s) against it irrelevant. This 
anticipates Chapter 7, in which I evaluate another justification for Kant‟s position on the 
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impossibility of intellectual intuition, namely the antinomial attack on metaphysics, which I do 
find successful.  
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Chapter 6: “The Meaning and Attempted Justification of Kant‟s Doctrine of Legitimate 
Judgments” 
Chapter Summary 
A. Introduction. I explain Kant‟s doctrine of legitimate judgments (DLJ). 
B. That Extra-Intuitive Judgments Must Be Conditioning Judgments. Kant‟s DLJ has been 
attacked on the grounds that it is undeveloped (Ameriks) and that it excludes scientific 
theories (Hegel). I argue that Kant could have responded to these criticisms first by 
noting that an extra-intuitive judgment must be a conditioning judgment. 
C. That Conditioning Judgments Must Not Be of the Unconditioned. Kant must develop 
another limit to conditioning judgments, namely, that they must not be of the 
unconditioned; if they are of the unconditioned, then one has assumed transcendental 
realism. 
D. Should We Believe Kant’s Doctrine of Legitimate Judgments? I argue that Kant‟s 
positions on legitimate judgments and intellectual intuition (detailed in 5.D) are 
dogmatic. They both require the presupposition that affection by intellectual objects is 
impossible, but Aristotle argues that intellectual affection is not just possible but 
necessary for experience. Thus, Kant‟s DLJ is not relevant for Aristotle.  
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A. Introduction 
In Chapter 4, I pointed to Kant‟s quid juris question: 
 
[j]urists, when they speak of entitlements and claims, distinguish in a legal matter 
between the questions about what is lawful (quid juris) and that which concerns the fact 
(quid facti), and since they demand proof of both, they call the first, that which is to 
establish the entitlement or the legal claim, the deduction (A84/B116). 
 
In answer to his own question, Kant concluded that we have a right to a judgment if and only if 
the concepts that it employs can be deduced:  
[a]mong the many concepts…that constitute the very mixed fabric of human cognition, 
there are some that are destined for pure use a priori…and these always require a 
deduction of their entitlement… I therefore call the explanation of the way in which 
concepts can relate to objects a priori their transcendental deduction, and distinguish this 
from the empirical deduction, which shows how a concept is acquired through experience 
(A85/B117). 
 
Kant concludes that concepts such as „cause,‟ „effect,‟ and „negation‟ can be transcendentally 
deduced, since they make experience possible. Concepts such as „rock,‟ „warm,‟ and „giraffe,‟ 
can be empirically deduced since the objects which give rise to those concepts are given in 
experience. We have a right to make any judgment which uses these concepts, even when that 
judgment is false. Since we have a right to these and no other judgments, this doctrine may be 
referred to as Kant‟s doctrine of legitimate judgments (DLJ).
92
 In Chapter 4, I showed how this 
doctrine commits Kant to a unique interpretation of non-omniscience. But now the success of the 
DLJ takes on significance, because as I showed in Chapter 5, whether it can be defended or not 
depends on whether Kant or Aristotle has a better interpretation of non-omniscience. In sections 
B and C, I develop Kant‟s DLJ in a way in that is both necessary and consistent with Kant‟s own 
remarks elsewhere in the Critique. While it is clear that this doctrine, if true, would undermine 
Aristotle‟s claims about the power of reason, it is still not clear how defensible it is. In sections 
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D-G, then, I will consider two different potential justifications for this doctrine and evaluate the 
extent to which those justifications are problematic for Aristotle. I find these defenses generally 
unsuccessful, which anticipates Chapter 7 where I consider a third Kantian reason for us to 
believe that metaphysical judgments are illegitimate judgments. 
 B. That Extra-Intuitive Judgments Must Be „Conditioning Judgments‟ 
Kant calls judgments that employ concepts that are neither transcendentally nor 
empirically deducible „transcendent judgments;‟ for reasons that will become clear, I will use the 
less pejorative term „extra-intuitive judgments.‟ It is possible to believe that Kant finishes his 
explanation of the DLJ here in the Transcendental Analytic. If so, extra-intuitive judgments and 
illegitimate judgments would be the same thing. But this is a difficult claim, and disappoints 
commentators such as Ameriks: “[t]o say simply that such claims are illegitimately 
“transcendent” is to beg a lot of questions about what that means, and it is surely not easy to hold 
that all of the Critique’s own major claims…are nontranscendent in a evident sense” (Ameriks 
258). Ameriks is here pointing out that even if the results of the Transcendental Analytic are 
accepted unconditionally, it is not obvious that the arguments of the Analytic are intended to rule 
out the possibility that all other judgments are illegitimate. While Ameriks is right to complain 
that Kant does not develop his DLJ at this point in the first Critique, it is possible to show that 
there is more to the story because Kant does satisfactorily develop his doctrine in the 
Transcendental Dialectic. 
What I propose, however, is not a widely accepted interpretation of the division of labor 
between the Analytic and the Dialectic. The Transcendental Analytic distinguishes legitimate 
and illegitimate judgments and thus is concerned with the understanding insofar as it is our 
capacity to make judgments, while the Transcendental Dialectic is focused on how reason links 
judgments together in a syllogism. But what is important for my investigation, and what still 
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remains unclear, is whether the Dialectic develops the DLJ. It is possible to believe that the 
Transcendental Analytic has explained why some judgments are illegitimate, while the 
Transcendental Dialectic merely explains how we arrive at some of those illegitimate judgments 
(namely, the traditional metaphysical ones). As such, it is nothing more than a genealogy of 
metaphysical judgments. Paul Guyer appears to accept this interpretation of the division of labor 
between these two sections while evaluating the success of the Transcendental Dialectic:  
…even if reason is tempted by some natural path to formulate or posit these 
transcendental ideas…can it acquire any knowledge by doing so? Don‟t claims to 
knowledge have to answer the quid juris…? Of course they do, and Kant‟s argument 
against traditional metaphysics is precisely that although it has formed its transcendental 
ideas by a natural mechanism, it has ignored the chief result of Kant‟s own critical 
philosophy, namely that concepts yield knowledge only when applied to intuitions…. 
(Guyer 133).93 
 
Guyer is saying that Kant has already critiqued traditional metaphysics in the 
Transcendental Analytic by showing why some judgments are illegitimate (i.e., that they did not 
answer the quid juris question).94 The Transcendental Dialectic is merely given the task of laying 
out the „natural mechanism‟ or the „natural path‟ that we take to metaphysics; that is, it explains 
how and why we come to have the metaphysical concepts with which we find ourselves. We 
should note that if Guyer is right that the Transcendental Dialectic does not extend the argument 
of the Transcendental Analytic, we have a right to be disappointed, for the notion that all 
transcendent judgments are illegitimate is not at all clear, as Ameriks has pointed out.  
It is not, however, all Kant has to say on the matter. We may begin by recalling Kant‟s 
warning about the misuse of judgment. When judgment is misused, it judges “without distinction 
about objects that are not given to us, which perhaps indeed could not be given to us in any way” 
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(A64/B88).  There are two distinctions buried in this sentence. The first is between objects that 
are not in fact given to us, and objects that could not be given to us. Examples of the former 
include devils and unicorns, while examples of the latter would include God and the soul. A 
second distinction is one that is not made explicitly, but seems relevant: when we „judge about 
objects,‟ we may be either making existential judgments or predicative judgments. Combining 
these distinctions yields four types of synthetic judgments: existential judgments of objects that 
could be given in intuition (“Demons exist”), existential judgments of objects that could not be 
given in intuition (“The soul exists”), predicative judgments of objects that could be given in 
intuition (“Demons are warm”), and predicative judgments of objects that could not be given in 
intuition (“The soul is immortal”). 
There is still a third important distinction to be made that will double the number of 
judgments, and unlike the first two distinctions, Kant does not address it explicitly in 
Transcendental Analytic. It is that some judgments are made for the sake of accounting for some 
feature of experience, while some judgments are not; I will call judgments of the former kind 
„conditioning judgments,‟ since they attempt to give the conditions that must hold in order to 
explain an appearance. Demons are not intuited, of course, but what gives an existential 
judgment about them a real air of implausibility is when this judgment is not made for the sake 
of accounting for any object given in sense experience. This raises an important question: is the 
judgment “demons are red‟” illegitimate because demons are not in fact given to us in intuition, 
or because that judgment is not made for the sake of unifying experience? And is it any different 
in the case of objects that could not be given in any possible intuition? For instance, should the 
judgment that „the soul is immortal‟ be rejected because the soul could not be given to us in 
intuition, or because that judgment does not help make sense of experience? With the addition of 
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this third criterion, there are now eight types of judgments, for any judgment may be categorized 
according to whether it is existential or predicative, whether its object could be given in possible 
experience or not, and whether it is made for the sake of accounting for experience or not. 
Consider these five scientific judgments: 
A. “The solar system is heliocentric” 
B. “Black holes occupy every region of space” 
C. “Atom X has X number of electrons” 
D. “Magnetic force exists” 
E. “Dinosaurs existed” 
Since Kant is a clear advocate of theoretical science, his DLJ must be interpreted in such a way 
as to allow the right of scientists to make these judgments. Two of the judgments (B, D) concern 
objects that could not be given in any possible intuition, while three contain objects that could 
(A, C, E); three of the judgments (A,B,C) are predicative, while two are existential (D,E). Thus, 
these five judgments, while all made for the sake of unifying experience, cut across our first two 
distinctions of predicative/existential and accessible/not accessible in possible intuition. And yet 
they must all be taken as legitimate. This means that what separates them from the judgment 
“demons are red” is a single criterion, namely, that our five scientific judgments are attempts to 
make sense of sense-experience.    
Before I defend Kant, I want to note that the point I am making is not always appreciated. 
James Kreines points out that this is precisely one of Hegel‟s motivations for rejecting Kant‟s 
attempt to limit cognition.95 Hegel says that “the empirical sciences do not stop at the perception 
of single instances of appearance; but through thinking they have prepared the material for 
philosophy by finding universal determinations, kinds, and laws” (12n).96 According to Kreines, 
this means that Hegel believes that “there are no sharp lines dividing our insight into objects of 
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perception from our insight into laws and kinds…so no sharp line at which knowledge might be 
said to end” (Kreines 322). As a result, “we can gain knowledge by thinking about what we 
observe, and drawing inferences about the natural laws and kinds which explain our 
observations” (Krienes 321, my italics). Hegel, then, rejects Kant‟s attempt to limit extra-
intuitive judgments by showing that some extra-intuitive judgments must be accepted as 
legitimate. 
The response open to Kant, and I believe the correct response, is to say that the judgment 
that magnetic force exists is a legitimate judgment but only because it is giving unity to some 
observable experiences; that it is say, it is explanatory of experience. So while its object 
(magnetic force) is not (and cannot be) given in experience, this affirmative existential judgment 
is legitimate. In other words, a legitimate judgment is now one which either employs concepts 
that can be deduced (whether empirically or transcendentally) or judgments that are made for the 
sake of explaining judgments which employ said concepts. Since these judgments attempt to 
derive the conditions necessary for explaining legitimate judgments, they may be described as 
„conditioning judgments.‟  
The judgment that black holes exist counts as a conditioning judgment because black 
holes are posited for the sake of making sense of some highly complicated calculations. But 
imagine a person before the advent of modern physics who claimed that light and energy got 
trapped into pits and could never get out, and when asked, he claimed to have come up with this 
theory to amuse his friends. Such a judgment would be illegitimate, but not because of the 
judgment itself; its illegitimacy issues from the fact that it was not given for the sake of unifying 
what is given in experience. 
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Kant does not say explicitly that conditioning judgments must be taken as legitimate, 
although he implies his support of this doctrine when disparaging certain metaphysical 
judgments that make knowledge claims for the sake of satisfying some interest with which we 
find ourselves. In a rarely cited section of the antinomies, “On the interest of reason in these 
conflicts,” Kant anticipates some philosophical and psychological insights that wouldn‟t be 
widely accepted for nearly a century. Kant considers the factors involved in pushing us toward 
the 
…side we would prefer to fight... Since in this case we would consult not the logical 
criterion of truth but merely our interest, our present investigation…will have the utility 
of making it comprehensible why the participants in this dispute have sooner taken one 
side than the other… (A465/B493, my italics). 
 
Kant believes that half of the antinomial metaphysical positions “are so many cornerstones of 
morality and religion,” while the other half of the positions “rob us of these supports…” 
(A466/B94). That is to say, the interest that at least partly guides us to champion certain 
metaphysical positions is a pre-critical acceptance or rejection of religion. Whether Kant‟s 
psychological analysis of exactly how our pre-critical interests drive our metaphysical arguments 
is correct is not the interesting point here. What is relevant is to note is that Kant believes that 
some metaphysical judgments
97
 are attempts to answer to our idiosyncratic interests, not 
attempts to account for experience. And we may extend this point to include not just concepts 
employed to further religious interests, but any interest at all, whether it be the concept of 
„fortune‟ used by fortune-tellers for profit, or the concept of „black holes‟ used by our jokester. 
 This is certainly a fair observation in the case of some metaphysical judgments. Take 
judgments about the soul, for example. Religious believers usually make existential judgments 
about the soul, but those judgments are easily classified as illegitimate because they are mere 
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attempts to explain how an article of faith, namely, immortality, may be possible, and not an 
attempt to explain what is given in experience. And obviously, this would extend to judgments 
about the existence of God. For example, immediately after Anselm gives the ontological 
argument for God‟s existence, he prays, “I give thanks, good Lord, I give thanks to you, since 
what I believed before through your free gift I now so understand…”98 Clearly, Anselm had a 
practical interest in God‟s existence, and that practical interest drove him to articulate his proof 
for God‟s existence. With this proof in his back pocket, he could always strengthen his own faith 
when it was failing, or perhaps have a ready philosophical argument to appeal to the atheist‟s 
rational side. In this case, the metaphysical judgment that God necessarily exists in reality is a 
metaphysical judgment posited because of an interest and in no way accounts for what is given in 
experience. Kant‟s argument that judgments must respect the limits of sensibility is violated 
here, since this judgment is not about an object given in experience nor it is a judgment that 
attempts to explain what is given in sensibility. My point here is that Ameriks and Hegel were 
both right to worry that if Kant simply meant that all extra-intuitive judgments were illegitimate, 
he would be excluding many universally accepted explanatory judgments. But I have shown that 
Kant could easily accept extra-intuitive judgments as legitimate provided that they are 
conditioning judgments. This would mean that the judgment that God exists is illegitimate (at 
least) insofar as it is the conclusion of the ontological argument. 
C. That Conditioning Judgments Must Not Be Unconditioned 
The first restriction on extra-intuitive judgments, then, is that in order to be legitimate 
they must be conditioning and not made for the sake of satisfying some interest. Thus, it is worth 
noting that some traditional metaphysical judgments – the kind Kant wants to reject - are 
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conditioning judgments. For example, although I have only considered the ontological argument 
for God‟s existence, it is also possible to argue for God‟s existence as a theoretical attempt to 
account for some feature of experience. This is what Aristotle does when he argues for the 
Unmoved Mover, since the purpose of positing the Unmoved Mover is to account for the 
phenomenon of motion in general.99 Of course, Aristotle‟s actual argument has some 
dramatically untrue premises, such as his belief that all heavenly motion is circular. But we are 
not concerned with whether the judgment results from a sound argument, but whether he has a 
right to this judgment (quid juris).100 It might seem that he does have this right, just as much as 
the scientist has a right to posit magnetic force for the sake of making sense of certain motions. 
This same reasoning can be extended to include existential judgments about the soul. It is one 
thing when the religious believer makes one for the sake of accounting for his belief in 
immortality, but, as we have seen, Aristotle‟s doctrine of nous is his valiant attempt to account 
for experience.
101
 And again, whether Aristotle‟s argument is sound is not relevant here. What 
this means is that if Kant wishes to maintain his attack on metaphysics, he must introduce 
another condition for legitimate judgments. I argue that the Transcendental Dialectic provides 
such a condition. 
In the Transcendental Dialectic, Kant is not focused on the nature of legitimate judgment 
as such, but rather aims to discover why human reason often attempts to ascend dialectically the 
chain of syllogisms to reach an unconditioned judgment. Kant claims that despite the 
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complexities, the basic presupposition (which leads to a misuse of reason) exposed by the 
Transcendental Dialectic is fairly straightforward: “[i]f the conditioned is given, then the whole 
series of all conditions for it is also given” (A497/B525). The pre-critical ontologist believes that 
because conditioned objects are in fact given to us in sensibility, reason should be able to ascend 
to the unconditioned because the unconditioned - that is, the final judgment grounding the series 
of conditions - must also be given. Kant names the position that leads reason on this misguided 
quest „transcendental realism,‟ which ignores the warnings given by transcendental idealism. 
The transcendental realist believes in the existence of the external world, which requires 
her to make “modifications of our sensibility into things subsisting in themselves” (A491/B519). 
Thus, transcendental realism is simply rooted in the failure to appreciate that space and time are 
the conditions of sensibility, which according to Kant, implies that they are not features of the 
world in-itself. If this mistake is made, then it follows that when appearances are given, they are 
conditioned entirely by external, mind-independent reality; so to speak, space and time are 
presented to us by reality. Therefore the conditioned objects subsist in themselves, and are given 
to us on occasion of our having some experience of them. But transcendental idealism holds that 
“the objects of experience are never given in themselves, but only in experience, and they could 
never exist at all outside it” (A492/B521). The conditions of space and time come not from 
reality, but from the one doing the experiencing. 
If one presupposes transcendental realism, then one has presupposed that any given 
object is conditioned by reality. Given such a presupposition, it is not only understandable but 
logically necessary to believe that the unconditioned is also given: 
[i]f the conditioned as well as its condition are things in themselves, then when the first is 
given not only is the regress to the second given as a problem, but the latter is thereby 
really already given along with it; and, because this holds for all members of the series, 
then the complete set of conditions, and hence the unconditioned is thereby 
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simultaneously given, or rather it is presupposed by the fact that the conditioned, which is 
possible only through that series, is given (A498/B526). 
 
One point highlighted here is that how one interprets the judgment „the unconditioned is 
therefore also given‟ is what determines whether one accepts transcendental idealism. In one 
sense, this judgment is analytically true since “the concept of the conditioned already entails that 
something is related to a condition, and if this condition is once again conditioned, to a more 
remote condition, and so through all the members of the series” (A487/B526). So it is at least 
true by definition that the unconditioned is given to us as a problem, although the further 
inference that the unconditioned condition is a feature of reality is the very assumption that Kant 
wishes to expose. When the conditioned is given in appearance, reason finds itself bound by a 
subjective law: “[f]ind for the conditioned knowledge given through the understanding the 
unconditioned whereby its unity is brought to completion” (A308/B364). 
The distinction between the unconditioned being given to us and being given to us as a 
problem is the same distinction that Kant highlights by characterizing the two ways to take this 
law, namely either as objective or subjective (A306/B363). Kant‟s characterization of this 
principle as a law suggests that reason does not have a choice but to follow it. This is indeed 
what Kant means by labeling this as a special type of error; he calls it the doctrine of 
transcendental illusion. This is why Michelle Grier says that “Kant‟s view is that the 
transcendental principle that states that an unconditioned unity is already given is itself a rational 
assumption that must be made if we are to secure unity of the understanding and knowledge” 
(Grier 123).
102
  
Thus, accepting the idea of the unconditioned is a transcendental condition for giving 
unity to experience, and as such, we finite creatures always find ourselves under illusion. But if 
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we become transcendental idealists, we can understand that this principle cannot be used to 
acquire theoretical knowledge. Kant highlights this conviction in a series of rhetorical questions: 
[t]ake the principle, that the series of conditions…extends to the unconditioned. Does it 
or does it not have objective applicability?...Or is there no such objectively valid 
principle of reason, but only a logical precept, to advance toward completeness by an 
ascent to ever higher conditions and so to give our knowledge the greatest possible unity 
or reason? (A309/B366). 
 
Kant is reviving the distinction he made in the Transcendental Deduction between what is 
subjectively necessary and what is objectively valid. The law that requires reason to seek the 
unconditioned is classified as a law because it is necessary for subjective experience. It is not, 
however, for that reason objectively valid. Once we realize this, we must relinquish whatever 
theoretical knowledge we have previously assumed we had gained through this process. Making 
judgments about the unconditioned, then, is illegitimate because it assumes that the 
unconditioned is a feature of reality. This, then, is Kant‟s doctrine of legitimate judgments. 
D. Should We Believe Kant‟s Doctrine of Legitimate Judgments? 
In Chapter 4, I showed how Kant‟s analysis of cognition leads him to his doctrine of 
(partial) spontaneity, how spontaneity implies epistemic limits, and how epistemic limits in turn 
imply Kant‟s radical redefinition of the limits of reason. In 5.D, I underscored that Kant‟s 
account of spontaneity is unique because it is a priori spontaneity, and this is a consequence of 
his denial of intellectual intuition. This, however, does not at all settle the matter of whether Kant 
is justified in believing that intellectual intuition is impossible for human cognition. In order to 
evaluate Kant‟s position on intellectual intuition, I have been examining Kant‟s doctrine of 
legitimate judgments. The DLJ says that judgments may only use concepts that either 1) arise 
from objects given in sense experience, 2) make experience possible, or 3) are concepts 
necessary for use in conditioning judgments. This entire doctrine, of course, is built on the 
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Kantian principle that the understanding has an empirical use in unifying what is given in sense 
intuition, and not a transcendental use in intuiting objects.  
For his part, Kant certainly believes that his discussion of legitimate judgment has proven 
that intellectual intuition is impossible:  
[a]fter what has been shown in the deduction of the categories, hopefully no one will be 
in doubt about how to decide the question, whether these pure concepts of the 
understanding are of merely empirical or also a transcendental use, i.e., whether, as 
conditions of possible experience, they relate a priori solely to appearances, or whether, 
as conditions of possibility of things in general, they can be extended to objects in 
themselves (without any restriction to our sensibility)… (A139/B178). 
 
That is, Kant has proven to his own satisfaction that the pure concepts of the understanding do 
not have a transcendental use because noumenal objects are not “given to the understanding” by 
means of an intellectual intuition (A257/B313). For the sake of argument, let us grant the success 
of the transcendental deduction, which is clearly the most difficult part of the DLJ. Thus, we will 
say that Kant has indeed proven that the categories do have an a priori empirical use. But how 
has anything Kant has said so far proven that the categories do not have a transcendental use? 
What, exactly, is the problem with supposing that objects may be given to the understanding? It 
seems that Kant‟s denial of intellectual intuition implies his position on legitimate judgments, 
and his DLJ implies that intellectual intuition is impossible. But where is the independent proof 
that Kant is right about all of this? 
Kant sheds some insight into how he answered this question for himself in a letter to 
Marcus Herz. There, he reminisced about his pre-critical days, when he believed that “[t]he 
sensuous representations present things as they appear, the intellectual representations present 
them as they are” (CK 10:130). The way he talked about the given-ness of intellectual 
representations was more or less typical of a rationalist, and already far away from general 
empiricism: [i]n my dissertation I was content to explain the nature of intellectual representations 
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is a merely negative way, namely, to state that they were not modifications of the soul brought 
about by the object…[i.e.] the way in which they affect us…” (CK 10:130). This is, in other 
words, simply to deny that any of the categories are “caused by the object…” (CK 10:130). 
Sometime after that, Kant second-guessed his own project: “[h]owever, I silently passed over the 
further question of how a representation that refers to an object without being in any way 
affected by it is possible” (CK 10:130). Specifically, the question he passed over was this: “…by 
what means are these things given to us, if not by the way in which they affect us?” (CK 10:130). 
 Kant there implies that even as a pre-critical philosopher, it was obvious to him that 
intellectual objects cannot affect us. But this raises an important issue, for if we assume that 
intellectual representations refer to (noumenal) objects, and thus are “given to us,” yet do not 
affect us, “whence comes the agreement that they are supposed to have with objects…?” (CK 
10:130). We can say positively that affection is an appropriate way to understand the relationship 
of sensibility to objects:  
[i]f a representation is only a way in which the subject is affected by the object, namely, 
as an effect in accord with its cause, [then] it is easy to see how this modification of our 
mind can represent something, that is, have an object. Thus the passive or sensuous 
representations have an understanding relationship to objects (CK 10:130). 
 
 Kant‟s epiphany in this 1772 letter is clearly imported to the first Critique.
103
 The 
memorable opening lines of the Critique proper are: 
[i]n whatever way and through whatever means a cognition may relate to objects, that 
through which is related immediately to them, and at which all thought as a means is 
directed as an end, is intuition. This, however, only takes place insofar as the object is 
given to us; but this in turn, is possible only if it affects the mind in a certain way. The 
capacity (receptivity) to acquire representations through the way in which we are 
affected by objects is called sensibility (A19/B33, my italics). 
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It may seem that this is blatant dogma; why does Kant just assert that the only capacity 
that can be affected by objects is sensibility? Charles Parsons articulates this concern when he 
says that 
[t]he capacity for receiving representations through being affected by objects is what 
Kant calls sensibility; that for us intuitions arise only through sensibility is thus 
something Kant was prepared to state at the outset. It appears to be a premise of the 
argument of the Aesthetic; if not Kant does not clearly indicate there any argument of 
which it is the conclusion (Parsons 66).
104
 
 
Parsons is certainly right to observe that Kant does not „clearly indicate‟ the argument that led 
him to his doctrine that all intuition is sensible intuition. But, as I have pointed out, Kant‟s 1772 
letter at least gives us his train of reasoning: all intuition is by means of affection, only sensible 
objects affect us, and therefore all intuition is sensible intuition.  
Let‟s leave aside Kant‟s premise that „all intuition is by means of affection‟ and focus on 
the second, as it is directly relevant for the dialogue I have been developing between Kant and 
Aristotle, namely, that „only sensible objects affect us.‟ What has Aristotle said about affection 
that may be relevant here? If empiricism is simply the theory that objects make our 
representations of them possible, then Aristotle is an empiricist, for he also considers the object 
the cause and our representation of it the effect; Aristotle says that “before the mind intuits it is 
not any actual thing” (DA 429a23-4).
105
 However, Aristotle‟s notion of perception is more 
sophisticated than the empiricist account of perception that Kant addresses in the Transcendental 
Analytic, for Aristotle believes that intuition is not only of sensible but also intellectual forms. 
Charles Kahn argues that Aristotle makes this move because he believes, with Kant, that the 
intuition of sensation is indeterminate and cannot by itself account for experience. As Kahn 
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explains, for Aristotle, “[i]f we were restricted to the reception of sensible forms, all we could 
perceive would be colors and shapes;” that is, in order to turn the sensible forms into experience, 
the sensibility must be “enriched by the conceptual resources provided by its marriage with 
nous” (Kahn 369).106 This is what Aristotle means when he says that “one perceives an 
individual, but perception is of the universal – e.g. of man, but not of Callias the man” (Post 
Analytics 100a17).
107
 Perception, for Aristotle, is thus of the particular thing (which imparts the 
sensible forms) and also of the universals in which it partakes (which impart the intellectual 
forms). In this way, the objects that νοῦρ intuits, the intelligible forms, are necessarily intuited; if 
they were not, sense perception would not turn into meaningful experience. 
It will be recalled that Kant‟s criticism of empiricism focuses on the inability of the 
empiricist to explain the unity of sensation: 
[u]nity of synthesis in accordance with empirical concepts would be entirely contingent, 
and, were it not grounded on a transcendental ground of unity, it would be possible for a 
swarm of appearances to fill up our soul without experience ever being able to arise from 
it (A111). 
 
Determinateness must obtain of sensation if sensation is going to turn into even minimal 
experience. The empiricist, by thinking that sensation might be unified by empirical concepts, 
asks the impossible of raw sensation. Kant has recourse to the categories because he believes that 
this determinateness can be explained only if the a priori categories are involved in the synthesis, 
that is, if the synthesis has „a transcendental ground of unity‟: 
…the way in which sensibility presents its data to the understanding for its 
conceptualization already reflects a particular manner of receiving it, that is, a certain 
form of sensibly intuiting, which is determined by the nature of human sensibility rather 
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than by the affecting objects…this form of sensibly intuiting conditions the possibility of 
its ordering by the understanding (Allison 14-15).
108
 
 
Kant appreciates the problem of the indeterminacy of sensation and posits the a priori categories 
as the ground of the unity of sensation. Kant no doubt believes that this criticism catches 
Aristotle‟s epistemology as well. However, Aristotle sees the very same problem, but instead 
posits a passive intuition of the intellectual form of the object. It would be too weak, then, to say 
that Aristotle merely avoids Kant‟s criticism of the indeterminacy of sense data; it is more 
accurate to say that he gives this criticism.  
By recognizing that sensation must be complemented by the intelligible form of the 
object in intuition, Aristotle is acknowledging that sensation is not determinate in its own right. 
Aristotle‟s doctrine of intellectual intuition is thus a sensible answer to the quid juris question 
because it explains the presence of intellectual representations of objects in our mind, but it does 
so by simple cause and effect; the cause of our intellectual representations is our encounter with 
the objects themselves. This, then, is intellectual intuition that is affective. As Aristotle 
concludes, 
[t]he mental part of the soul must therefore be, while impassible, capable of receiving the 
form of an object [ηὰ νοηηά]; that is, must be potentially identical in character with its 
object without being the object. Mind must be related to what is intelligible, as sense is to 
what is sensible (DA 429a15-18, my italics). 
 
Now it is certainly possible that Aristotle was wrong about all this; but it seems clear, as 
Parsons wrote in his notes on the Aesthetic and I observed in the letter to Herz, that Kant simply 
does not take seriously the possibility of affection by intellectual objects. It seems, then, that 
Kant‟s position that the philosophical tradition in general has misunderstood human cognition is 
not relevant for Aristotle. And, as I have argued, it is Kant‟s rejection of the possibility of 
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intellectual intuition that gives rise to his doctrine of a priori spontaneity, and his unique 
understanding of spontaneity that gives rise to his radical redefinition of the limits of human 
reason. Aristotle therefore is not obligated to yield to the conclusions either in the 
Transcendental Aesthetic or Analytic. However, as I will argue in Chapter 7, Kant‟s indirect 
argument from the antinomies sufficiently supports his position on the impossibility of 
intellectual intuition, and all that implies epistemologically. 
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Chapter 7: “The Antinomial Attack on Metaphysics” 
 
A. The Role of the Transcendental Dialectic. The antinomies, unlike the paralogisms and 
ideal, offer a defense of transcendental idealism that, according to Kant, can be evaluated 
independently of any previous feature of his philosophy.  
B. The Antinomial Attack on Metaphysics in the First Critique. Here I introduce sections C-
F, which explain Kant‟s antinomial attack. 
C. The Logic of a Dialectical Argument. Kant characterized the dialectical use of logic as a 
misappropriation of logic by reason. While logic is useful for determining what must be 
false (insofar as it violates logical form), we cannot simply assume that it can also tell us 
what must be true. This claim, explained in E, is the mistake of using logic as an organon 
and not merely a canon of truth.  
D. Antinomial Argument as Dialectical Conflicts. The first feature of an antinomial 
argument is that certain propositions are contradictory if transcendental realism is 
presupposed. 
E. Antinomial Arguments as Apagogical Arguments. The second feature of an antinomy is in 
the way that it is argued for, namely, by accusing the contradictory position of being self-
contradictory. Kant tried to warn us about the danger of this style of argument, because it 
does nothing to guard against the possibility that we will take what is subjectively 
necessary for what is objectively valid, which is the concern expressed in the 
canon/organon discussion in C. 
F. Antinomial Arguments as Arguments Rooted in Experience. The third relevant feature of 
an antinomial position is that it is rooted in an attempt to account for something given in 
experience. 
G. The Antinomial Attack on Metaphysics in the Third Critique. Sections C-F describe the 
antinomial attack as it exists in the first Critique. Kant also describes the antinomial 
attack in the third Critique, which is useful for my purposes because he invokes the 
intellectus archetypus. 
H. Does the Antinomial Attack Present a Problem for Aristotle? Here I review Aristotle‟s 
argument for teleology in nature, and the way in which Kant‟s antinomial attack 
undermines it. 
I. Is the Antinomial Attack Successful as a Defense of Transcendental Idealism? Here I 
show how the antinomial attack is problematic not just for Aristotle, but for the whole 
transcendental realist tradition. 
J. A Return to the Intellectus Archetypus 
K. Conclusion: Two Conceptions of Non-Omniscience.  
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A. The Role of the Transcendental Dialectic 
It is possible to believe that Kant is using the Transcendental Dialectic simply to show 
why typical arguments from the history of metaphysics are invalid. For example, the sentence 
that begins his critique of the metaphysical doctrine of the soul identifies the argument for the 
soul as a “transcendental paralogism,” which “has a transcendental ground for inferring falsely 
due to its form” (A341/B399). For example, if we expect to understand ourselves as substances, 
we may argue that “I, as a thinking being, am the absolute subject of all my possible judgments, 
and this representation of Myself cannot be used as the predicate of any other thing. Thus I, as 
thinking being (soul), am substance” (A348). The problem with that argument is that there is an 
equivocation on the concept „subject,‟ and thus this syllogism only seems to extend our 
knowledge of ourselves if “it passes off the constant logical subject of thinking as the cognition 
of a real subject of inherence…” (A350). This syllogism, which has the initial look of validity, is 
invalid on closer inspection. In the ideal of pure reason, Kant first turns his attention to the 
ontological argument, since he believes that all arguments for the existence of God ultimately 
depend on the ontological argument.
109
 The ontological argument, in essence, argues that the 
concept „God‟ is inseparable from the predicate „being,‟ in the same way „triangle‟ is inseparable 
from „three-sidedness.‟ However, 
[b]eing is obviously not a real predicate, i.e., a concept of something that could add to the 
concept of a thing…In the logical use it is merely the copula of a judgment. The 
proposition God is omnipotent contains two concepts that have their objects: God and 
omnipotence; the little word “is” is not a predicate in it, but only that which posits the 
predicate in relation to the subject” (A598/B626). 
 
 The arguments against the metaphysical claims about God or the soul are certainly 
important and interesting. However, they are not essentially related to Kant‟s general 
epistemological project of transcendental idealism, for it is perfectly consistent to accept the 
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force of these arguments and yet reject transcendental idealism. Conversely, it is possible to be 
convinced of transcendental idealism and yet complain that while Kant‟s conclusions are correct, 
he has made some important mistakes in the paralogisms and ideal. No matter, the transcendental 
idealist would say, because God and the soul are still unconditioned concepts. Guyer 
summarizes: 
…the chief result of Kant‟s own critical philosophy [is] that concepts yield knowledge 
only when applied to intuitions, and as a result…all ideas of the unconditioned are 
fundamentally incompatible with the structure of our sensible intuition, which is always 
conditioned…In other words, it is the most fundamental characteristic of our intuitions 
that they are always conditioned by further intuitions, and so nothing unconditioned can 
ever be “given”…Therefore nothing unconditioned can ever be an object of knowledge 
for us (Guyer 133, my italics). 
 
Thus it is true that the failure of the paralogisms and the ideal do not indicate that transcendental 
realism has failed, and the success of those sections does not count in favor of its success. But 
the argument(s) in the second section of the Dialectic, the antinomies, are of a different character 
entirely. In this present chapter, I will argue that A) their success does in fact support 
transcendental idealism, and B) that they are in fact successful.   
B. The Antinomial Attack on Metaphysics in the First Critique 
It is first important to note the asymmetry between the antinomies on the one hand and 
the paralogisms and ideal on the other. While the mistake of seeking an unconditioned judgment 
to ground conditioned judgments is common to all three sections of the Transcendental Dialectic, 
the antinomies are unique in at least two respects. They are first of all distinguished because they 
give this unconditioned judgment specifically to ground the “series of conditions of appearance” 
(A334/B391). Kant attempts to expose the root of attempts to reach the unconditioned in 
cosmological debates. His project is to demonstrate that contradictory positions on the four main 
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issues in cosmology can both be supported with sound arguments. Kant characterizes the four 
debates as follows (the first is in two parts): 
…whether the world has been there from eternity or has a beginning; whether cosmic 
space is filled with beings ad infinitum or enclosed within certain bounds; whether 
anything in the world is simple, or whether everything can be divided as infinitum; 
whether there is a generation or production from freedom, or whether everything is 
attached to the chain of the natural order; and finally, whether there is some entirely 
unconditioned and in itself necessary being, or whether everything is, as regards its 
existence, conditioned and hence dependent and in itself contingent (B509). 
 
But there is another way that the antinomies are distinct. Guyer‟s characterization of the 
project of the antinomies is helpfully concise: 
Reason seeks the unconditioned in the series of objects in space and events in time 
(quantity), in the division of objects and events in space and time (quantity), in the series 
of causes and effects (relation), and in the dependence of contingent things or states upon 
something necessary (modality). And in each of these series, moreover, reason finds two 
incompatible ways of conceiving the unconditioned, thus generating the insoluble 
conflicts… (Guyer 133). 
 
Unlike the paralogism and ideal, which argue that taking the unconditioned as a feature of mind-
independent reality results in the beliefs in the soul and God respectively, here there are two 
ways of conceiving the unconditioned; furthermore, these two ways are contradictory. 
This means that the antinomies are able to offer a critique of transcendental realism that 
is unavailable to the other sections of the Transcendental Dialectic. Karl Ameriks puts the matter 
this way in order to distinguish the antinomies from the claims made in both the paralogisms and 
ideal:  
[c]osmological claims, on the other hand, get us into contradictory theses that are 
resolvable only by transcendental idealism…Here the problem is not one of a lack of 
knowledge or detail; rather, for [cosmological] questions…there simply is no sensible 
answer about an ultimate nature (Ameriks 254). 
 
Kant himself appears to recognize this significance of the antinomies. In a letter, Kant 
reuses one of his most well-known sayings in the context of the antimonies: they “woke me from 
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my dogmatic slumbers” (CK 252).110 Hume‟s skepticism about cause and effect - the original 
epistemological alarm-clock - is well known, and the Transcendental Deduction, if sound, would 
restore optimism in knowledge of the sensible world. But the antinomies, when properly 
understood, should give rise to a healthy skepticism:  
the dogmatic use of pure reason without critique…[leads] to baseless assertions that can 
always be opposed by others that seem equally plausible, and hence to skepticism…[A]ll 
attempts to answer these natural questions – e.g., whether the world has a beginning or 
has been there from eternity, etc. – have met with unavoidable contradictions” (B22-23).  
 
Kant‟s point is that the recognition of these contradictions should give us a clue that something is 
wrong with transcendental realism. Thus, the antinomies provide indirect support for 
transcendental idealism. This is why he says 
[n]ow the propositions of pure reason, especially when they venture beyond all 
boundaries of possible experience, admit of no test by experiment with their objects…: 
thus to experiment will be feasible only with concepts and principles…If we now find 
that there is agreement with the principle of pure reason when things are considered from 
this two-fold standpoint, but that an unavoidable conflict of reason with itself arises with 
a single standpoint, then the experiment decides for the correctness of that distinction 
(bxviii-bxix fn). 
 
Here and elsewhere111 Kant argues that if a debate can be shown to generate contradictory 
judgments, then the very presuppositions of that debate would have to be discarded. And if we 
grant that transcendental realism supplies the presuppositions that generate the antinomies and 
that transcendental idealism is the contradictory position, then the antinomies will provide 
indirect support for transcendental idealism.  
The result in each case is that we are forced to believe that the phenomenon in question 
cannot “exist in itself without relation to our senses and possible experience” (A493/B522). Kant 
summarizes the ideal pattern of discovery:  
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If the world is a whole existing in itself, then it is either finite or infinite. Now the first as 
well as the second alternative is false…Thus it is false that the world…is a whole existing 
in itself. From which it follows that appearances in general are nothing outside of our 
representation, which is just what we mean by their transcendental ideality (A507-
8/B535-6).  
 
Thus, Kant believes that the antinomies are unique among the three divisions of the 
Transcendental Dialectic because the antinomies provide a defense of transcendental idealism, 
while the arguments in the paralogisms and ideal do not. In order to evaluate to force of the 
antinomial attack, I will develop its meaning in sections C-G.   
C. The Logic of a Dialectical Argument 
 
The antinomies come to exist because of the dialectical use of reason, which Kant will 
argue is always a misuse of reason. Kant‟s argument against the dialectical use of reason begins 
not when he turns in earnest to the topic in the Transcendental Dialectic but toward the beginning 
of the Critique in the section titled “On the division of general logic into analytic and synthetic.” 
Kant begins by observing the importance and reliability of general logic. As such, the following 
premise summarizes Kant‟s view of logic:  
P1. General logic provides the rules for generating formally acceptable judgments and 
valid arguments. 
 
Given this, the temptation to make the following inference is overwhelming: 
C2. Therefore general logic provides the rules for generating truth. 
The conclusion seems innocent enough; after all, general logic certainly can be a guide for 
making claims in some cases. For example, general logic would relieve me of the empirical 
chore of finding out whether it is true, as you claim, that you are both in the room and not in the 
room at the same time and in the same sense. The simple reason is that your judgment has 
violated one the two central principles of general logic – the law of non-contradiction, and thus, 
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the form of the claim is wrong. Together with the law of the excluded middle, these provide the 
ultimate criteria for judging and inferring.  
The problem, as Kant points out, is that such “criteria concern only the form of truth, i.e., 
of thinking in general, and are to that extent entirely correct but not sufficient” (A59/B84). So 
while we were justified in allowing the rules of general logic to tell us what must be false 
because it violates logical form (as in the case of your claim about being in the room and not in 
the room), no rules of logic can tell us the content of what is true: [t]he merely logical criterion 
of truth…is therefore certainly the…negative condition of all truth; further, however, logic 
cannot go, and the error that concerns not form but content cannot be discovered by a touchstone 
of logic” (A59/60-B84). Logic is therefore “the negative touchstone of truth;” it is negative 
because it can only tell us what claims about reality must be untrue, and it is a „touchstone‟ 
because “one must before all else examine and evaluate by means of these rules the form of 
cognition before investigating its content in order to find out whether…it contains positive truth” 
(A60/B84-5). In the end, then, this is general logic in its analytic employment, since in this way 
“[g]eneral logic analyzes the formal business of the understanding and reason…” (A60/B84). 
 However, general logic has a siren-like quality, and thus is liable to misappropriation: 
Nevertheless there is something so seductive in the possession of an apparent art for 
giving all of our cognitions the form of understanding…that this general logic, which is 
merely a canon for judging, has been used as if it were an organon for the actual 
production of at least the semblance of objective assertions, and thus in fact it has thereby 
been misused. Now general logic, as a putative organon, is called dialectic (A61/B85). 
 
Premise 1 above refers to the general use of logic as analytic and formal - a tool for eliminating 
judgments and inferences that violate the rules for thinking. But as Kant understands it, our 
realization that we possess the a priori rules for judging and inferring makes us power-hungry. 
General logic is properly a canon for judging and inferring the form of truth; we, however, use it 
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to generate positive truth claims. General logic thus becomes an organon of truth. In other 
words, we pass silently from premise 1 to conclusion 2 without any attempt to justify our right to 
do so. Kant adds, somewhat cryptically, that “even if a cognition accorded completely with its 
logical form, i.e., if it did not contradict itself, it could still contradict its object” (A59/B84). He 
has already explained the first part of this statement – we know a proposition is false when its 
form is invalid – but how could cognition „contradict its object?‟Although Kant will not clarify 
his last remark until later on in the Critique (discussed in section E), it is certainly clear that he 
wants to establish “a critique of the understanding and reason in regard to their hyperphysical 
use” (A63/B88); that is, while the understanding and reason are necessary for experience (this is 
apparently their „physical‟ use), they are also used beyond experience. 
D. Antinomial Arguments as Dialectical Conflicts 
By the time Kant turns to the actual Transcendental Dialectic, he identifies not one but 
three ways in which logic is subject to this dialectical misappropriation, treated separately in 
three sub-divisions of the Transcendental Dialectic. Since Kant has insisted that the antinomies 
generate an independent argument for transcendental idealism, that particular dialectical 
misappropriation is relevant here. So what is an antinomy? We have seen Kant identify four 
theoretical112 antinomies in the first Critique,
113
 but without a rigorous definition of an antinomial 
argument, Kant has left us the task of finding the commonalities in these disputes. In D, E, and F, 
I identify three different features of an argument that seem to motivate Kant to classify it as 
antinomial. 
First, these positions must be contradictory and not contrary (or sub-contrary), and this is 
everywhere emphasized by Kant. In fact, if the two traditional positions could be reclassified as 
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contraries within the context of transcendental realism then these debates would be completely 
useless to Kant; it is specifically their transgression of the subjective rules of judging and 
inferring that we find our clue that some presupposition made by the arguers is wrong. For 
example, it is not interesting if we are arguing over the hygiene practices of Europeans, and you 
are able to prove your proposition that “Some French citizens smell good” and I can just as well 
prove my proposition that “Some French citizens do not smell good;” the obvious truth is that we 
are both right, and this is because our positions are sub-contrary, and not contradictory, as we 
may have believed at first. However, the fact that the opposed propositions „The world had a 
beginning in time‟ and „The world did not have a beginning in time‟ can both be supported is 
quite interesting; it should indicate that the presuppositions of our debate are wrong.  
In this context, Kant argues that an antinomy never presents a genuine contradiction: 
“[p]ermit me to call such an opposition a dialectical opposition, but the contradictory one an 
analytical opposition” (A504/B532). The contradictions of the antinomies are not genuine 
contradictions, but rather mere „dialectical oppositions‟ because the contradiction is removed by 
removing the presupposition of transcendental realism. In the case of the first antinomy, “…if I 
take away this presupposition,…and deny that [the world] is a thing in itself, then the 
contradictory conflict of the two assertions is transformed into a merely dialectical 
conflict…because the world…exists neither as an in itself infinite whole nor as an in itself finite 
whole” (A505/B533). Thus, without the presupposition of transcendental realism, these apparent 
contradictions are properly classified as contraries. Therefore, the positions in a debate may be 
both false (as in the first two antinomies) or both true (as in the last two antinomies); these 
oppositions are acceptable to logic. 
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E. Antinomial Arguments as Apagogical Arguments 
In addition to being contradictories, the proof of one position must consist of an attempt 
to undermine the other position. Kant sometimes calls this style of proof „apagogical,‟ as he does 
when naming the rules for pure reason at the end of the first Critique: “[reason‟s] proofs must 
never be apagogic but always ostensive…[T]he apagogic proof…can produce certainty, to be 
sure, but never comprehensibility of the truth in regard to its connection with the ground of its 
possibility” (A789/B817). Kant, by further associating apagogical proofs with „modus tollens‟ 
arguments (A791/B819), identifies apagogical arguments as those that find a contradiction in the 
rival argument. The form of a modus tollens is „If p (in this case, my opponent‟s position), then 
q; not q (because q is self-contradictory or at least absurd); therefore not p.‟  
This sort of indirect argument was precisely what Kant was concerned with earlier in the 
Critique when he warned against the negative use of logic. There he said “even if a cognition 
accorded completely with its logical form, i.e., if it did not contradict itself, it could still 
contradict its object” (A59/B84). Now, at the end if the Critique, Kant is in position to be clearer 
about how a cognition could contradict its object. He first asks us to consider a discipline where 
this sort of contradiction never happens: “In mathematics this subreption is impossible; hence 
apagogic proof has its proper place there” (A792/B820). The subreption to which he refers is the 
mistake of taking what is subjectively necessary for what is objectively valid. In mathematics, “it 
is impossible to substitute that which is subjective in our representations for that which is 
objective…” (A791/B819). Since mathematical objects are constructed by us, confusion between 
what is subjective and what is objective is impossible. Kant clearly suggests a contrast between 
mathematics and metaphysics in that while mathematicians are justified in the use of apagogic 
proofs, metaphysicians are not. The reason is that in metaphysics it is possible „to substitute that 
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which is subjective in our representation from that which is objective.‟ Unlike mathematical 
objects, we do not construct objects in the world as they are in themselves. This is just another 
way to describe the mistaken presupposition of transcendental realism because this position 
mistakes the subjective for objective by treating objects as we imagine them to be apart from our 
experience of them. 
Besides mathematics, Kant mentions another discipline that may use apagogic proofs, 
namely, natural science. But there is one important difference between the permissibility of 
apagogical logic in math and science, for while in mathematics its use is completely safe, it is not 
so in science; it only tends to be safe because there are other safeguards: “In natural science, 
since everything there is grounded on empirical intuitions, such false pretenses can frequently be 
guarded against through the comparison of many observations; but this kind of proof itself is for 
the most part unimportant in this area” (A792/B820). Kant‟s point is that the danger of an 
apagogical proof is mitigated in natural science because a future observation may make it 
obvious that the apagogical argument in question was wrong. But since metaphysical judgments 
are not liable to refutation by what is given in experience, there is no warning bell. 
F. Antinomial Arguments as Arguments Rooted in Experience 
There is at least one other notable similarity that Kant emphasizes, namely, the 
rootedness of antinomial arguments in experience; that is, they begin with a phenomenon. As 
Kant says, “[t]he entire antinomy of pure reason rests on this dialectical argument: If the 
conditioned is given, then the whole series of conditions for it is also given; now objects of the 
senses are given as conditioned; consequently, etc.” (A497/B525). Whether it be our awareness 
of space and time, our observation of orderly causal processes, or our discovery of the (at least 
partial) divisibility of substances, antinomial arguments always begin with evidence that seems 
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to demand a verdict. Kant is sympathetic with this idea, for the evidence - that which is 
conditioned - is certainly “given to us as a problem” (A498/B526). But only those who 
presuppose transcendental realism go on to infer that because it is given to us as a problem, it is 
given to us independently of the conditions of our sensibility and exists apart from our 
experience of it. In this way, our dialectical ascension begins with a phenomenon, and because of 
the presupposition of transcendental realism, ends in the only place where the realist can be 
satisfied: a theoretical judgment about the unconditioned condition.   
Kant‟s identification of one particular antinomial offender has the effect of emphasizing 
that the antinomies are rooted in experience: “…the famous Leibniz constructed an intellectual 
system of the world…by comparing all objects only with the understanding and the formal 
concepts of its thinking (A270/B326). That means that if we follow Leibniz, 
…we reflect merely logically, [and] we simply compare our concepts with each other in 
the understanding, seeing whether two of them contain the very same thing, whether they 
contradict each other or not, whether something is contained in the concept internally or 
is added to it, and which of them should count as given and which as a manner of 
thinking of that which is given” (A279-B335). 
 
Kant takes these remarks to be illustrative of Leibniz‟ many metaphysical arguments, including 
this one about the nature of space and time: 
 If I would represent outer relations of things through the mere understanding, this can be 
done only by means of a concept of their reciprocal effect, and I should connect one state 
of the one and the same thing with another state, then this can only be done in the order 
of grounds and consequences. Thus..space [is] a certain order in the community of 
substances, and…time [is] the dynamical sequence of their states (A275/B331). 
 
The general pattern is this: we begin with a given; in this case, the phenomenon of space (or 
time). Then we begin seeking to account for the given. That is, we attempt to identify what must 
be true in order to explain the phenomenon at hand (the necessary conditions), and this is done 
through a process of logical reflection. We finish by articulating an unconditioned ground for the 
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appearance in question; that is, we characterize “the inner constitution of things…” 
(A270/B326). Leibniz certainly believed that his mundane familiarity with the phenomenon of 
space together with his impressive familiarity with the rules of logic allow him safely to infer 
that the inner nature of space is „a certain order in the community of substances,‟ and not some 
kind of container as his rivals believed.114 Grier gives an apt summary: 
Kant‟s criticisms of Leibniz in the Amphiboly chapter are designed to undermine the 
attempt to draw substantive metaphysical conclusions about things in general (Dinge 
überhaupt) simply from the highly abstract concepts of reflection and/or principles of 
general or formal logic (e.g. the principle of contradiction) (Grier 71). 
 
Kant‟s central point is that Leibniz happily ascends the ladder of inferences, carefully using the 
rules of logic to add one rung at a time as he goes, and arrives at the unconditioned condition of 
the given phenomenon. There are thus three relevant features of an antinomial argument: the 
apparent contradiction (i.e. dialectical opposition) of the positions, the apagogic support for the 
positions, and the rootedness of the positions in the attempt to explain some feature of 
experience. 
G. The Antinomial Attack on Metaphysics in the Third Critique 
 
 Kant has said that careful attention to the existence of antinomial principles demonstrates 
transcendental idealism:  
If the world is a whole existing in itself, then it is either finite or infinite. Now the first as 
well as the second alternative is false…Thus it is false that the world…is a whole existing 
in itself. From which it follows that appearances in general are nothing outside of our 
representation, which is just what we mean by their transcendental ideality (A507-
8/B535-6).  
 
In sections C-F, I showed why Kant argues in the first Critique that the existence of the 
antinomies supports the inference to transcendental idealism. Kant revisits this attack and 
clarifies it considerably in this third Critique. For my purposes, Kant‟s additional comments are 
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worthwhile because he is explicit how the antinomial arguments relate to our finitude and why 
an intellectus archetypus would not have the problem of the antinomies. 
  In the Critique of Judgment, Kant argues that there are two functions of the power of 
judgment, distinguished by how they stand in regard to principles. One type of judgment is 
determinative judgment: “[t]he determining power of judgment by itself has no principles that 
ground concepts of objects. It is no autonomy, for it merely subsumes under given laws or 
concepts as principle” (CJ 5:385). Since the determining power of judgment uses laws or 
principles that are not of its own making, Kant says that it is not „nomothetic.‟ Kant anticipates 
the coming sections by pointing out an advantage that comes from merely following (and not 
creating) laws, namely, that the determining power of judgment “could never fall into disunity 
with itself…” (CJ 5:386).  
Since principles (or laws) that ground concepts are given to the determining power of 
judgment, we may ask, „from where are they given?‟ The answer from the transcendental realist 
would be „from the world as it is in itself.‟ Kant is here testing this presupposition. Here in the 
third Critique he considers in particular the principles of mechanism and teleology: 
…if one were to transform these…into constitutive principles of the possibility of the 
objects themselves, they would run: Thesis: All generation of material things is possible 
in accordance with merely mechanical laws. Antithesis: Some generation of such things 
is not possible in accordance with merely mechanical laws (CJ 5:387).  
 
According to Kant, this contradiction can be resolved only by abandoning the presupposition that 
these are “objective principles for the determining power of judgment” (CJ 5:387). So if these 
are not objective principles gleaned from our observation of the operation of world as it is in 
itself, where else could they have come from? 
 It is not possible to believe that the principles do not exist. The mere fact that we are 
judging rules this out, for “no use of the cognitive faculties can be permitted without principles” 
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(CJ 5:385). The last possibility, then, is that the principles are features of the power of judgment 
itself, although not in its determinative capacity, for the determining power of judgment “merely 
subsumes under given laws or concepts as principles” (CJ 5:385). This points to a special power 
of judgment: “…the reflecting power of judgment must serve as a principle itself…” (CJ 5:385). 
It is obvious that the principle of mechanism is necessary for judging natural objects. But Kant 
argues that the principle of teleology is also necessary for judging: “…we must…apply this 
maxim of judgment to the whole of nature…given the limitations of our insights into the inner 
mechanisms of nature, which otherwise remain hidden from us” (CJ 5:398).  
Therefore the principles of teleology and mechanism are necessary, but only 
“necessary…for the sake of cognition of natural laws in experience…” (CJ 5:385). This has the 
effect of removing the contradiction between the principles of mechanism and teleology because 
“[i]t is only asserted that human reason, in the pursuit of this reflection and in this manner” must 
use these principles for reflecting on nature, and “reflection in accordance with the first maxim is 
not thereby suspended, rather one is required to pursue it as far as one can” (CJ 5:387-8). Kant‟s 
point is that conceiving ends in nature is not anti-scientific, nor a relic from a religiously-
motivated physics. Rather, it is a necessary presupposition of human cognition, which 
understands nature through the power of judgment. In the end, then, this mistake “rests on 
confusing a fundamental principle of the reflecting with that of the determining power of 
judgment…” (CJ 5:389). To be sure, it will never be easy to convince the transcendental realist 
that neither teleology nor mechanism is a principle of nature in itself. However, the one who 
refuses to abandon the presupposition of transcendental realism is forced to explain how it is 
possible that nature gives us contradictory principles. The transcendental idealist, however, owes 
no such explanation.  
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In this way, Kant believes that the presupposition of transcendental realism, namely, that 
reality gives us the principles such mechanism and teleology for our determinative judgment, is 
unsustainable; they must, then, be reflective principles. This is the antinomial attack as expressed 
in the third Critique. We are now in position to evaluate the relevance of the antinomial attack 
for Aristotle. As I showed in Chapter 6, this is important because although Aristotle makes many 
judgments that Kant calls „illegitimate,‟ it does not appear that either of Kant‟s justifications for 
his doctrine of legitimate judgments is relevant for Aristotle.  
H. Does the Antinomial Attack Present a Problem for Aristotle? 
Aristotle‟s argument for teleology in nature is paradigmatic of what Kant has been 
complaining about. The argument begins with a question Aristotle poses to himself: “…why 
should nature not work, not for the sake of something…but of necessity?” (Ph 198b15).
115
 
Aristotle is considering the two ways that a cause and its effect may be related: either the effect 
is the goal of the cause (and causal process), or it is not.
116
 An initial observation is that in some 
cases, such as rain causing plant growth, it is clear that the effect (growth) is not the goal of the 
cause (rain): “[w]hat is drawn up must cool, and what has been cooled must become water and 
descend, the result of this being that corn grows” (Ph 198b19-20). If anyone would disagree that 
this is a mechanistic process, then he would also be obligated to believe that, for example, when 
that same rain storm spoiled crops on the threshing floor, the rain fell for the sake of ruining the 
crops (Ph 198b20-22).  
Because a mechanistic analysis is quite sensible in this case, the physicist may be 
tempted to make it in the case of not just some but all natural events. She would then hold this 
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respectively, I take it that Aristotle‟s distinction is identical to the one Kant considers. 
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proposition: “[a]ll generation of material things is possible in accordance with merely 
mechanical laws” (CJ 5:387). Aristotle, of course, plans to argue the contradictory position that 
“[s]ome generation of such things is not possible in accordance with merely mechanical laws” 
(CJ 5:387). Aristotle reasons that if the effect is not the goal of the causal process, then the effect 
always arises through chance and spontaneity. This, however, is not faithful to our observation of 
the way that nature actually works: “natural things either invariably or for the most part come 
about in a given way; but of not one of the results of chance and spontaneity is this true” (Ph 
198b35-199a1). The way we know that an effect is the coincidental result of a causal process is 
that the effect doesn‟t happen often. Natural things, however, are generated with regularity. 
Aristotle concludes: 
[i]f then, it is agreed that things are either the result of coincidence or for the sake of 
something, and these things cannot be the result of coincidence or spontaneity, it follows 
that they must be for the sake of something…Therefore action for an end is present in 
things which come to be and are by nature” (Ph 199a3-5). 
 
Aristotle said it perfectly: his argument works if it is agreed that teleology and 
mechanism are the only possibilities for how nature in itself works; or, as Kant says, if they are 
“constitutive principles of the possibility of things themselves…” (CJ 5:387). That, of course, is 
the „if‟ that Kant exploits. What Aristotle has done is to show that mechanism, as a constitutive 
principle, is unable to account for the generation of all nature‟s effects. We may note that Kant 
agrees with this conclusion: “with respect to our cognitive faculty, it is just as indubitably certain 
that the mere mechanism of nature is also incapable of providing an explanatory ground for the 
generation of organized beings” (CJ 5:389). Kant‟s complaint is about what Aristotle has not 
done, which is to defend his own position directly by offering any kind of explanation of how 
teleology might work. As Kant has pointed out, metaphysical arguments must work to avoid this 
danger because we are not doing math, but metaphysics; in mathematics, “it is impossible to 
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substitute that which is subjective in our representations for that which is objective…” 
(A791/B819). In metaphysics, however, subreption is possible. Therefore, in order for Aristotle 
to deliver a decisive proof that he has not confused the subjective principles with objective ones, 
he must argue for teleology in nature directly and not by resorting to an apagogical argument.  
Kant is now in position to ask whether the principle of teleology is constitutive of things 
themselves, or whether it is a nomothetic law, created by the reflective power of judgment for the 
sake of making judging possible. If it were not possible to construct an equally convincing 
argument for mechanism, we would not be able to answer Kant‟s question. But, of course, the 
mechanist can produce equally convincing reasons to discard teleology. Thus, we can bring in 
Kant‟s words from the first Critique concerning the conditions for holding the distinction 
between appearances and things in themselves: since “we now find…[that] an unavoidable 
conflict of reason with itself arises with a single standpoint,…the experiment decides for the 
correctness of that distinction” (bxviii-bxix fn). Thus, these principles are best conceived as 
regulative, at once necessary and nomothetic, created by the reflective power of judgment for use 
by the determining power of judgment. 
I. Is the Antinomial Attack Successful as a Defense of Transcendental Idealism? 
 In this way, the antinomial attack undermines this argument and Aristotle‟s other 
metaphysical arguments insofar as they are apagogical. But perhaps this is unfair; perhaps if 
Aristotle had been aware of the danger of taking what is subjectively necessary for what is 
objectively valid, he would have constructed his arguments in such a way as to avoid these 
dangers. Another way of stating this concern is to wonder whether Kant‟s attack, even though it 
presents a problem for the historical Aristotle, also presents a problem for the entire tradition of 
transcendental realism. Perhaps the most obvious way for the transcendental realist to proceed is 
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by noticing a necessary premise in Kant‟s argument: in regard to teleology and mechanism, he 
says that “…reason can prove neither the one nor the other of these fundamental principles…” 
(5:387). But perhaps this is just false, and reason could produce a proof; the fact that it has not 
yet been done does not by itself mean that it will never be done. 
In order to evaluate the general success of the antinomial attack, we may begin by posing 
this question: „What would count as an argument that would undermine Kant‟s attack?‟ When 
Kant states that reason cannot prove either of these principles, he obviously does not mean that 
reason cannot support these principles in any way, for reason often provides apagogical proofs of 
one or the other of these principles. Successfully using reason in this way, however, does not 
offer evidence that transcendental realism is true, since an apagogical proof could never rule out 
the possibility that these principles are not merely necessary for judgment. Kant means, then, that 
reason cannot support either premise with an ostensive proof. So could there be an ostensive 
argument for, say, teleology or mechanism? I think the answer is „yes;‟ I am aware of no logical 
principle that rules out the possibility that some über-philosopher may come along and make this 
sort of argument.  
Kant‟s argument, therefore, depends on a premise that is falsifiable. While it is possible 
to see this as a weakness, it is better seen as a strength. Kant has developed a theory that the 
principles of mechanism and teleology are given to the determinate power of judgment by the 
reflective power of judgment, which he has argued is better than the theory that nature in itself 
gives these principles to the determinative power of judgment. Kant‟s theory would be falsified 
if someone produced an ostensive proof for mechanism or teleology, but no one has yet done so. 
This means that his theory is falsifiable without being falsified. This theory, therefore, is strong 
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in the same way that the theory of gravity is strong; the theory of gravity is also falsifiable, but 
that fact that nothing has actually happened to falsify it part of what makes it a good theory. 
J. A Return to the Intellectus Archetypus  
It is in the context of distinguishing the two powers of human judgment that Kant returns 
to the concept of the intellectus archetypus. The investigation into the powers of judgment has 
identified “a special character of our (human) understanding with regard to the power of 
judgment in its reflection upon things in nature” (CJ 5:406). But if this is the distinguishing mark 
of the kind of understanding with which we find ourselves, it must be distinguished from some 
other kind of understanding. In other words, since human understanding is a species of 
understanding, we have a right to wonder what other species of understanding are possible. Kant 
notes that this project is analogous to the one in the first Critique, where “we had to have in mind 
another intuition if we were to hold our own to be a special kind…” (CJ 5:405). 
Our species of understanding is distinguished in part because of the way we are 
constrained to view the relationship between the particular and the universal:  
[t]his contingency [in the constitution of our understanding] is quite naturally found in 
the particular, which the power of judgment is to subsume under the universal of the 
concepts of the understanding; for through the universal of our (human) understanding 
the particular is not determined… (CJ 5:406) 
 
This is so because “it is contingent in how many different ways distinct things that nevertheless 
coincide in a common characteristic can be presented to our perception” (CJ 5:406). This 
contingency is due to the fact that our intuition is receptive, and thus our concepts depend on an 
act of receptivity in order to have objects.  
There are two ways that the intellectus ectypus (human understanding) may proceed in 
judging nature; one way is from the parts of nature to the whole of nature. In this case, “a real 
whole of nature is to be regarded only as the effect of the concurrent moving forces of the parts” 
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(CJ 5:407). If we proceed in the opposite manner, from whole to parts, we are confined to “go 
from the analytical universal (of concepts) to the particular (of the given empirical intuition), in 
which it determines nothing of the latter, but must expect this determination for the power of 
judgment…” (CJ 5:407, my italics). B atrice Longuenesse notes that these two ways represent 
the principle of mechanism and teleology, known by now as subjectively necessary principles of 
reflective judgment: 
[t]he rule of mechanism is imposed upon our reflective power of judgment by the 
understanding in its distributive use, which proceeds from parts to whole. The rule of 
teleology is imposed upon our power of judgment by consideration of particular objects, 
which have to be understood from whole to parts. Both depend upon the discursive nature 
of our understanding (Longuenesse 174).117 
 
This is how the understanding of an intellectus ectypus is constrained to operate. 
However, since this is only one kind of understanding, we have a right to imagine 
a complete spontaneity of intuition [which] would be a cognitive faculty distinct and 
completely independent from sensibility, and thus an understanding in the most general 
sense of the term[;] one can thus also conceive of an intuitive understanding (negatively, 
namely merely as not discursive), which does not go from the universal to the particular 
and thus to the individual (through concepts) (CJ 5:407). 
 
This is the intellectus archetypus, a being whose intuition is not receptive and understanding is 
not discursive. For such an understanding, concepts would be useless: 
since it is not discursive like ours but is intuitive, [it] goes from the synthetically 
universal (of the intuition of a whole as such) to the particular, i.e., from whole to the 
parts, in which, therefore, and in whose representation of the whole, there is no 
contingency in the combination of the parts (CJ 5:407). 
 
As Longuenesse notes, both ways of proceeding (whole to parts, parts to whole) “depend upon 
the discursive nature of our understanding. Both would be useless for an intuitive understanding, 
which would reveal their common ground” (Longuenesse 174, my italics). 
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It is obvious that Kant believes that judgments of mechanism and teleology are legitimate 
ones, provided that they are categorized as reflective (and hence subjective) and not 
determinative (and hence objective). While this is certainly true, Longuenesse is pointing to a 
more profound subjectivity: 
…the very fact that determinative and reflective uses have to be distinguished in this way 
is a characteristic of our own finite, discursive understanding. In this sense,…both 
determinative and reflective uses of our power of judgment are “subjective” 
(Longuenesse 173). 
 
Thus, mechanism and teleology are both different reflective principles specifically because they 
are both necessary „from the point of view of man‟ (this is the title of her chapter). The truth is 
that the human condition forces us to consider objects both from whole to parts and from parts to 
whole.  
Specifically, Longuenesse notes that the culprit is receptivity:  
[i]f we suppose an intellect for which concept and intuition are not distinct, an intellect 
which unlike ours does not depend on receptivity for the reference of its concepts to 
objects, then neither determinative judgment (which has to find the particular objects for 
a given general concept) nor reflective (which has to find universal concepts for given 
particular objects) have any use at all (Longuenesse 173). 
 
Longuenesse emphasizes Kant‟s point that this antinomy is generated specifically because of the 
conditions of our cognition. In this way, the antinomies are an important clue for understanding 
the nature of human non-omniscience. They simultaneously require us to recognize our human 
limits and that there is another possible cognition that is of a different kind: “[t]he supposition of 
an intuitive understanding which escapes the distinctions of our own understanding…is itself a 
supposition proper to an understanding such as ours” (Longuenesse 174). The intellectus 
archetypus, then, which I have argued is an omniscient intellect, cognizes not just more things 
than humans do, but cognizes them in a different way - intuitively. It is possible for us to 
recognize that such an intellect is theoretically possible, but it is not possible for us to cognize 
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things in the same manner, for we can only understand the world through judgment, whether 
determinative or reflective. An omniscient intellect, on the other hand, has no use for the power 
of judgment.  
K. Conclusion: Two Theories of Non-Omniscience 
Aristotle recognizes sensible intuition, passive intellectual intuition, discursive reasoning, 
and active intellectual intuition (i.e. contemplation), while for Kant, humans only have sensible 
intuition and discursive reasoning. As I showed in Chapter 2, it is not particularly mysterious that 
Aristotle believes in the human capacity for active intellectual intuition since he first posits 
passive intellectual intuition; intellectual intuition becomes active when we intuit the forms 
which constitute the mind after our passive intuition of them. I showed in Chapter 3 and 
emphasized in Chapter 5 that this is important to my investigation because active intellectual 
intuiting is also divine mental activity; hence, the more one contemplates, the closer one is to 
having a thought life identical to God‟s. If Aristotle had been right about this, non-omniscience 
would be degree non-omniscience, since human contemplation could be measured by degrees of 
separation from omniscient contemplation.  
Given that Aristotle‟s doctrine of contemplation is rooted in passive intellectual intuition, 
it was necessary to understand why Aristotle first posits that capacity. In Chapter 6.E, I showed 
that it was because Aristotle, like Kant, recognized that sensible intuition by itself could never 
turn into meaningful experience. Hence, Aristotle posited intellectual intuition in order to 
account for experience. Since intellectual representations of objects do not come by way of 
intellectual intuition for Kant, he explained the presence of intellectual representations in another 
way: “…they must have their origin in the nature of the soul” (CK 133).
118
 As I pointed out in 
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5.E, this means that in order to have intellectual representations of objects, we must first subject 
them to the epistemic conditions of space and time – the pure forms of human intuition – in order 
for them to be concepts; concepts are famously empty without intuited objects. But the fact that 
we have epistemic conditions is both a blessing and a curse; it is a blessing because it guarantees 
that knowledge is possible, and it is a curse because it also guarantees that whatever we 
experience does not exist in the spatio-temporal way in which we experience it. 
Human cognition is thus bifurcated into intuition and understanding, such that intuition is 
never intellectual, and the understanding is never intuitive. This is the cognition of the intellectus 
ectypus, and it is essentially different from that of the intellectus archetypus; intellectual intuition 
and intuitive understanding are two ways of describing a single mode of cognition. If Kant is 
right about this, then non-omniscience is kind non-omniscience, since an intellectus ectypus and 
the intellectus archetypus are different kinds of cognition, and an intellecus ectypus must subject 
objects to epistemic conditions in order for them to be our objects. Conversely, if it is false, then 
non-omniscience is degree non-omniscience. Hence, everything depends on whether we can 
believe that there are such things as epistemic limits to human intuition – in Kant‟s case, space 
and time – since these limits show that all human intuition is necessarily derived and sensible. I 
have argued in this present chapter that Kant‟s antinomial attack supports such an inference. 
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